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Treaty, and that "they shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of "which might be to interfere with the liberty and entire security of the navigation."

The comprehensive provisions of this Article would afford any Signatory Power which desired to cause us embarrassment a convenient pretext for protesting against any military measures we might take on the Canal for the defence of Egypt, whether by the construction of works or the concentration of troops.

Turkey, on the other hand, does not appear to share this disability. The Convention of 1888, of which Turkey is also a signatory, did not contemplate the possibility of the menace of the Canal by a Turkish force attempting to invade Egypt. The result is that the provisions of the Convention accord to Turkey as suzerain of Egypt certain privileges of military action on the Canal which are denied to Great Britain and the other Signatory Powers. Under Article 10, for example, it is laid down that other provisions of the Convention shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan might take for securing by his own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order; and Article 12 reserves the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power.

17. In the event of a Turkish force succeeding in reaching the Canal, Turkey might explicitly repudiate any intention of violating the neutrality of the Canal, and might claim the right of moving troops across it under Articles 10 and 12 of the Convention of 1888, on the pretext of punishing her rebellious vassal Egypt, who has no international status apart from Turkey.

If this contention were accepted, the Powers, whose obligations are limited to measures for the preservation of the free navigation of the Canal, would have no cause to interfere with Turkey's action, while we could not under the Convention claim similar immunity for our troops.

18. In these circumstances it is submitted that it is desirable on diplomatic grounds, in order that the Signatory Powers of the Convention may not be furnished with a pretext for taking exception to our measures for the defence of the eastern frontier of Egypt that military as well as naval action on the Canal should be avoided except in case of extreme emergency.

IV.-Military Aspects of the Defence of the Suez Canal Line.

19. The Suez Canal is 86 miles long. The military defence of the line of the Suez Canal involves holding a front of 65 miles. The remaining 21 miles of the Canal run through the deep water of the lakes, which, if patrolled by launches, would require no special defence arrangements.

20. The Canal has a width for the most part of over 100 yards, but certain lengths of it are little over 60 yards wide. The banks on either side vary in height from 10 to 80 feet above the level of the water. The configuration of the banks is such that the Canal is not well adapted for defence. The eastern bank is, as a rule, somewhat higher than the western bank, and, even when this is not the case, the occupation of the eastern bank by the defending infantry is invariably necessary in order to gain a good field of fire and to avoid leaving a considerable area of dead ground in which an enemy might concentrate under cover. defenders necessitates the disposition of the firing-line and supports on one side of the The occupation of the eastern bank by the Canal, whilst the reserves, in order that the transport facilities afforded by the railway may be utilised, will generally be on the other side.

Another result of the occupation of the eastern bank is that the Canal does not become an obstacle to the enemy till he has driven the defenders from their first positions, and even then it is rather a physical obstacle than a military one, for the Canal cannot easily be swept by the fire of men occupying the banks, and fire can only be brought to bear upon troops crossing the Canal by means of artillery posted at some distance on the flanks.

On the other hand, the great advantage of the Canal as a defensive line is that, provided that adequate water transport is available, reinforcements can be sent rapidly and under cover to any threatened point. The railway, which runs parallel to the Canal on the western bank, can also be used for the same purpose.

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