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So, the seven major Chinese importers of Japanese goods in Hong Kong began to openly sell their commodities. They collectively re­ fused to pay the fines imposed on them by the boycott organizations. By promising monetary benefit, they sought to induce merchants in Hong Kong and Kwangtung to buy Japanese sea products from them. Meanwhile, they approached the Japanese vice-consul in Hong Kong with a grand strategy as follows: to bribe the merchants in Hong Kong and Kwangtung into purchasing Japanese sea products, a sum of thirty thousand dollars would be needed. Telegrams would be sent to merchant communities in various places to inform them that the boycott had been called off. The Chung-kuo jih-pao and the Shih-chieh kung-i-pao (the two T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries' news­ papers, which had been opposed to the boycott) would be requested

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 225



to report the "dissolution of boycott by the Nam Pak Hong commer­ cial association." Finally, the Japanese merchants would run an ad­ vertisement in the local Chinese press to express their appreciation to the Nam Pak Hong for the "satisfactory conclusion of the boy­ cott."83

Delighted by this proposal, Vice-Consul Funatsu thought that now was the golden opportunity to deal a blow to the boycott organiza­ tion. The vice consul called a meeting of Japanese businessmen on October 23 to discuss the grand strategy. Those present included the heads of ten major Japanese business concerns in Hong Kong— Seikin Bank, Nippon Yûsen Kaisha, Mitsubishi Company, Mitsui Bussan Company, Tôyô Kisen, Osaka Shôsen, Bank of Taiwan, Mi­ yazaki Company, Antaku Company, and Ozawa Company. It was generally agreed that an opportunity to end the boycott had arrived. Yet grave concerns were also expressed that such a strategy of open battle and direct confrontation with the boycott organization at a time when the boycott had rather subsided might provoke and anger the boycotters and rekindle the fire of the whole boycott movement. But the market season for Japanese sea delicacies had started in late October and would reach its peak around the Chinese New Year's Day, when there would be a big demand for them. With great anxi­ ety, the seven major Chinese importers were eager to resume trade and determined to break up the boycott.84

The boycott activists were provoked to actions. The newspaper published by the Canton Seventy-two Commercial Guilds' Associa­ tion denounced the "cold-blooded beasts" who spread the false ru­ mor about the end of the boycott. The newspaper alleged that the Japanese sea products contained poison. The Pao-huang-hui news­ paper in Hong Kong, Shang-Pao, joined in to propagate the continu­ ance of the boycott.85Lo Chor San (Lo Tso-ch'en, a Chinese merchant dealing in Japanese goods) reported to the Hong Kong Japanese consulate that on October 23 a Chinese who called for an end to the boycott was beaten up by the "ruffians" of the Dare to Die Society; and that a feeling of fear had been generated. Lo Chor San urged that more policemen and detectives be sent to the area where stores dealing in Japanese goods were located.

Rather than being a separate organization the Dare to Die Society was just a name under which leaders of the boycott movement threatened to impose coercive sanctions against boycott traitors.86 On

226 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



October 21 and 26 the Japanese Consulate received letters from a Chinese merchant requesting police protection, for the loading of Japanese potatoes and onions for export to Haiphong and Saigon had been interfered with by the boycotters. Meanwhile, the Kumano Maru arrived in Hong Kong on October 27 with two hundred tons of dried sea products, part of which had been claimed by the Chinese merchants, although the rest remained unclaimed. This prompted the boycott agitators to take further actions.87

A shop assistant named Chiu Hong who worked for the Japanese sea product firm of Cheong Sing Hong was beaten up and had his ear cut by five or six "ruffians" sent by the Dare to Die Society. The Dare to Die Society also put up posters and wrote anonymous letters threatening to kill and cut off the ears of all boycott betrayers who coveted private profit. Many shopkeepers trading in Japanese goods had received anonymous notes warning: "We hear that you are a traitor. Take warning!" 8 In fear of their lives, the Chinese dealers of Japanese goods in Hong Kong completely stopped their transactions on October 29. Their grand strategy to break up the boycott fell to pieces.89

The importation of a large amount of Japanese sea products surely

had aroused great aversion to it. Again, this was largely due to economic competition and conflict of interests. Nationalism was fused with economic interest to prompt the boycotters to action. While promoting the boycott, the Canton Merchants' Self-Government So­ ciety had floated in September 1908 a company called the Seventy- two Guilds Fishing Industry Company, with a capital of eight hundred thousand dollars, to promote the fishing industry in the South China Sea. The business of the company included fishing, fish curing, the manufacture of fish glue, and allied industries. It was also in Septem­ ber that the Canton Sea Delicacies Guild joined with the Piece Goods Guild and other guilds to call for more stringent measures in the enforcement of boycott. In one of their meetings, held at the Mer­ chants' Self-Government Society's hall, copies of a circular were dis­ tributed to the public, stating that the Japanese sea products con­ tained poison.90 With economic interest in conflict, the end justified the means for the merchant boycotters.

Passions ran high among the Cantonese merchants, whose invest­ ment in the native fishing industry was threatened by the large importation of Japanese sea food products. Yuan Heung Po, a Can-

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 227



ton sea delicacies merchant, had this to say: "Those who deal clan­ destinely in foreign [Japanese] articles not only deserved monetary punishment but even the punishment of death was inadequate to the crime/' Cheong To Sang, another Canton sea products merchant, added:

China is like a broken bird's nest, and one would be very unlikely to find a good egg in such a nest. If we do not hold firm from beginning to end we shall receive insults much more disgraceful from other (foreign) countries. If we do not devise means to save the situation of the present generation we ought to take steps to protect our sons and grandsons from receiving such treatment from the hands of foreigners.91

Concern with economic interest was fused with patriotism to propel the boycott movement. The merchant boycotters asserted their sec­ tional interests in the name of patriotism. They threatened to cut more ears from anyone guilty of "unpatriotic behavior."

On November 2, the Shih-pao (Shut Po, edited by Pun Lan Sz, a boycott activist), published a Cantonese ballad entitled "The Story of the Ear Cutting: A Satire on a Merchant Who Had His Ear Cut Off in Hong Kong":

Hello, My man! How many ears have you got? You had better be careful of your ear in the future. You had two and you let one be cut off.

It makes you look out of shape. Who would be so unkind

As to make you such a laughing stock? It is far worse than thieves in Canton

Who are paraded in the street "with a notion stuck down the back of their neck" [i.e., ears].

It is indeed dangerous to have an ear that is so unpopular. Although it was not cut right off . . .

It will make you frightened for some time to come. After this it will be harder for

You to save your ears than it will be to save your life. If any company is willing to insure it

You had better hurry up and come to terms. You have only so far lost one ear.

You still have one left.

Take care that you do not lose both.

228 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



There is a saying "I must draw an ear on the wall to listen to you" [i.e., when a man is lying].

If you lose the other you will be

Like a urinal pot without a handle (ear).

People will then object to your occupying a space. Baskets without handles (ears) are no use.

It is very hard to put cording on them. Every man has ears.

How is it that you alone cannot remember! Aye. You had better wake up.

Let all your senses be awakened. I am twisting your ear.

And will twist it till you are black in the face. 92

As in the previous anti-American boycott of 1905, the Canton picto­ rial Shih-shih hua-pao rose to the occasion by printing pictures drama­ tizing the Dare to Die Chinese patriots cutting "nearly ten" traitors' ears in Hong Kong.93

Meanwhile, some Chinese merchants in Japan cabled merchants in Canton stating that the Japanese merchants had received orders for marine products in such bulk that they rejoiced exceedingly and organized a procession to celebrate the death of the boycott move­ ment. Included in the procession were lanterns on which were painted fish, tigers, and other animals, all without tails—signifying that the Chinese could start a thing very well but could not put a tail to it and finish it.94 Such lanterns were alleged to have been hung also before Japanese shops in Amoy. This was reported to have so annoyed and enraged a great number of the Chinese that riots were organized in Hong Kong.95





Riots in Hong Kong, November 1 -2

News of the arrival of some thousands of packages of Japanese goods in the West Point warehouses aroused the anger of the boycotters. They selected Sunday, November 1 as the day for an organized attack on the shopkeepers dealing in Japanese articles. At 9:30 a.m. "an apparently organized gang of coolies" broke into a warehouse in Ko Shing Street and carried away many cases of Japanese marine products.96 The police arrested twenty-two men and recovered most of the property. At 2:00 p.m. three more warehouses were broken

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 229



into. Some Japanese marine products were taken and dumped into the sea. The police arrested nine men and recovered part of the property.97 When the Japanese vice-consul Funatsu arrived on the scene, around 3:30 p.m., all seemed quiet, although two or three Chinese shouting at him: "Ti-chih! Ti-chih!" (resistance! resis­ tance!).98

Around 7:30 at night, a number of men started wrecking the "ring and marble saloons" in the Western District. These saloons (imita­ tions of Japanese pachinko-ya) were shops where games with rings and marbles were played and cheap articles (such as towels and soaps) were given away as prizes. Extra police were sent from the Central District but the "mob" had smashed the contents of a dozen of these "saloons." Meanwhile, around 8:00 p.m., a shop on Kwai Wah Lane in the Central District was attacked; more Japanese sea products were removed by the boycotters. The police arrived too late to stop them. 9

The rioters numbered considerably over two hundred and fifty, and the Central District and the area toward West Point (where the Chinese merchants who dealt in Japanese goods had their shops and warehouses) became the scene of great disturbance, the uproar being at its height soon after 9:00 p.m. About twenty or thirty shops and warehouses were attacked during the first day of riots. Over two hundred policemen were mobilized to suppress the riots. Order was not restored until midnight.1 0

