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It is therefore necessary to consider whether any increase of the primary armament is required to deal with the more formidable class of naval attack now assumed to be possible in a war with Japan, see paragraph 20 (a) of this Memorandum.

23. In view of the changes which have taken place in the naval situation of recent years, the Admiralty are now of opinion that a hostile Japanese fleet might, in certain eventualities, attempt to close with and run past the batteries with a view to forcing an entrance into the inner waters of the harbour. They consider that ships approaching the Eastern Entrance by keeping close to the western shore of the channel might reach the waters lying immediately to the south-east of Cape Collinson without exposing themselves to the fire of the batteries guarding the Eastern Entrance of the harbour. Having reached that point, half of the ships could then stand into Chung-Kwango Bay pouring their united fire into the batteries, while the remaining ships steamed through Lyemun Pass firing into the batteries at close

range.

In an attack on the defences of the Western Entrance to the harbour they are of opinion that a Japanese fleet would approach with Lamma Island aligned with Mount Davis, so as to defilade the ships from the guns mounted there. The ships would thus not come under the fire of the batteries on Mount Davis until they had passed Wo-lo-tsui Point at a range of about 7,000 yards. Having reached that point, the ships would then steer so as to pass the batteries at a range of 3,000 to 4,000 yards, and, when abreast of Mount Davis, they would steer so as to pass through Sulphur Channel.

The Admiralty are of opinion that, with the fixed defences as now approved with few guns covering the inner waters of the harbour, a Japanese fleet of armoured ships would have no difficulty in running past the forts in daylight. Having effected an entry into the harbour the ships would attempt to land men under cover of the guns of the fleet with a view to taking the place by a coup-de-main.

24. In these circumstances the Colonial Defence Committee recommend that, in order to deter armoured ships from attempting to force an entrance into the inner waters of the harbour, the primary armament covering the inner waters should be strengthened. In order that full value may be obtained from any new guns mounted it is desirable that the batteries should be so sited that the guns may be able, not only to sweep the inner waters of the harbour, but also to reinforce the batteries covering the channels of approach to the entrances of the harbour.

25. They suggest that batteries sited on Mount Parker and Victoria Peak would fulfil these conditions. A howitzer or high-angle-fire gun would be the most suitable weapon for batteries on these high sites, for with the aid of a position finder the southern shore of the island could be swept, and the approach of transports with a view to landing troops there prevented.

The Committee understand that the Army Council are now conducting experiments with a 92 înch howitzer which does not require permanent works of an expensive character. The Colonial Defence Committee recommend that this pattern of howitzer should be adopted for the proposed batteries.

26. The Committee are of opinion that the primary armament so strengthened, supplemented by submarine mines and an adequate local naval defence flotilla, as proposed in sections XI and XII of this Memorandum, will serve effectually to deter armoured ships from attempting to rush the channels of approach with a view to forcing an entry into the inner waters of the harbour. A table showing the fixed armament and defence electric lights of Hong Kong, existing and proposed, is printed as Appendix VI to this Memorandum.

27. As regards the suggestion that a battery should be constructed on Point d'Aguilar to oppose the landing of a military force on the south coast of the island, it is pointed out that the fire of such a battery would not cover the waters of Deep Bay or Aberdeen Channel, which transports would be able to reach unobserved under cover of darkness. A battery on this site would therefore be less effective to sweep the southern shore than the proposed howitzer batteries on Victoria Peak and Mount Parker, which, moreover, will have the advantage that they can in addition cover the

inner waters of the harbour.

Apart from these considerations a serious tactical drawback to a battery at Cape

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