MENT33K
SECRET
C.P. (51) 128
8th May, 1951
Printed for the Cabinet. May 1951
CABINET
Copy No.
31
THE EUROPEAN ARMY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I circulate herewith for the information of my colleagues the following note on the progress of the Paris Conference on the European Army since its opening in February, and on United Kingdom policy towards the French proposals.
2. Preliminary Foreign Office views on the French memorandum outlining the plan for a European Army were formulated in February. These were, briefly-
(a) that the French proposals made no attempt to reconcile the immediate military necessities of North Atlantic Treaty defence and the long-term political requirements of European federation; nor did they offer, except at a much later stage, the equality for Germany which had been claimed to be one of the main features of the Pleven Plan; (b) that His Majesty's Government would not wish to join a European Army on the lines proposed, but that if Western Germany and the Continental countries of N.A.T.O. could agree on a workable plan which would not impede or delay N.A.T.O. defence, we should be content to let them proceed without interference on our part;
(c) that in fact the Plan was so impractical as to be unlikely to succeed, except
for urgent political reasons.
The conclusion was that there was no need to vary the instructions already given to Sir O. Harvey, as His Majesty's Government's representative at the Con- ference; namely, that he should attend merely as an observer and should intervene only if the Plan showed signs of threatening our interests as an Occupying Power in Germany or as a member of N.A.T.O.
3. The substance of these views was put to the Chiefs of Staff with a request for their opinion. They have now replied, without comment, that they agree with our conclusions.
ATTITUDE OF OTHER COUNTRIES
4. Before finally adopting these conclusions as the basis of our policy towards the European Army we should review, in the light of the progress of the Paris Conference in its first seven or eight weeks, what chances of success the Plan now seems to have and, in this connexion, the attitude of the other Powers mainly concerned.
(a) France
It is difficult to distinguish any firm French governmental policy towards the European Army. To some it may be a means of delaying German rearmament in any form, either indefinitely or at any rate until after the French elections; to others it has a political appeal as a further move towards European federation. But the French delegation to the Conference has stated in terms that the aim of the Plan is primarily political and it now seems clear that it is intended as a second stage (the Schuman Plan being the first) in the progressive association of Germany with the West iPagh 44ayfas & secure the advantages of her co-operationgwithout the 87
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