At 9:00 a.m. the next morning, November 2, a "ring and marble saloon" in Queen's Road was invaded and the goods thrown into the street. The police made eight arrests. When the Japanese vice consul arrived on the scene after 9:30 a.m., two or three Chinese again shouted boycott slogans at him.101 "Business was at a standstill in the western district, and as the mob grew more riotous many shops were dosed."102Around 11:00 a.m. "large mobs" congregated in several prindpal streets of the Central District. "A large crowd made an attack on a shop in Wing Kat Street but the Police charged them and drove them into Des Voeux Road."103 The Japanese vice consul observed that the rioters' movements were so quick that it looked as if the police were chasing douds of flies, quite unable to catch them. On the request of the Japanese consulate, a strong guard was placed over the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha's warehouse. Three or four Chinese dealers of Japanese marine products requested protec-

230 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



tion from the Japanese consulate, seeking to send their goods to the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha's warehouse for temporary safekeeping.104

With few exceptions, the crowds confined their actions to attack­ ing Chinese shops suspected of selling Japanese goods. "No shops kept by Japanese were attacked nor were the keepers of any shops personally molested." The raids were well-organized.105 But some Chinese joined the raid on stores in order to loot. A man who looted a blanket was beaten by the boycotters, who preferred to destroy the goods. A woman who attempted to carry away some towels was similarly treated. And some Chinese who endeavored to carry off umbrellas that had been thrown into the street were roughly han­ dled.106 So, while a number of raiders were disciplined and well- organized, a number of others were not—and the raid gave them a chance to loot. When the police interfered and arrested some of the crowd, riots broke out. Riots gave vent to the anticolonial sentiment of the Hong Kong populace, a sentiment nourished by a series of previous hostile confrontations with the authorities. The boycott is­ sue and age-old anticolonialism were combined.

Around 1:30 p.m. a riot started near the International Hotel; the police drove the crowd toward the Land We Live In Hotel in Queen's Road West. Here the rioters were strengthened by "mobs" that poured in from the East Street (Taipingshan). The riotous crowd now num­ bered between five hundred and one thousand men. They hurled bricks, stones, bamboos, flower pots, and other things at the police. Some among the crowd were armed with bill hooks and boat hooks. Revolvers were discharged from the crowd firing at the police. Two men were dressed differently from the rest, each carrying a revolver in his right hand and a placard in his left. They cried "Ta, ta, ta-he" (strike, strike, strike).107About a score of policemen received wounds in their struggle with the rioting crowds. The police fired into the crowd. A bullet hit a coolie named Chu Loi through the buttocks. Bleeding profusely, he was conveyed to the Civil Hospital, where he died early the next morning. Another Chinese was shot in the thigh when he grappled with a Sikh policeman in an attempt to wrest the carbine away. Reports were current that six other Chinese were shot, although the police received no information regarding this.108 Ac­ cording to the Japanese vice-consul Funatsu, there were "four or five [Chinese] killed or wounded" by gun shots.109

An excited Chinese gentleman called at the office of the South

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 231



China Morning Post protesting that the policemen's shooting of the Chinese coolie was a most unjustifiable outrage and that his country­ men were deeply incensed. It was a vain protest. In a subsequent court inquiry into the Chinese coolie's death, the jury (which con­ sisted of Europeans) considered the shooting justified. Whenever social disturbances occurred the colonial government would confer with the Chinese elite. The registrar general called a meeting of the Chinese justices of the peace and the District Watch Committee. The riots caught them off guard and were beyond their control. They promised the government every assistance and "advised the adop­ tion of stem measures to quell the disorder," 10 again revealing the coopted Chinese elite's alienation from the populace in the 1900s and their readiness to use coercion for social control.

Around 3:00 p.m. British troops numbering one hundred and fifty strong arrived at the junction of Bonham Strand and Queen's Road West. There they were met by Registrar General E. A. Irving and Ho Kam Tong, a prominent Chinese comprador, who continually ad­ vised the great crowd to disperse. The crowd took no heed of his words. The police scattered the crowd in all directions and soldiers paraded every street in the vicinity. Many Chinese business places closed their shops after dark, and those who stayed open had plac­ ards posted stating that they did not sell Japanese goods. In Wan- chai, a number of warehouses contained Japanese goods. They were carefully guarded by the police and troops throughout the night. The riot had practically ended by midnight. 1

The following day, November 3, happened to be the birthday anniversary of the Meiji emperor of Japan and the seventy-fourth birthday of the empress dowager of China. The latter event seemed to have passed in Hong Kong practically unheeded. In contrast, the subjects of the Japanese emperor observed the anniversary in Hong Kong with customary éclat. A large number of the leading residents and officials in the colony were invited to the Japanese vice consul's residence, which was decorated with flags and lanterns, the Anglo- Japanese alliance being symbolized by crossed flags at the entrance and fireworks.112

On this same day the Hong Kong police court was "crowded with unwashed [Chinese] coolies" in custody. In all, 119 arrests were made in the riots of the previous two days. Those arrested included a "gentleman" and a "businessman," but most of them were coolies.

232 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



One of the riot ringleaders was an aid employed in a fishmonger's stall at the Central Market. He was alleged to have urged the crowd to attack a shop when he was arrested. The magistrate at the police court discharged several juvenile offenders, but punishments were imposed on those convicted ranging from small fines to six months inprisonment and hard labor. 13



Riot Instigators

According to Hong Kong police intelligence the National Disgrace Society in Canton sent twenty-five men to the colony. Enlisted into the service of these men were about a hundred Chinese in Hong Kong, comprised of vegetable hawkers and coolies who usually were employed to carry ammunition for the military authorities to the rifle ranges. At a given signal from one of the twenty-five men they attacked the stores of the Chinese merchants who dealt in Japanese goods and then walked away, leaving the goods to be picked up by "the rabble" as loot. 14

The National Disgrace Society (Kuo-ch'ih-hui) originated with members of the Canton Merchants' Self-Government Society.115 The Chinese authorities' capitulation to the Japanese demands leading to the release of the Tatsu Maru on March 19 was regarded as a national disgrace; hence the name of the society. Its members went to various places to propagate the boycott and incite anti-Japanese feelings.116 Thus, it may be regarded as an offshoot of the Canton Merchants' Self-Government Society. Despatching emissaries to organize riots in the British colony, it was more radical than the leadership of the Self- Government Society, which had insisted on "civilized" resistance (i.e., peaceful boycott) against Japan. Under British protestation. Viceroy Chang Jen-chun defended the Self-Government Society as a responsible and reputable organization, and denied the existence of a National Disgrace Society in Canton. 17

The leadership of the Self-Government Society published a circular notice on November 6 deprecating the "turbulent ruffians" responsi­ ble for the rioting in Hong Kong and exhorting the people in Canton to abstain from similar "uncivilized" acts and to keep the peace.118 Nevertheless, since various members of the Self-Government Society had been so closely connected with the boycott that led to riots, both

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 233



the British and Japanese officials blamed the Self-Government Soci­ ety for the riots. 19



Cracking Down the Boycott Activists

With the outbreak of the riots the Hong Kong government seized the opportunity to punish a number of boycott activists, whether or not they had any direct connections with them. Banishment orders were issued against four leading members of the Canton Merchants' Self- Government Society—Li Kai Hi (U Chieh-ch'i), Lo Kuan She (Lo Kuan-shih), Lau Tze Kai, and Tse Yam Luk (who were in Hong Kong collecting money for the Canton Floods Relief Fund).120 On Novem­ ber 20 three boycott activists in Hong Kong were ordered to leave the colony within a week—Chiu Shiu Pok (Chao Shao-p'u, proprietor of the Kung-ho firm and a founding member of the Li Men Hing Kwok Knitting Factory Co., who, according to Vice-Consul Funatsu, was most prominent in organizing the boycott and inciting the Dare to Die Society to action), Chan Lo Chun (Ch'en Lu-ch'üan, comprador of the Butterfield and Swire Co.), and Pun Lan Sz (Fan Lan-shih, a founding member of the Li Men Hing Kwok Knitting Factory Co. and editor of Shih-pao, which published the ballad about the ear- cutting of a boycott betrayer, thus violating the colonial govern­ ment's order forbidding the local Chinese press to print news about the boycott). Also ordered to be banished was Kwok Yik Chi (Kuo I- chih, a founding member of the Li Men Hing Kwok Knitting Factory Co. and comprador of Amhold Kerberg & Co.), but, thanks to the German firm's petition on his behalf, the banishment order against him was revoked.121

On November 24 banishment warrants were issued against six

other prominent Chinese in the colony: Ho Tso Wan (Ho Tsao-yün, head of a boycott organization known as the Commerce Investigation Society), Leung Sui Hing (Liang Jui-heng, manager of the Fu-an Insurance Co. and a founding member of the Li Men Hing Kwok Knitting Factory Co.), Chan Hang Kiu (Ch'en Hsing-ch'iao, manager of the Kwong Man Tseung firm), Tsang Yan Po (Tseng En-p'u, Chinese medicine dealer and a native piece goods shipper for Tient­ sin), Nip Koon Man (Ni Kuan-wen, manager of the Kwong Yuen Tai firm), and Wu Hsien-tzu (Ng Hin Tsz, editor of Shang-pao).1 2

234 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



The Pao-huang-hui newspaper Shang-pao played a major role in instigating the boycott. For some time before the riots occurred, it had been "in the habit of indulging in veiled threats against such Chinese merchants as did not participate in the boycott," Governor Lugard complained.123The two editors of the newspaper, Wu Hsien- tzu and Hsü Ch'in, were ordered to be expelled from the colony. Thereupon Hsü Ch'in and several other Chinese connected with the riots fled to Bangkok, where they continued to agitate for boycott.124 But Wu Hsien-tzu boldly chose to remain in Hong Kong to continue his struggle against the colonial authorities. He filed a petition on November 27 through solicitor Otto Kong King for revocation of the banishment order. Meanwhile, he distributed copies of a long fare­ well letter addressed to the colony's Chinese compatriots, propagat­ ing the nationalist cause of anti-Japanese boycott and denouncing the British authorities' "uncivilized" actions against the boycotters. What is more, Wu Hsien-tzu incited a number of merchants to sign a joint petition to the colonial authorities for the revocation of banish­ ment warrants, intimating that if this demand was not met the boy­ cott would turn against the British.125

Unwilling to publish a statement to repudiate his connection with the boycott and refusing to leave the colony, Wu Hsien-tzu was arrested by the police on December 1. His defiance to colonial author­ ities and his decision to test the validity of the legal proceedings against him aroused great interest and concern among the Chinese community in Hong Kong. On the day of his trial, December 4, several hundred Chinese thronged the court, only to be notified that the proceedings against him had been dropped and the suspect had been set free the previous day.126 A remarkable young Pao-huang- hui journalist at twenty-eight years of age, Wu Hsien-tzu reflected the feeling of resentment among many Chinese in Hong Kong against the colonial authorities' high-handed measures.



