CAB129-78 — Page 140

491age 48 pong

1410

141

4

but in what conditions self-determination would be applicable of The Prime Minister said that We had offered the Cypriots wide measure of self- government now.

M. Kardelj said that they started by sympathising with the Greek people and their request for self-determination, but they took concrete relationships into consideration and had been trying to persuade the Greeks to calm the situation down. The riots in Turkey had, however, aggravated the position. The Yugoslav Government fully understood the true position of the British Government between Greece and Turkey, but they felt that perhaps the Three-Power Conference in London had had an unfortunate influence on this question. The best way in future might be to proceed in a way which would not provoke passions. The Yugoslav Government were trying now to find through the Balkan Alliance some way in which the three Ministers might meet. There was a disposition on the Greek side gradually to liquidate the situation.

The Prime Minister thought that the present Greek Government were more anxious to reach a settlement than their predecessors, but also they were much weaker and more frightened particularly with elections so near. Her Majesty's Government were not contemplating another Three-Power Conference at present. Discussion would now be underground.

Mr. Kardelj expressed pleasure at this and added that, although th、 reeks would be ready to help, the Turks ought to also, but lately they had issued new anti-Greek memoranda which had poured oil on the flames.

The Prime Minister said he had always been sure that the Turks would get angry eventually about Cyprus. This was why he had not talked to the Greeks before. Cyprus was the last Turkish off-shore island. It was necessary find some way of keeping things quiet at least for the next few years. Wh. Her Majesty's Government wanted was to be able to use Cyprus for aircrat and headquarters. This did not mean that we were prepared to give up sove eignty now; we could discuss self-government and start it and discuss self-determination. later. Mr. Kardelj said that this seemed to suggest a possible solution.

-

On the Middle East the Prime Minister said that Mr. Kardelj would have. observed that Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, was not pleased with what he had said at the Guildhall. The Prime Minister did not mind, because someone had to say what he had said and President Eisenhower had put out a useful statement last night saying much the same thing. Both sides must understand that they had to make some territorial concessions, not necessarily enormous. Once that position had been reached, settlement would become a Trieste operation, but until then the situation became more dangerous with both sides getting more arms. As far as Israel and Jordan were concerned, probably quite minor adjustments were needed to enable the frontiers to work. The difficult part was the Israeli-Egyptian frontier and there what the Arabs wanted most was à link between Jordan and Egypt. Dr. Velebit interjected that the Israelis wanted a port and a solution was very difficult without creating a new corridor as unsatisfactory as previous ones. The Prime Minister said that perhaps two triangles might be agreed. He believed that Israel must have its port and could keep the part of its territory in which oil had been found which was what mattered. The Prime Minister added that in his view Israel would win all the battles but the Arábs would win the war in the end, or at least smother Israel.

Mr. Kardelj said that Yugoslavia was not directly concerned in this area, but only indirectly. He agreed that President Tito was going to Cairo in December, and the Prime Minister said that he had had quite a good reaction from Colonel Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister, to his proposals. President Tito might have considerable influence in encouraging him towards agreement. Mr. Kardelj said that certainly Yugoslavia was interested in the possibility of finding a solution and agreed to the action of the Prime Minister and of President Eisenhower. As far as President Tito could exercise a positive influence he would do his best. The Prime Minister said that Colonel Nasser should be fairly good. A difficulty was that each Arab State might accuse the other of being pro-Israeli and Her Majesty's Government had done what they could to prevent this. The details of the settlement would be very difficult but might be worked out if once agreement in principle was reached. Mr. Kardelj agreed and said that the Yugoslav view of