CAB129-37 — Page 87

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IS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Page 8&point for the Cabinet. October 1949 Page 88 of 1097

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SECRET

C.P. (49) 209

19th October, 1949

CABINET

F.;་

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Copy No.

THE MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this paper I set out, for the information of my colleagues, some general reflections on foreign policy in the Middle East, which for the present purpose is regarded as including Greece, Turkey, the Arab countries, Persia, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Egypt and Cyrenaica.

Economic Importance

1. The Middle East, and particularly the oil-producing countries and Egypt (cotton), is an area of cardinal importance to the economic recovery of the United Kingdom and Western Europe. It is hoped that by 1951 82 per cent. of our oil supplies will be drawn from the Middle East (as compared with 23 per cent. in 1938), and this will present the largest single factor in balancing our overseas payments. If we failed to maintain our position in the Middle East the plans for our economic recovery and future prosperity would fail.

2. Increased agricultural production in the Middle East, for which major enterprises, including the Nile Waters Scheme and the Irrigation and Flood Control Schemes in Iraq, are now being concerted, is also an essential factor in the problem of world food supply. This is already inadequate and is in danger of being outstripped by the increase in population, especially in the Middle East and Asiatic countries. (As examples, the population of Egypt is increasing by about 300,000 a year and the population of India and Pakistan by about 5 million a year.)

Strategic Importance

3. The Middle East is important strategically because it shields Africa; is a key centre of land and sea communications; and contains large supplies of oil, particularly in Persia, the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Above all, in the event of attack on the British Isles, it is one of the principal areas from which offensive air action can be taken against the aggressor. The strategic key to this area is Egypt, to which there is no practical alternative as a main base.

4. If the Middle East is to be denied to an enemy in war-time, at least two conditions are necessary :—

(a) Certain peace-time facilities which include the maintenance of airfields

and stores.

(b) The goodwill of the inhabitants.

5. It is also extremely desirable that we should possess the right of entry or reinforcement in case of apprehended emergency. Otherwise we might be obliged to enter or reinforce certain countries either without right or too late.

General Conclusion from the Above

6. The desire of His Majesty's Government is accordingly that the Middle East should be stable, prosperous and friendly, and to have defence arrangements with some or all Middle East countries which will afford the best prospect of

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