The Colonial Government Sofiens Its Stand

A combination of circumstances forced the colonial government to relax the enforcement of banishment orders. First, the banishment of prominent merchants and newspaper editors for alleged complicity in the riots had caused a deep feeling of unrest among the Chinese in the colony. The Chinese felt that punishment had been inflicted

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 235



without sufficient reason and in some cases unjustly. It was feared that any one might yet suddenly receive a notice of banishment. "None of the leading Chinese merchants felt themselves safe," Gov­ ernor Lugard admitted.127This fear paralyzed trade. The Piece Goods Guild and the Metal Guild decided to suspend business for two weeks in protest against the government's action of deporting men without trial. The Hua-i Company, a Pao-huang-hui financial group, withdrew some thirty thousand dollars of its deposit from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, setting an example for other Chinese merchants to follow. Rumors were spread that Chinese merchants would accept only hard cash but not the paper currency issued by the Hong Kong bank.128

Second, the dislocation of trade caused a panic in foreign business circles. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Hong Kong Branch of the (British) China Association, and the Hong Kong (European) Chamber of Commerce all pointed out to the colo­ nial authorities the need to restore confidence among the Chinese in the colony. They suggested that the government issue a proclama­ tion stating that no further steps would be taken against anyone so long as the law was obeyed and disturbances did not take place. A proclamation to that effect was subsequently published.129

Finally, by December 1908, an anti-British movement was brought about by the Fatshan incident. A Chinese passenger was kicked to death by a Portuguese ticket collector on the British steamer Fatshan of the Butterfield and Swire Company on November 29. This incident had aroused bitter feelings of resentment against the British. The Canton Merchants' Self-Government Society started an agitation against the British shipping and British authorities. Apprehensive of a boycott against the British interests, the colonial government soft­ ened its stand on the banishment issue, set Wu Hsien-tzu free, and let the banishment orders against others lapse.130On January 9,1909, the Hong Kong government officially withdrew banishment orders against the four leading members of the Canton Merchants' Self- Government Society.131



The Boycott Comes to An End

The anti-Japanese boycott was a prolonged movement that lasted about nine months, from March to December 1908. By January 1909,

236 Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908



however, the boycott had nearly come to an end and trade with Japan was generally resumed in Hong Kong and Canton. This was due to several factors. First, the colonial government's banishment orders against prominent merchants and boycott activists had an important effect in halting the boycott, even though the government eventually softened its stand and relaxed the enforcement of such orders. Not all boycott activists were as bold as Wu Hsien-tzu, who dared to challenge the colonial authorities' banishment order. His colleague Hsü Ch'in had to flee to Bangkok. Other activists, such as Chiu Shiu Pok, Ho Tso Wan, and Leung Sui Hing, also had to flee the colony for some time until the banishment orders were relaxed.132 The banishment orders' deterrent effect on the boycott movement was best illustrated by the case of Chan Hang Kiu (Ch'en Hsin- ch'iao), who was thrown into panic on receiving an exile warrant. In a flurry, he went to see the registrar general to plea his innocence and agreed to publish a statement dissociating himself from the boycott.1 3 He also requested Ho Kai to petition the government for cancellation of the exile warrant. In the meantime, he asked the comprador of the Japanese Seikin Bank to help him obtain an inter­ view with Vice-Consul Funatsu, to whom he promised to help in the suppression of the boycott. The exile warrant against him was there­ upon revoked by the colonial government.134 Merchants feared the banishment order because it threatened to deprive them of their base of business operation and thus lead to bankruptcy. Merchants dis­

liked bankcruptcy.

A second factor contributing to the resumption of trade with Japan was the conciliatory step taken by the Japanese vice-consul Funatsu, who proposed to hold kondankai, or "friendly meetings," between Chinese merchants and Japanese businessmen in Hong Kong. The vice-consul invited some twenty leading Chinese merchants and an equal number of Japanese businessmen to dinner at his official resi­ dence on December 27, 1908. One of the honored guests. Sin Tak Fan (chairman of the Tung Wah directorate), spoke about the need to promote the mutual understanding and mutual interests of China and Japan. To reciprocate the Japanese goodwill. Sin Tak Fan and the Chinese merchants invited the Japanese to another "friendly meeting" on January 2, 1909, at a Chinese merchants' club in Hong Kong.135 Another important factor contributing to the end of the boycott was, ironically, the boycott riots of November 1-2, 1908,

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Riot in 1908 237



organized by the radical boycott activists from Canton. Because the riots had caused some death and injuries, had disrupted law and order, and had caused many stores and shops to close their doors for business, a number of merchants and shopkeepers had begun to take a dislike to the boycott.136

By January 1909 the anti-Japanese boycott had largely subsided, although it was briefly revitalized in April in opposition to the Japa­ nese claim to the Pratas shoal (Tung-sha tao), and again in September and October of 1909, in protest against Japan's extension of the Mukden-Antung railway in southern Manchuria.137 Japanese eco­ nomic competition and the adverse effect of Japanese capitalist in­ roads continued to generate anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese, serving as a motivating force for a long series of anti-Japanese boycott movements in subsequent years. In 1908 the T'ung-meng-hui failed to exploit the anti-Japanese current of the day for the cause of revo­ lution. The problem of how to win the sympathy of the Chinese populace challenged the T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries.

N I N E‌

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution, 1911-12



O f every hundred Chinese in Hong Kong ninety-nine are in sympathy

with the rebels, and perhaps seventy-five percent wildly and recklessly so. —China Mail, November 7 ,1911

The animosity against foreigners which, always existent in the Chinese mind, has been inflamed by the recent revolution [This reveals]

the real feelings of the mass of population towards Englishmen in this Colony. — Governor F. Henry May's secret dispatch to London



At various stages of the Chinese republican revolution Hong Kong played a critically important role. For example, the revolutions staged in Waichow (Hui-chou), both in 1900 and 1911, were headquartered in Hong Kong; so was the Canton uprising of the spring of 1911. In fact, during the years between 1895 and 1911 at least eight revolu­ tionary attempts were organized in Hong Kong.1 These, however, are not my major concern in this chapter. My purpose here is to examine how the Chinese revolution affected the Chinese commu­ nity in Hong Kong in 1911-12. This chapter, as all earlier chapters, is concerned with three main themes—Chinese community structure, social unrest, and nationalism in the British colony of Hong Kong.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 gave an important stimulus to Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong. A large proportion of people from all classes in the colony were aroused to a new awareness of and concern with China's politics and problems. The laborers became

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 239



politically activated, which found expression in their participation in popular jubilation over the fall of the Manchus in China as well as in labor strikes. These strikes were directed against empolyers, unlike most coolie strikes in the nineteenth century, which were usually directed against the colonial government regulations that threatened coolies' lives and work.

In the years around 1911-12 labor strikes against employers were sporadic and on a small scale. They generally posed no serious threat to social order in Hong Kong. It was not until the early 1920s that labor disputes turned into large-scale workers' strikes. But the trend towards organized labor began at the end of the nineteenth century, when various employees' guilds were activated and assumed some characteristics of Western-style trade unions. As we have seen in chapter 3, the consciousness of different interests of capital and labor was beginning to emerge in the 1880s and 1890s, and labor strikes for better wages and working conditions sporadically took place among employees in various trades. By the 1900s some republican revolu­ tionaries had learned that to win labor support for their cause they had to stoop to working with laborers. They succeeded in organizing some workers to support the revolution.



