CAB129-78 — Page 139

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. KARDELJ ON WEDNESDAY, 16th NOVEMBER,

AT 10 DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1

Present:

Sir Anthony Eden.

Mr. Kardelj.

Dr. Velebit (Yugoslav Ambassador).

Mr. Prica.

Mr. Sokorac (Interpreter).

Sir Harold Caccia.

Sir Frank Roberts. Mr. de Zulueta.

After an exchange of compliments the Prime Minister began by saying that he was not surprised by the slow progress at Geneva as he had thought that the Russians would want to halt and look around. What to do now was a problem; he had been communicating with Mr. Macmillan on this point. The Prime Minister's own view was that as the Russians were coming here in April 1956, it would be better not to have another Four-Power meeting until after that.

Mr. Kardelj agreed that the Yugoslavs had not expected much from Geneva and therefore were not disappointed. He thought that probably the talks in London would enable a little progress to be made.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that conditions in the Soviet Union were a little relaxed.

Mr. Kardelj said that the Russians had made certain moves in this respect. Although these were not big, it was significant that the trend existed. This meant gradual weakening of certain Stalinist positions. The group round M. Kruschev was, however, encountering a certain resistance. Therefore he thought that the Russians were interested to go forward in achieving a certain stabilisation but dared not do anything to strengthen the internal resistance to their policies of which Mr. Kardelj had spoken. Consequently they dared not lose too much as far as their positions were concerned and this explained some vacillations in Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless there was a trend towards stabilisation and agreement with the West; of course, on the basis of the status quo. To-day there was no question of their going back from the status quo and therefore the German question was central for the Russians. The Yugoslav Government were convinced that the Russians would not leave Eastern Germany and therefore it seemed to them that an East-West agreement must somehow be found within the framework of the present balance of forces in Germany.

The Prime Minister said that the German question was very difficult; it was hard to get a peaceful Europe with a divided Germany at the heart of the Continent. Nevertheless he agreed with Mr. Kardelj's analysis, but the remedy was difficult. That was why Her Majesty's Government had put forward a security arrangement worked out to give all possible guarantees against aggression. It was remarkable that the United States had entered into such a guarantee and he did not understand why the Soviet Union did not value this. He supposed it was because the Russians did not believe that the Americans would honour their pledge. If such a guarantee had existed in 1939 the last war would not have broken out. It was hard to see how to move if the Russians would not change their position on Eastern Germany. Of course, if the Russians did not move, Western Germany would become increasingly restive; perhaps the Russians thought that things would be easier for them in Western Germany after Dr. Adenauer was out of the way, but in the Prime Minister's view such a conclusion would be wrong. Dr. Adenauer was a stabilising influence.

Mr. Kardelj said that if things remained as they were it would leave the present line. of division. Perhaps in these circumstances certain contacts with Eastern Germany agaid Rapithelections and so forth in thagaut9of the bther

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hand this might not happen and things might stabilise they M4U. OMB Kardelj thought that the Russians counted on American participation in European security. If the Russians really wanted peace now, as the Yugoslav Government thought, they must be interested to find a certain equilibrium in Europe. Security in Europe would lead to security in the world as a whole and therefore the Russians must count on United States participation in European security.

The Prime Minister recailed that at Geneva he had tried to persuade Bulganin and Kruschev that it was better to have Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation than out of it. Bulganin had said this might be all right for you but we look many years ahead. In the Prime Minister's view this was unduly pessimistic, because Germany was not now so well placed to make trouble in the world. For example she had nowhere in which to explode an experimental bomb. When Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, was in Moscow recently, he put the same argument to Kruschev. Kruschev said that the Russians were not frightened of Germany but were frightened of the United States. Mr. Pearson had asked whether it was not better to have the United States in N.A.T.O. than out of it. What did Mr. Kardelj think?

Mr. Kardelj said that he thought the Russians were frightened both of the United States and of Germany and in particular of collaboration between the United States and Germany, because such collaboration could possibly change the balance of force in the world to the detriment of the Russians. From one point of view there was some danger in the German position even if they rearmed inside N.A.T.O. The Yugoslav Government feared that if the present sharp division between blocs remained for a long time the mere logic of the inter bloc clash would drive N.A.T.O. to require more and more arms for Germany. This could change the relationships and balance of forces in N.A.T.O. and give Germany a new role. Yugoslavia had twice been attacked by Germany and therefore they remained to some extent afraid of such a possible development which even N.A.T.O. could not prevent if things developed as the Yugoslavs feared. Therefore the Yugoslav Government were in favour of some European security arrangement if at all possible.

The Prime Minister said that he shared Mr. Kardelj's fears about Germany and had had them before the war, but he thought that perhaps Germany had learnt a little. It took a long time and cost a great deal to build up modern arms and now the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, controlled all the taps which turned off the petrol. Without his agreement it was almost impossible for any one to start anything. He agreed that the Germans might become stronger, especially as France was growing steadily weaker. The Prime Minister regretted this, but did not see what could be done; France was richer than England but politically weaker. (Mr. Kardelj agreed with this view.) The Prime Minister said that Her Majesty's Government attached great value to their friendship with Yugoslavia and therefore hoped the Yugoslav Government would not hesitate to communicate any thoughts that they had before the Russians visited London. Her Majesty's Government had no desire for Europe except to get peace and security. Mr. Kardelj agreed that this was the sole aim of Yugoslavia and that they started from that standpoint. They therefore considered some gradual formula for solving the German question should be found.

Turning to Trieste the Prime Minister congratulated Mr. Kardelj on the progress made. Mr. Kardelj agreed that things had developed well even though in some matters there were still difficulties. The great thing was that to-day Italy and Yugoslavia did not clash, even though they were not yet close friends.

The Prime Minister said that he was afraid that Her Majesty's Government had caused the Yugoslavs certain difficulties in the Balkan Alliance because of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government had been trying to work out some solution to this question, but, quite apart from the British position there was a strong reaction from the Turks if we went to far towards the Greeks. Her Majesty's Government's concern in Cyprus was strategic. We had no intention of getting out of Cyprus while the world was in its present state, but did not say that there could never be self-determination for Cyprus. On this basis Her Majesty's Government had prepared a formula which the Governor would give the Archbishop when he returned to Cyprus, which he seemed slow to do. (Sir Harold Caccia at issue was not the principle of self-determination