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SECRET.

LOCAL ACTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE Foreign Office Memorandum, dated the 6th March, 1911 (C.L.D). Paper 103-D), concerning Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf, which has been submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence, concludes with the expression of an opinion that it is desirable now to consider “what form local action in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty's Government had best take; what measures would be required of the Indian and Imperial naval and military forces; and what effect such action would be likely to have on Great Britain's position in Egypt and India and on her prestige in other Mahommedan

countries."

In the absence of more definite and direct instructions, and with the object of answering such of these questions as concern the War Office, the following paper has been prepared by the General Staff.

Although the suggestion of the Foreign Office does not go beyond purely local action in the Persian Gulf, it must be borne in mind that the outcome of local military action is not necessarily limited to the locality, but that such action may involve not only reprisals on the spot, but retaliatory action elsewhere.

It is conceivable, though perhaps unlikely, that this would be the case in the present instance, and that British military action, though intended to be confined to the region of the Persian Gulf, might produce far-reaching effects in other directions. In any case, it seems desirable that military action with the object of bringing pressure to bear upon another Power should not be initiated without considering the possibility of its leading to strained relations and war with that Power.

The situation appears to be as follows: The Sheikh of Koweit, whose territory at the head of the Gulf offers perhaps the best and most natural terminus for the Bagdad Railway, is not only friendly to us, but is bound to Great Britain by Treaty engagements which place him in some measure under our protection. The temporary occupation of his territory by a British force might therefore seem the obvious step for us to take at this juncture, and one perhaps as well calculated as any other to enforce our views upon the Ottoman Government.

On the other hand, while our occupation of Koweit would assert our influence over the Sheikh and his possessions, and to that extent would uphold British interests and prestige in the Gulf, it would not cause Turkey any material inconvenience or loss; and if she acquiesced in our remaining there, possibly under protest, it is not clear what permanent advantage we should have gained on the withdrawal of our troops.

Forcibly to enter Turkish territory against the wish of its Mahommedan inhabitants would not only be an act of war against Turkey, but might arouse religious feeling among the more fanatic of the Mahommedan races. But to occupy territory which we claim as being under our protection with the good-will of its population is another matter, and might be agreeable rather than distasteful to the Maliommedans who think themselves oppressed under Turkish rule. The sympathies of the Arab tribes west of Koweit, which we should not be unlikely to secure, would further tend to strengthen our position.

There appear to be no great military difficulties connected with this occupation. which would, it is assumed, be carried out by troops from India. The Turkish garrisons in these regions are small, amounting at present, perhaps, to no more than 800 men at Bussorah and Umkasr, with possibly a post on Warba Island. Further to the south, garrisoning the province of El Hasa upon the western shore of the Gulf, there may be about 1.000 Turkish troops who would have a difficult desert march of from four to five days through a region by no means friendly to them, were they to move northwards.

It is submitted that the British occupation, if decided on, should be confined to the

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