Tung-meng-hui Activities Among the Working People

Among the laborers in Hong Kong, the skilled and semiskilled work­ ers such as seamen and mechanics were more literate than nonskilled coolies and were generally more responsive to the T'ung-meng-hui revolutionary ideas. The Cantonese seamen were among the earliest supporters of Sun Yat-sen's program. Their leaders, for example. Su Chao-cheng and Yang Yin, both natives of Sun Yat-sen's home county of Hsiang-shan, had joined the T'ung-meng-hui before 1911. Su Chao- cheng was a member of the Lien Yi and Chuang Yi societies set up by the revolutionaries in Hong Kong.2

The T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries also began to establish close

ties to the Chinese mechanics. Subjected to racial discrimination and frequently involved in labor disputes with their foreign employers, the mechanics in the colony became politically conscious and felt the need to combine their forces to defend their interest, looking to the revolutionaries for help. The T'ung-meng-hui activists came to the assistance of a Taikoo Dockyard mechanic named Wong Kwei Hung,

240 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



who was unjustly fired by his foreign employer in November 1908, and another mechanic who was beaten up by his foreign supervisor. To avoid the colonial government's suspicion the T'ung-meng-hui activists set up offices under such names as Ch'ün-lo Country Villa, Tse-wen Literary Society, Ch'ün-i Study Society, and Ch'ün-ai Public Discussion Society. In these societies the revolutionaries held secret meetings with the mechanics, seeking to advance labor interests and to recruit them for the revolutionary cause.3

Ma Ch'ao-chün, a labor leader, played an important role in bring­ ing together the mechanics and the revolutionaries. After a mechan­ ic's apprenticeship for two years in Hong Kong, Ma Ch'ao-chün went to the United States in 1902 to work at a shipyard in San Francisco, where he joined the Triad Chih-kung-t'ang and met Sun Yat-sen in 1905. Following Sun Yat-sen to Japan, he joined the Tung-meng-hui, and was sent back to Hong Kong in the spring of 1906 to recruit laborers, especially his mechanic colleagues, for the revolution.4 Close ties were being established between mechanics and revolutionaries. The activists handed out printed bills to mechanics in late 1908, urging them to get organized to protect their own interests. Within three weeks over three thousand mechanics responded expressing interest in the organized movement. On March 24, 1909, the Hong Kong Chinese Mechanics' Association (Hsiang-kang Hua-jen chi-ch'i hui) was formally founded. On April 19, some five hundred or six hundred members gathered in a meeting to discuss how to organize themselves. The colonial government arrested three mechanic activ­ ists who made speeches in the meeting, although they were soon released to prevent a threatened mechanics' strike. Henceforth, to avert the colonial government's suspicion the mechanics held secret meetings on holidays under the disguise of recreation parties such as the Spring Time Picnic Party and Swimming Party. And small labor groups were formed with the cooperation of the T'ung-meng-hui

revolutionaries.5

Meanwhile, the Chinese Institute for the Study of Mechanics (Chung-kuo yen-chi shu-shu) was founded on July 24, 1909, to pro­ vide education for the mechanics and their children. The teachers included T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries (e.g.. Chu Po-yüan), "en­ lightened" foremen, and masters of the mechanical workshops. Over two thousand people participated in the founding ceremony of this institute. Renamed The Chinese General Association for Engineering

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 241



Studies (Chung-kuo chi-ch'i yen-chiu tsung-hui) in 1910, it was reg­ istered with the Hong Kong government as "mainly an association of the employers." In fact, however, it was nothing less than an association dedicated to labor education and revolutionary activities. It set up several night schools for the mechanic laborers, raised money for the revolution, and recruited laborers to fight in the upris­ ings. In 1910 it helped to found a sister association in Canton named the Kwangtung General Association for Engineering Studies,6 laying the basis for the future Cantonese mechanics' union.

To recruit labor forces for the revolution the T'ung-meng-hui intel­ ligentsia "stooped" to establish connections with coolies and the hui- t'ang secret societies. For instance, they persuaded over thirty hotel workers in Hong Kong to join the T'ung-meng-hui.7 The revolution­ ary Kot Him, before being executed in 1908, confessed to the Canton authorities:

Our party comprises men of education and rank, but we all stoop when necessary to find adherents. We even join military bodies and take up employments as cooks, coolies, etc The Ko Lo

Association are uncivilized; they still kidnap, rob people and have no education nor experience. They make no distinction between the Manchus and the Hans. We are now enlightening them with a view to their joining forces with us in order to successfully accom­ plish our great object.8



To organize armed uprisings in Kwangtung, the republican revo­ lutionaries had, since 1895, sought to ally with the hui-t'ang secret society leaders who shared a common hostility towards the Man­ chus. The revolutionaries based in Hong Kong (such as Cheng Shih- liang, Yu Lieh, Tse Tsan Tai, Sun Yat-sen, and Ch'en Shao-pai) had joined the Triad society, hoping to turn it into an instrument for revolution. The Triads, however, were not easily converted into ded­ icated republican nationalists, which frustrated revolutionary intelli­ gentsia like Kot Him. When the Triads joined the revolutionary up­ risings against the Manchus they were often motivated, not by ab­ stract patriotism, but by the lure of monetary gains (as mercenaries) and by a desire to protect their material interests against the govern­ ment tax collectors (as in the case of the Triad salt smugglers in Waichow).9 The revolutionaries hired mercenary detachments from among the hui-t'ang in Kwangtung to fight in the Canton uprising of

242 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



1895. By 1900 revolutionaries had closer and more extensive ties with the hui-t'ang. The detachments under the hui-t'ang leaders joined the military operation in the 1900 Waichow uprising.10 And a hundred T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries from Hong Kong joined in the Wai­ chow revolution of 1911. They included "more than thirty waiters and porters presumably recruited through Triad channels from the big hotels in Hong Kong." 1

The traditional bonds of provincialism and localism served the cause of nationalist revolution. Sun Yat-sen and other Cantonese revolutionaries often appealed to provincial and local ties to recruit their fellow Cantonese into the revolutionary camp. The Sze Yap Association in Hong Kong illustrated how localism served to enhance the nationalist cause. Originally it was composed of returned Califor­ nian and Australian coolie and artisan emigrants from Sze Yap (Four Districts), Kwangtung. As they had personally experienced persecu­ tion and discrimination in foreign countries, they became more polit­ ically aware than others that the individuals' well-being ultimately depended on the existence of a strong nation to protect them. The association came into prominence as a result of reorganization in Hong Kong around 1910 and was "excellent material ready to the hand of the conspirators against the Manchu dynasty."12 In fact, as early as 1894 and especially since 1905 the revolutionaries from Sze Yap had been actively propagating revolution among the Sze Yap people both in Kwangtung and in the United States.13

Many republican conspirators from commercial backgrounds in Hong Kong came from Sze Yap. They included, among others, such leading activists as Ch'en Shao-pai, Li Chi-t'ang, Li Yü-t'ang, and Teng Chung-tse. Appealing to local ties, they had recruited into revolutionary forces the Sze Yap working people in the colony. The Sze Yap Association came to consist of merchants and traders as well as artisans and coolies, many of whom became members of the T'ung-meng-hui. Through the Sze Yap Association, money and men were procured from Hong Kong for the revolution at Canton.14 The association became the most important and energetic agency of what the colonial authorities called the Young China Party in Hong Kong.15 It provided much of the power and leadership for the patriotic move­ ments in the colony to support the revolution in Canton—the jubilant celebration of the successful revolution, the fund-raising campaigns

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 243



for the Canton revolutionary government, and the boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway.



Politicized Chinese Populace in the British Colony

The revolution of 1911 had a great impact on the British colony. A great proportion of people from all classes were aroused to a new awareness of and concern with China's politics and problems.

Since the Wu-ch'ang uprising of October 10, 1911, the feeling in Hong Kong was largely in favor of the revolution. This was reflected in the social unrest during the anniversary celebration of Confucius' birthday in the colony on October 18. In contrast to previous years when the imperial dragon flag was a prominent part of decorations put up by Chinese shopkeepers in the colony, the dragon flag this time was rarely displayed.16A crowd of about four hundred Chinese attacked the offices of the royalist Pao-huang-hui newspaper Shang- pao and of the Bank of China, forcing them to remove the dragon flags.17

Equally significant was the agitation for the removal of the queue, a symbol of submission to the Manchus. Within a few days after the October 10th Wu-ch'ang uprising thousands of men in Hong Kong had removed their queue. A barber's shop in Des Voeux Road of­ fered to cut the queues free of charge for three days. On October 29, more than two hundred workers in a chair-making factory took col­ lective action in cutting off their pigtails.18

The revolution in China greatly politicized the Chinese population of Hong Kong. As noted in the press, “they avail themselves of the newspapers to keep themselves acquainted with the latest happen­ ings. . . . [MJost of the lower class Chinese in the Colony are sym­ pathetic towards the revolutionaries."19 The comings and goings through Hong Kong of the revolutionaries added to the excitement in the British colony; many came from south China and Southeast Asia.20The revolutionaries also recruited Chinese in Hong Kong into their forces, reportedly offering each person eight taels of silver as monthly salary. And Huang Hsing was said to have purchased in Hong Kong tens of thousands of shirts and shoes for the rebels.21 On October 24 the Manchu general Feng Shan passed through Hong Kong, where scores of hostile coolies at the dockyard jeered at the

244 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



two men for going on board to see the general. Over ten revolution­ aries conspired to assassinate Feng Shan. They followed him on board to Canton where, on the morning of October 25, he was killed by a bomb.22

Meanwhile, a great number of refugees began to arrive at the colony from Canton, Shanghai, and other ports in the north. Thou­ sands of them came by steamboat and railway, creating an acute housing problem in Hong Kong. Among the refugees from Canton were about two thousand Manchus, some of whom were abused by the Chinese in Hong Kong. Turbulence and insecurity in Canton forced even high-ranking officials to send their families to take refuge in Hong Kong on October 31.23 The colony's population rapidly increased. In 1911, over thirty thousand Chinese refugees took up residence in Hong Kong. By 1914 the total population went over the half-million mark.24



,
Spontaneous Popular Jubilation Over the Alleged Fall of Peking November 6 - 7

The revolution made a great impact on the colony's Chinese popula­ tion. It inspired high hopes and dreams of a better future and brought together all classes of Chinese in support of the republican cause. On November 6 news (which later proved untrue) was received by the Chinese press in Hong Kong that Peking had fallen to the revolution­ aries and the Manchus had fled. This provided "the occasion of the most amazing outburst which has ever been seen and heard in the history of this Colony," Governor Frederick Lugard reported to the Colonial Office in London. "The entire Chinese population appeared to become temporarily demented with joy. The din of crackers . . . was deafening and accompanied by perpetual cheering and flag- waving—a method of madness most unusual to the Chinese."25

The wide-spread excitement led a local English paper to affirm that "of every hundred Chinese in Hongkong ninety-nine are in sympathy with the rebels, and perhaps seventy-five per cent wildly and recklessly so."

