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Sheikh of Koweit's territory. The entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab is only guarded by small fort at Fao, the capture of which would offer little difficulty; but it would seem desirable to avoid entering territory indisputably Turkish, or attacking Turkish forces, unless these had invaded the Sheikh's territory.

It is, of course, possible that the Turks might anticipate us by occupying Koweit, over which they are understood to claim suzerainty, but such action, besides being dangerous in the face of the opposition of the Arabs, especially the Muntifik and other tribes west of the Euphrates, who are always in a state of partial revolt against Turkish rule, would be of so unfriendly a nature that it may be doubted whether the Turks would take it.

Our occupation of Koweit might lead to the reinforcement of the Turkish garrison in and around Bussorah, but it may be that no deliberate attempt to turn us out of Koweit would be made. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that even a comparatively small British force would be unable to hold its own in circumstances peculiarly favourable to defence, especially if supported by the Navy from the sea, and by the Arabs inland.

The force to be dispatched from India should be as small as is consistent with safety, the climatic conditions in the Persian Gulf during the summer months being unfavourable. It might perhaps suffice to send two battalions of native infantry and a native mountain battery, together with personnel for a small camel corps, the camels being purchased on the spot. The opinion of the Indian military authorities should, however, be obtained as to the strength and composition of the force. It would also seem prudent that an adequate reinforcement should be held in readiness in India, and that arrangements should be made for its early dispatch should au emergency occur.

It must be understood that the occupation of Koweit is only suggested as a means of temporarily putting pressure on Turkey without the use of actual force. The occupation is not suggested as the first step in an offensive campaign, nor should it be regarded as a preliminary to further operations in the direction of Bussorah or Bagdad. Such operations would not meet the contingency of a war with Turkey, and it is not proposed that in the event of war the British line of advance should ascend the valley of the Euphrates.

As regards the possible effect of our occupation of Koweit in other directions, the Turkish countermove might take the form of a concentration of Turkish troops upon the eastern frontier of Egypt. Although the Turkish army is not just now in a position to undertake offensive operations upon a large scale, owing partly to the reorganisation which has only recently been begun, and partly to the troubles in Albania, with the Druses and in the Yemen, it is possible that a concentration on a moderate scale might be effected. This measure and a consequent stirring up of unrest in Egypt

It seems important, improbable, if we put pressure on Turkey at Koweit or elsewhere. therefore, that if it be decided to occupy Koweit we should be ready to reinforce the British garrison in Egypt, which at present is only sufficient for the preservation of internal order.

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It may be added that on its present footing, and pending the completion of the scheme of reorganisation now in progress, the Turkish Army is calculated to provide 29 army corps of 1st line troops (18 cavalry brigades, and 58 divisions, of an aggregate strength of 25,000 cavalry, 580,000 infantry, and 1,600 guns).

When the reorganisation is completed, the number of army corps will be increased to 38, with 20 reserve divisions in addition, giving a total of 14 cavalry brigades, and 92 divisions, of an aggregate strength of 25,000 cavalry, 920,000 infantry, and 2,200 guns.

It is anticipated that the reorganisation will be completed in 1915; it will involve heavy expenditure on personnel and matériel, and it is possible that the requisite funds may not be forthcoming.

The rank and file of the Turkish Army are of excellent quality, and the training of the troops, especially in Europe, has greatly improved under their German instructional staff. Hitherto the weak spot in the army has been the officers, but here also a marked improvement has taken place both in the junior and in the senior ranks.

Imperial General Staff, War Office,

May 1, 1911,

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY J. W. Harrison,-19/7/1911,

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