[T]he rebel flag . . . appeared as if by magic, and floated from many an upper window and verandah, or was carried through the streets by excited mobs with an enthusiasm that could be called nothing

Hong Kong in the Chinese Révolution 245



else than wild. For hours the trams [were] at the mercy of the Revolutionists. They were crowded by literally hundreds of exdted youths who were waving white flags, and cheering each other till they grew hoarse. . . . [0]n many of the trams appeared scrolls bearing the four characters which might be rendered:'Long Live the Han [Chinese].'26

Several thousand people ran into the streets, some waving pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Li Yüan-hung.27

Some Chinese merchants complained of the conduct of queueless youths who came up to them in the street and called upon them to take their queues away. As G. R. Sayer recollected, “whereas in the spring of 1911 a Chinese discarded his queue at the risk of losing his head, in the spring of 1912 he risked his head who kept his queue.“ 28 Crowds surrounded shops and stores and insisted upon the inmates setting off firecrackers on pain of having their signboards de­ stroyed.29 A crowd of several hundred people gathered around the building of the royalist newspaper Shang-pao. Some broke into the office, smashing its windows and furniture. An editorial staff was brought into the street and compelled to set off firecrackers and wave a revolutionary flag. The stocks of paper and furniture were taken out to be burned on the street. A force of Indian constables and British officers arrived on the scene, and a fire brigade turned out to extinguish the fire. The resentful crowd threw stones at the police, who used the firehose to disperse the crowd.30

Popular jubilation continued on November 7. Setting off firecrack­

ers and queue-cutting went on in various parts of the colony. Several barber shops, named Wei-hsin (renovation), Wen-ming (civilization), and Hsin-Han (new China), offered to cut queues free of charge for five days. The streets were thronged with people striking gongs and waving republican flags with the written characters “Long Live the Chinese Republic." The crowd demanded a holiday for schools. Sev­ eral boat owners and workers also demanded a holiday to celebrate the alleged fall of Peking to the revolutionaries.31 The Hong Kong Tramway Company complained that the Chinese crowds did not bother to pay tramfare for the ride.32 The jubilant crowds consisted of revolutionary activists, republicans, shopkeepers, merchants, traders, boat owners, barbers, hawkers, and other coolie workers. All rejoiced at the alleged fall of the Manchu government in Peking.

246 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



Turbulent Situation in Canton

Meanwhile, the situation in Canton only eighty miles away was extremely tense and turbulent. On October 18, 1911, Governor Gen­ eral Chang Ming-ch'i had received a communication from Hong Kong purporting to come from the revolutionary leader Huang Hsing, which threatened a general uprising in Kwangtung unless the gov­ ernor general joined the revolution within five days. The loyalty of provincial troops to the governor general was already questionable. A scare in Canton was occasioned by the assassination of the Man- chu general Feng-shan on October 25. Rumor went around on Octo­ ber 30 that the famous robber chief Lu Lan-ch'ing was marching on Canton to attack the city. Shops were shut and all gates closed. A large exodus from Canton to Hong Kong took place. Admiral Li Tsun sent his family to take refuge in Hong Kong on November 3. Fighting broke out at Waichow (Hui-chou) between the Ch'ing provincial troops and the revolutionaries. A white flag was hoisted in the Delta. Revolutionaries were gathering at Fatshan (Fo-shan). The dty of Canton was full of troops, estimated at twenty-thousand under the command of the royalist Lung Chi-kwang. On November 6 a meeting of the Seventy-two Guilds, the Nine Charitable Institutions, and the chamber of commerce was held in Canton to consider a letter re­ ceived from the revolutionaries in Hong Kong. Great efforts were made by the merchants in Canton to effect a peaceful change of government. They were anxious that Governor General Chang Ming- ch'i would retain control of the government of an independent Kwangtung province as its president. 3

In the meantime, the revolutionaries in Hong Kong made a deal with the robber chief Lu Lan-ch'ing, promising him a large financial reward if he would support them in overthrowing the Ch'ing govern­ ment. Consul General J. W. Jamieson had arranged for naval rein­ forcement from Hong Kong, to protect the British concession in Canton. The new model troops in Ch'ien-shan had hoisted a flag of independence from the Ch'ing government. Even the representatives of the Manchu banner forces in Canton told Governor General Chang Ming-ch'i on November 8 that they wished to go over to the revolu­ tionaries' side, provided that their safety and that of their families were guaranteed. The tearful governor general promised to do every­ thing he could to prevent fighting in the city. At 3 p.m. he pro-

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 247



claimed, in view of the unanimity of the people's demand for inde­ pendence, that he would consider an early date for making a formal declaration.34

The British consul general J. W. Jamieson called on the governor general at 1 p.m., November 8. The governor general confided that the naval forces (under Admiral Li Tsun) could no longer be trusted, and that he could depend on only 10 percent of the provincial army, including General Lung Chi-kwang. Prostrate with grief and mental anxieties. Governor General Chang Ming-ch'i wept as he confessed that at last he had "decided to be traitor to his Emperor and avoid bloodshed." Jamieson endeavored to soothe him:

Speaking not as His Majesty's Consul General to the Ruler of the two Kwan Provinces, but as one man to another, I think you have done the right thing: you have put your duty to God Almighty above everything else; if you find it impossible to stay here, my house on Shamien is at your disposal whenever you wish to use it.35

His excellency expressed great gratitude. Jamieson then bade fare­ well; he left with the impression that within the next twenty-four hours the governor general would probably "seek a solution of his difficulties in suicide." In fact, however, the governor general was quick to take advantage of Jamieson's kind offer. As soon as Jamie­ son left, the governor general quickly started packing. Jamieson was back on Shamien at 12:45 a.m., November 9, and within less than two hours, at 2:30 a.m., was awakened by one of the governor general's secretaries, saying that his excellency was there seeking protection. As he was in such a feeble state, Jamieson at once helped him to bed. Awakened at 8 a.m., the governor general was put on board a British destroyer, which left at once for Hong Kong. At noon, November 9, "the flag of independence, blue with white sun in the centre, was hoisted amidst great jubilation all over the city" of Can­ ton.36

The independence of Canton was declared by the provincial as­ sembly, which had, on the previous day, nominated Governor Gen­ eral Chang Ming-ch'i as president of the new Canton government, not knowing that he would flee.37 Admiral Li Tsun had, by then, turned to the revolutionaries' side after secret negotiations in Hong Kong (with the Honorable Mr. Wei Yuk serving as a mediator). The

248 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



provincial assembly met again on November 9 to nominate the revo­ lutionary leader Hu Han-min as the military governor (Tu-tu) of Kwangtung. Accompanied by a number of prominent republican conspirators from Hong Kong, Hu Han-min arrived at Canton early on the morning of November 10 to become head of the new Canton revolutionary government.38

The ex-govemor general, Chang Ming-ch'i, upon arrival in Hong Kong, took up residence in a house provided by the manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. The following day, November 10, he lunched at the Hong Kong Government House. Governor Lugard assured him of safty and hospitality while in Hong Kong. Chang Ming-ch'i left for Shanghai on November 17.39



Hong Kong Celebrates the Declaration of the Republic in Canton

The two Chinese legislative councillors. Ho Kai and Wei Yuk, re­ ported to Governor Lugard that the Chinese decided to keep a holi­ day on November 13, with a demonstration to celebrate the declara­ tion of the republic in Canton. The governor deprecated a demon­ stration, but Ho Kai and Wei Yuk explained that "the proposed demonstration was one of relief on learning that Canton had changed its allegiance without bloodshed, and was a very natural one, apart altogether from politics, as so many Hong Kong people had relatives in Canton." Governor Lugard reluctantly consented and directed the Chinese press to notify the residents that setting off firecrackers would be permitted only from 12 to 2 p.m., on the understanding that this was to signify joy at the absence of bloodshed in Canton.40 In short, the British authorities pretended to understand that it was not politics but only the absence of bloodshed in Canton that the Chinese in the colony were to celebrate. But in reality the colonial authorities knew only too well that the Chinese community was jubilant for political reasons. Extremely sensitive about the involve­ ment of the colony's Chinese in China's politics, the Hong Kong authorities sought to discourage this involvement wherever they could.

Prearranged by the republican revolutionaries and their support­ ers, November 13 was observed as a public holiday by the Chinese in the colony to celebrate the birth of the republican government in

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 249



Kwangtung.41 In spite of a drizzling rain throughout the day, a flag flew from almost every house. Although the people in the streets were fairly orderly, an "unruly spirit" was displayed by groups of enthusiasts when they thought any of their countrymen were not sufficiently enthusiastic about the occasion. The crowds ordered res­ idents to give proof of their loyalty by setting off firecrackers.42 But, as a local English paper observed, little pressure was required, as the great majority of the Chinese population in the colony were revolu­ tionists at heart and were only too willing to celebrate the downfall of Manchu rule in Canton. For at least an hour from noon, every Chinese street was given over to firecrackers, creating black smoke and deafening noise.43

The twin cities of Hong Kong and Canton were closely connected with each other in several important ways. Ethnically, most Hong Kong residents had relatives (and property) in Canton and its sur­ rounding towns. Economically, the two cities formed inseparable ties, with Hong Kong serving as an entrepôt—importing goods for Canton merchants to distribute to the mainland and exporting goods that Canton had collected from inland. Such ethnic and commercial ties constituted the socioeconomic forces for patriotism among the Chinese in Hong Kong. They were deeply concerned about the polit­ ical revolution in China. With the weak and corrupt Manchus over­ thrown and a new republican government set up in Canton, they wished the new government well, hoping that it would bring about better governance for their relatives in Canton and more trade and prosperity for themselves in Hong Kong. Politically, the republican conspirators who had used Hong Kong as a revolutionary base now became leaders of the new Canton government. They included a number of Hong Kong residents, particularly some prominent mem­ bers of the Sze Yap Association. As we shall see, the successful republican revolution in China inspired many Chinese in Hong Kong to dream about a better political status for themselves, challenging the British colonial authorities.



Subscriptions for the Chinese Revolution

With the founding of the republican government in Canton on No­ vember 9, 1911, subscription campaigns were launched in Hong Kong to aid the cause of the revolution. As the new Canton govern-

250 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



ment desperately needed money, it sought financial relief from the Chinese communities of Hong Kong, Canton, and overseas. A sum of about six hundred thousand dollars was obtained in a very short time in Hong Kong alone. A quarter of a million dollars more had been raised by November 14, the contributors to this loan being promised the return of double the amount subscribed at the end of twelve months. 4 The Canton government set up a subscription bu­ reau in Hong Kong, which consisted of thirty businessmen and was headed by Yang Hsi-yen (from Sze Yap). It sought to raise a loan of five million dollars from the Chinese communities overseas (includ­ ing one million from Hong Kong). The Sze Yap Association worked closely with the bureau in raising funds.45

In addition, various civic groups in Hong Kong volunteered to collect money for the Canton government. A citizens' subscription office was set up in December 1911 by two merchants, Li Chi-p'ei and Ch'en Keng-yü (Chan Keng Yu, who had opposed the revolu­ tion before 1911). Within a few days, they collected $3,227. Though a small sum, it reflected popular participation in subscription, with hundreds of people contributing small amounts of one or two dollars to the fund.46 For a time, activists seemed to be everywhere soliciting contributions—on board the passenger vessels running between Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao, in restaurants and bars, in stores, and in the streets. In one meeting, the old clothes guild raised more than four thousand dollars. The seamen pledged portions of their salaries to the revolutionary government. 47 The mechanics associa­ tion also helped in raising fund.48 The students of the Yüeh-chih Girls' School raised money by selling their handiwork in an exhibi­ tion.49 Hundreds of people in Hong Kong responded to the call to subscribe to provide medicine for the People's Army (min-chün) in Canton.50

At a time of revolutionary war the Chinese communities in Hong Kong and Canton showed concerns not only for the Cantonese but also for their countrymen in other parts of China. On October 26, 1911, an East Kwangtung Red Cross Society was founded by a group of Cantonese civic leaders, including Hong Kong businessmen such as Li Yü-t'ang (revolutionary veteran ), Ma Ying-piao (of the Sincere Co.), Ch'en Ch'un-ch'uan (a Teochiu merchant of the Yuen Fat Hong), and Yin Wen-k'ai (doctor). They called upon their compatriots to

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 251



contribute money to procure medicine and medical personnel for the wounded in Wuhan.51

In December 1911 the Hong Kong Chinese General Commercial Union joined with the Tung Wah Hospital and other charitable orga­ nizations in the colony to sponsor subscriptions for procuring food, clothes, and medicine for hundreds of thousands of war refugees in Hupei and flood refugees in Anhui.52 Men and women went from door to door soliciting subscriptions. The amount of individual con­ tributions ranged from ten or twenty cents or a dollar to a hundred dollars or more, the great majority being very small contributions. Tens of thousands of Chinese from all classes in the colony sub­ scribed. In about a month, by January 18, 1912, a sum of eighty-two thousand dollars had been collected, in addition to a case of medi­ cine, seven thousand clothes and one hundred and ten thousand pounds of cakes. All these were conveyed to the Chinese and For­ eign Relief Society (Hua-yang i-chen hui) in Shanghai for distribution to the refugees.53

Merchants and students in Hong Kong also helped to promote the military expedition against the royalist forces in the north. Thirty- four Hong Kong merchants sponsored a fund drive to organize a Determined-to-Die Northern Expedition Troop in Canton under Chu Shao-t'ing's command.54 Several thousand dollars were collected in a few days—a result of small contributions by many hundreds of Chinese residents in Hong Kong, again indicating the politicization of the populace in the British colony. The Hongkong Hotel employees pledged ten percent of their monthly income until the formal estab­ lishment of a republican government for a unified China. A group of theatrical troupes contributed over a thousand dollars. And men and woman fund-raisers frequented restaurants, brothels, and theaters soliciting contributions. 5 Over a hundred overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia had assembled in Hong Kong and were organized into an Overseas Chinese Bomb Troop.56 A Women's Northern Ex­ pedition Troop was also created, which consisted of thirty or forty women, mostly teachers and students from Hong Kong and Macao.57 Eventually, the Kwangtung Northern Expedition Army consisted

of about eight thousand well-armed troops, recruited mainly from the New Army, Chinese youths from overseas, T'ung-meng-hui members, and Triads. Under the general command of Yao Yü-p'ing,

252 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



the expedition forces first sailed to Shanghai and then proceeded to Nanking. By defeating the Ch'ing forces at Shu-chow and Hsu-chow in Anhui, they contributed a great deal to secure Nanking for the republican revolutionary forces.58 With Nanking secured. Sun Yat- sen and other revolutionaries entered into lengthy negotiations with the Ch'ing royalist Yüan Shih-k'ai. It was not until February 12,1912, that the Manchus abdicated and Yüan Shih-k'ai pledged his support of the republic. On the following day. Sun Yat-sen stepped down as the provisional president of the republic in favor of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Tensions continued unabated, however, between the Kuomintang revolutionaries and Yüan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang forces in the north.



Rights Recovery Movement and Native Goods Promotion Movement

With the rapid growth of Chinese-owned industrial enterprises since 1905, Chinese nationalism was reflected in the concurrent move­ ments to boycott foreign goods, to recover national rights, and to promote "national products." Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs used patriotism as a vehicle to assert their interests; as usual, sec­ tional interests were being equated with national interests. Commer­ cial advertisements in the Hong Kong native press abounded with appeals to patriotism in time of revolution as in time of boycott.

Restaurants sold cakes on which were imprinted the Hupei gov­ ernor's seal and the republican flag. The national flags were used as trademarks for liquor. The Hua-lo-yüan Restaurant advertised that it would donate one day's earnings to the fund for the People's Army in Canton. A medicine labelled "manufactured blood" was adver­ tised as a panacea for a "hundred diseases" and for "strengthening our race and state." The Oriental Printing Company printed large and small republican flags for sale to the Chinese compatriots. The Connaught Aerated Water Factory advertised to help "restore [Chi­ na's] sovereign rights" by producing high quality aerated water for the compatriots.59

The Chinese Association for the Promotion of National Products was set up in Shanghai by Wu T'ing-fang and others. The Hong Kong Chinese Commercial Union supported its effort to recover China's sovereign rights by promoting native goods.60 The China Felt Cap Factory produced "fashionable and beautiful straw hats" for

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 253



sale to "our fellow compatriots," to help restore "our interests and sovereign rights."61 The Yung-hsin Li-min Machine Weaving Com­ pany in Chiu-chiang, founded by five Hong Kong businessmen, aimed to help promote China's industry and thereby enrich the country and benefit the people.62 The Kwang-hsin Weaving Com­ pany (with twin locations in Canton and Hong Kong, and agencies in Shanghai, Foochow, Chiang-men, Singapore and Penang) pro­ duced socks, shirts, and underwear to promote native goods and to help restore the nation's interests and sovereign rights.63 For the Chinese entrepreneur, the promotion of an enterprise in pursuit of self-interest was identical with the recovery of the nation's interest and sovereign rights.

The inauguration of the Bank of Canton in Hong Kong on Western lines is another illustration of merchants' patriotism. It was closely related to the Canton Bank of San Francisco. With a registered capital of two million dollars provided by Chinese shareholders in the United States, Hong Kong, and Australia, the Bank of Canton aimed to "strive for the national polity, recover the nation's interests and rights, and promote commerce and facilitate communication."64



The Mongolia Issue

Chinese patriotism was also revealed in the Mongolia issue. The republican revolution had precipitated a declaration of Outer Mogo- lian independence from China on December 28,1911. Russia steadily increased its influence and power over Outer Mongolia by arming and training the Mongol army. In November 1912 a Russian-Mongo- lian convention recognized Outer Mongolia's autonomy and Russia's economic privileges in Mongolia. In November 1913 China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia agreed on the formula of Chinese suzerainty and Outer Mongolian autonomy, which actually meant Russian domination over Mongolia.65

Russian advances in Outer Mongolia aroused a general anti-Rus­ sian feeling among the Chinese. Chinese newspapers in Peking pub­ lished "inflammatory" articles and telegrams from the provinces showing that "the people throughout the country are greatly excited on the subject." 6By November 1912 some twelve thousand Chinese troops had proceeded from northern military depots into Inner Mon­ golia to counter the Russian advance. Even as far west as Szechwan

254 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



people volunteered for war with Russia/ and as far south as Canton arrangements were made for dispatching troops to Mongolia.67

In late November 1912 when a "war fever" hit Canton, an appeal to the Dare to Dies was posted about the colony of Hong Kong to this effect: "Fight! Fight! To your horses and onward to St. Peters­ burg to blow up the Emperor of Russia." These notices were promptly tom down by the colony's police.68 A Peking newspaper reported that a telegram was received from the Tu-tu (military governor) of Canton stating the the Chinese in Hong Kong had been very earnest regarding the Russo-Urga affair and had raised a large sum of money to be forwarded to Peking as soon as the Mongolian expedition was decided upon.69 The Tu-tu had also received $3,620 from Chinese communities in Thailand.70

The Chinese in Hong Kong became so hostile to Russia that they boycotted a Russian aviator's flying exhibition in Shatin on Saturday and Sunday, December 14-15, 1912. Not a single Chinese was on board the special trains provided by the railway authorities going out to Shatin. It was the "most complete" boycott that had so far been witnessed in the colony. Later, in January 1913 the Chinese of Hanoi also boycotted the Russian aviator, and bills announcing his flights were tom down.71 On April 12, 1913, a Chinese was charged with causing an obstruction in Water Street in Hong Kong, where he was addressing a crowd of some two hundred people and distributing pamphlets related to the Russian aggression in Mongolia. The defen­ dant described himself as an engineering student at Kowloon Docks. On previous occasions he had managed to slip away on the approach of the police. But this time he was arrested and fined five dollars or seven days in prison.72

Political revolution was an agency of national awareness. The 1911 revolution stimulated national consciousness among the Chinese in many parts of the country. In Hong Kong, Chinese nationalism manifested itself in many ways—in the spontaneous popular jubila­ tion over the fall of Manchus and the founding of the republic; in the subscription campaigns for the Chinese revolution; in the rights recovery movement and the national products promotion move­ ment; in the Mongolian issue; and also in a movement to revive Confucianism.

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 255



Revival of Confucianism

During the years of republican revolution of 1911-1912, when the Chinese were supposed to be making a distinct departure from the beliefs and traditions of the past, there was paradoxically a move­ ment to revive Confucianism in Hong Kong. In previous years the anniversary of Confucius' birthday (the 27th day of the eighth lunar month) did not attract much attention. But now it was celebrated with much enthusiasm. To make arrangements for the celebration a large committee was set up in late September 1911, which consisted of about three hundred and fifty prominent merchants and commer­ cial firms in the colony.73

On October 18, 1911, most of the Chinese business stores were closed for the occasion, and the streets were decorated with colorful lanterns, flags, and Confucius' portraits. Joyous music was played.74 At the Tai Ping Theatre, the president of the local Confucian Society, Lau Chu Pak (comprador to Messrs. A.S. Watson & Co.), addressed an audience of more than four thousand: "It was due to Confucius that the principle and virtue governing human relationships still existed in China; that the mind of the Chinese still has vitality; and that China is still conscious of what is justice."75 Lau Chu Pak re­ ported that the Hong Kong Confucian Society had set up eleven schools in Hong Kong and Kwangtung, with a total of over one thousand students being taught gratis. He praised Governor Sir Frederick Lugard for being concerned with the education of the Chinese youths in the colony, saying that this was in accordance with Confucius' teaching. Lau Chu Pak also reported that the Con­ fucian Society had engaged three preachers to preach Confucius' doctrines on board the river steamers and elsewhere, and that such doctrines were also preached to appreciative audiences at the soci­ ety's hall every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evening. Lau Chu Pak concluded his long speech with the assertion that the moral principles and "uplifting power of Confucianism" would confer "a blessing on China as a nation."76 The anniversary of Confucius' birthday during the first year of the republic on October 7, 1912, was again celebrated with extraordinary enthusiasm in Hongkong and Canton. 7

But why the paradoxical revival of Confucianism during the years of republican revolution against the old political faiths? Confucianism

256 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



provided a focus for the Chinese people in their search for identity as a nation. Indeed, the Hong Kong Confudan Sodety pointedly asserted that it aimed to develop "Confudan and Mendan national­ ism" (K'ung Meng min-tsu chu-i).78 At the same time, however, the colonial authorities encouraged the cult of Confucianism because the Confudan ideology promoted by the Chinese elite was conservative in nature, pladng great emphasis on "instruction in moral prindple" as "the life and soul of a nation," and on the inculcation in young people of the duties of loyalty, fraternity, and filial piety.

The British colonists heartily approved of this interpretation of Confucianism.79 In the revival of Confudanism the main objective of both the Chinese elite and the colonial authorities coindded—to revive a conservative ideology for better sodal control. To both, the propagation of Confucianism was most opportune, indeed, for the years of the republican revolution saw rampant dvil disobedience and popular unrest, which took the forms of "rowdysm," "hooligan­ ism," and labor strikes in Hong Kong. It seemed that the merchants attempted to restore Confudanism as the hegemonic ideology that had held the Chinese community together under the elite's leader­ ship in the good old days of the 1870s and 1880s. But in the new milieu of a complex, heterogeneous sodety in the twentieth century it proved only a vain, quixotic attempt.



"Rowdyism" and "Hooliganism"

The Chinese revolution politicized the masses of Hong Kong to an extent never previously attained. This was further reflected in popu­ lar dvil disobedience, which took the form of rampant "hooliganism" and "rowdyism" in the streets. On November 18, 1911, Police Con­ stable Clark was stoned by a crowd while attempting to make an arrest at Cross Street, Wanchai. On the following day, as Acting Sergeant Atwell arrested a Chinese for tearing an earring from a woman's ear in Hollywood Road, a large crowd gathered and at­ tempted to drag the prisoner from the sergeant, who had to tire his revolver in the air to disperse the crowd. Another crowd made a demonstration outside the Yaumati Police Station on November 20, where the police were loudly hooted and jeered. The cause of this was the arrest of a man for the attempted snatching of a woman's wristlet.80

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 257



Purse snatching was nothing other than a petty crime, but the crowd's hostility to the colony's policemen bent on arresting the offender showed popular animosity towards British colonial rule. The most daring assault on the police occurred on November 20. As Sergeant Willis arrested a man for snatching a hat from a country­ man, a large crowd of about one thousand assembled and demanded the release of the prisoner. Sergeant Willis, who spoke excellent Chinese, attempted to explain why the man was arrested, but the crowd was determined to rescue the offender. Shouting ta farikwei (strike the foreign devil), they threw bricks and stones at the police­ man, who took shelter in the Fun Fong Bird Shop. The crowd fu­ riously attacked and wrecked the shop.81 Such cases of the colony's policemen being mobbed by the crowd were of frequent occurrence. Incidents involving stone-throwing at police continued to occur for several months, not only in Victoria City and Kowloon but also in villages.®

To deal with "rowdyism" and "hooliganism" an amendment of the Peace Preservation Ordinance of 1886 was rushed through the Legislative Council on November 30, reintroducing the flogging of prisoners.83 During the three months from December 1911 to Febru­ ary 1912, fifty-one prisoners were flogged with the cat-o'-nine-tails for such offences as theft, assaults on the police, and resisting arrest. At the same time, two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery were sent from India to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison.84

In ordinary times the snatching of jewelry from ladies was a form of crime so detested by the Chinese that they always gave the most eager assistance to the police. The fact that now in such criminal cases the crowd should have resented the arrest of the offender by the police was significant.85The Hong Kong populace, politicized by the Chinese revolution, expressed displeasure with colonialism in willful civil disobedience. On December 9, 1911, it was reported to Governor Lugard that "an antiforeign gang" loudly declared that Hong Kong should be returned to China, and that it was their inten­ tion to poison the whole of the troops on Christmas Day. This report might have originated among the European residents themselves, but it was circulated among the Chinese. The animus of the crowds was shown by their shouts to "strike" or "kill" the foreigners.86

In a confidential report to London Governor Lugard stated that the feeling of hostility towards the colonial authorities was "confined

258 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



to certain of the lower classes, some of whom riff-raff from Canton." He commented that "their heads have become swollen by the con­ templation at a safe distance of the exploits of others in 'the emanci­ pation of China from the foreign (Manchu) yoke', and their heads deprived of the queue have become unbalanced."87Thus, the gover­ nor conceded that the Hong Kong Chinese populace, much inspired by the emancipation of China from die Manchu foreign yoke, dreamed about its own emancipation from British colonial rule. This showed the dose linkage between anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist senti­ ments. The fate of the Manchu dynasty and the position of foreign powers in China were linked, as the theory of Sino-foreign synarchy suggests. A "Sino-British synarchy" was created in China by the unequal treaty system after 1860, a synarchy in which the Chinese sovereignty was "overlaid or supplanted by that of the treaty pow­ ers." 8 The overthrow of the Manchus let loose a flood of anti­ imperialist sentiment and activities in the British colony. The Chinese crowds seemed to feel that now the Manchus were gone the privi­ leged foreigners had to go too. The Chinese revolution aggravated their resentment against being treated as a subject people.

Mr. Murray Stewart, a prominent member of the legislative coun­ cil, was "elbowed off the pavement in Queen's Road and into the gutter by a half-naked Chinese coolie."89 In some cases, European ladies were attacked in the streets. The general manager of the Hong­ kong Tramway Company, J. J. Stodard Kennedy, urged the govern­ ment to act with suffident firmness against forces of disorder. As his work involved "fairly dose observation of large numbers of lower- dass Chinese," he "saw frequently a truculently insolent attitude of the people travelling on cars and elsewhere towards Europeans." He reported "the rush of Europeans to buy firearms."90

Governor Lugard observed that the feeling of hostility was not shared by "respectable Chinese" in the colony.91 Living in security and prosperity under the British flag and maintaining dose economic ties to foreign capitalism, the "respectable Chinese" were eager to cooperate with the colonial authorities to maintain peace and order. They did not approve of popular outbursts of "rowdyism" and "hoo­ liganism" as valid expressions of patriotism. In the legislative council meeting, November 30, Ho Kai and Wei Yuk applauded Governor Lugard's speech regarding the need to suppress street disturbances. They voted for the amendment of the Peace Preservation Ordinance,

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 259



which authorized corporal punishment of "rowdies" in prison.92The wealthy Chinese merchants who served on the District Watchmen's Committee took energetic measures to help prevent further popular unrest by engaging lecturers to persuade the people to observe gov­ ernment regulations and keep the peace.93

Yet social unrest continued unabated. The colonial government became deeply concerned that the "peculiar and distorted views of 'independence' ["freedom" or tzu-yu] bred by the Revolution and interpreted to his own liking by every coolie, will have a permanent effect on the traditional submission to regulation which has hitherto simplified the duties of officials."94 Unlike earlier cases of popular unrest such as those that occurred in 1884,1888,1894,1895, and 1908 when strikers and rioters had some specific grievances and demands, the populace in 1911-12 held a general sense of discontent about British colonial rule. Confronted with "considerable disorder of a novel kind,"95 the Chinese merchant elite were powerless to exert influence over their countrymen. In fact, some "respectable Chinese gentlemen" themselves were subjected to harassment of the "row­ dies." On November 22,1911, a gentleman was roughly elbowed off the pavement by a Chinese in Des Voeux Road Central. And on November 24 Mr. Kotewell's brother (a Eurasian) and two friends had their queues seized and pulled by "roughs." They hurried to a restaurant, from the verandah of which they saw several Chinese gentlemen similarly treated.96

Anticolonial civil disobedience was committed not merely by cool­

ies but also by some shopkeepers who were among the disorderly crowds. On February 27, 1912, a shopkeeper named Chan Sing and several others assaulted the Indian Police Constable Roor Singh.97 On January 2, 1912, a shopkeeper was arrested by a European con­ stable for obstruction and for calling upon his folk to strike the officers.98 And on November 24,1911, a Chinese, "well-dressed and apparently of the better class, seized a public chair in which Mr. Bullock was riding, and in an insulting manner thrust his face with a cigar in his mouth into Mr. Bullock's face—he went away laugh­ ing." 9 Republican revolutionaries were also among the crowds in­ volved in enforced queue-cutting and other cases.1 0 A sense of rev­ olution so permeated the colony that even school children became politicized. Two Chinese schoolboys, after leaving school on Decem­ ber 25,1911, had an argument concerning the revolution. The tiff led

260 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



to a quarrel and one boy took a pocket knife out of his pocket and slashed the other on the throat. The wounded boy was taken to the hospital.101



Compositors' Strike, October 20-December 12, 1911

The Chinese revolution contributed to the general feeling of unrest in Hong Kong. Popular unrest also took the form of labor strikes. Workers demanded legitimate rights to higher wages and better treatment from their European and Chinese employers. On October 20, 1911, a Chinese employee was assaulted by a European in the office of the South China Morning Post. Infuriated, all Chinese printers and compositors of the Morning Post went on strike. By mid-Novem­ ber, the strike was extended to the office of the Hongkong Telegraph, which came to the assistance of the Morning Post. The police arrested three leaders of the compositors' guild on the night of November 17, one of whom was banished to Macao. Immediately, on the following morning, a general strike of the compositors and printing machine hands was declared, involving about six hundred people. All the printing business in Hong Kong was affected.102

The Chinese Compositors' Guild was a modem trade union orga­ nization formed by the employees ''as a weapon for enforcing their terms on [their] opponents." It maintained connections with the guild of the same trade in Canton.103As skilled workers could not be easily replaced, the sabotage of work in Hong Kong went on for several weeks. The strike was ordered by the guild with the idea that by paralyzing the whole printing and publishing business of the colony, the government would be forced to cancel the order of ban­ ishment issued against the guild leaders. When it became known that wholesale prosecutions were contemplated by the Chinese mas­ ter printers, a large number of the men departed on the night of November 21 for Canton, the fares being paid out of the guild funds. The strikers threatened death to anyone who went back to their employment without the guild's sanction.104

The colonial authorities were convinced that "the strike was engi­ neered by agitators who put their own curious interpretation on the revolutionary doctrine of 'independence' and wished to show the power of their guild," and that they seized on the opportunity of-

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 261



fered by the "small trouble" of an assault by a European on a Chinese to order a strike.105The compositors employed in the Chinese news­ paper offices had decided to resume work on December 3, but learn­ ing later on that day that the European papers did not intend to reengage the whole of their men, they revoked their decision.106 It was not until December 12 that the compositors returned to work, in a few cases on rather better terms but generally on the same condi­ tions as before, while a few of the more "troublesome" men lost their appointments altogether.107 Beginning as a protest against the Euro­ pean employer's assault on a Chinese employee, it became clearly a case of labor dispute, with the organized workers of the guild turning against their European and Chinese employers in the printing busi­ ness. This again reflected certain degree of community disintegration in Hong Kong in the years around 1911.



Canton Government's Attitude Towards Hong Kong Civil Disorder

What was the attitude of the Canton republican government toward the social unrest in the British colony? Ironically, it disapproved of the labor strike and anticolonial popular movements that were in­ spired by the revolution in Canton. Governor Lugard attributed the "very great increase of rowdyism" in Hong Kong to an influx of "bad characters" from the mainland. He requested the tutu (military gov­ ernor) of Kwangtung, Hu Han-min, to help prevent the departure for Hong Kong of "bad characters" and to promote the "friendly feelings" between Canton and Hong Kong.108 Eager to win British approval and support, the new revolutionary government in Canton responded favorably. In fact, the tutu had written to the Chinese Press Association in Hong Kong, deprecating "rowdyism" and labor strikes, which, the tutu said, did not help the revolutionary cause.109 Yet Governor Lugard was apprehensive of the tutu's political power and influence over the Chinese in the colony. He asserted that it was not "advisable" for the tutu to directly cause the Hong Kong press to print the Canton official notice.

The Canton revolutionary government's attitude towards the Brit­ ish colonial government was no less paradoxical. The revolutionaries resented the colonial government for its hostility to the revolution.

262 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



But once in power, the Canton revolutionaries, although still resent­ ful, sought to cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the colonial authorities.

The revolutionaries in Canton had a number of grievances against the Hong Kong authorities. During the course of revolution the British colonial authorities had not remained "neutral/' Rather, they had placed numerous obstacles in the way of the revolution. On April 27, 1911, at the request of the Ch'ing government. Governor Lugard stopped all steamers and railway traffic from Hong Kong to Canton, to prevent the revolutionaries from sending reinforcements to the embattled Chinese city.110 The colonial authorities had at­ tempted to ban all revolutionary activities in the colony. A number of revolutionaries were banished from Hong Kong. Sun Yat-sen had been expelled and banned from the colony for fifteen years—since 1896. As late as November 19, 1911, when Sun applied for permis­ sion to visit Hong Kong, the colonial authorities reluctantly permit­ ted him to pass through Hong Kong on the condition that he would not reside in the colony and use it as a base for political operations in China. 1 Apprehensive of the Chinese revolutionaries' political in­ fluence over the Chinese in Hong Kong, Governor Lugard added another condition—Sun should not be received with a great ova­ tion. 12

In fact, the British colonial government sought to discourage the Chinese revolution in every way, even after Canton had passed into the revolutionaries' hands. Keeping the docile Manchu government in power in Peking seemed preferable to having a nationalist revolu­ tionary government that posed as a potential threat to foreign impe­ rialism in China. At the end of November 1911 the Canton revolu­ tionary government approached a British broker named Ray to char­ ter ships for the transport of troops to North China presumably for an attack on Peking, but the Hong Kong government forbade such shipments. Failing this, the Canton revolutionaries decided that the troops would be conveyed in vessels of the China Merchants Steam­ ship Company, a Chinese company. But Governor Lugard would not allow the vessels either to enter the Hong Kong harbor or to pass through the Hong Kong waters. Again, to discourage the revolution the traffic on the Kowloon-Canton Railway was suspended on No­ vember 6 and was not resumed until December 4,1911. 13

For these reasons, the Canton government held a strong anti-

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 263



British feeling, as the consul general, J. W. Jamieson, reported. 14 The precarious new Canton government, however, did not wish to alienate the omnipresent British imperialists. In fact, it sought to cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the British colonial authori­ ties in Hong Kong, because it looked to the banking institutions and Chinese mercantile community in Hong Kong for assistance in finan­ cial matters. When the Hong Kong colonial secretary, Mr. C. Clem­ ent, visited Canton on December 9, 1911, he found the Chinese officials "more than friendly"—they were inclined "to accept Hong Kong as a model" rather than resent the British presence there. 15

The Canton government's attempt to court British colonial author­ ities' goodwill eventually led to its alienation from the colony's Chinese populace. To win British approval and support, the Canton govern­ ment found itself in a position of deprecating popular unrest in Hong Kong. It was an irony that the Canton revolutionary government should have disapproved of the anticolonial popular movements in Hong Kong, which were inspired by the revolution in Canton. The tutu of Canton discouraged the Hong Kong compositors' strike in 1911. The year 1912 witnessed several labor strikes for higher wages and better working conditions in the British colony.



Labor Strikes in 1912

The paucity of sources allows only brief discussion of these labor strikes against employers, which in the years around 1912 still did not pose a serious threat to social order in the colony. It was not until the early 1920s that labor disputes turned into large-scale workers' strikes. The strikes in 1912 were sporadic and on a small scale.

In May 1912 the washerman employees in Victoria went on strike for better wages. The odd-job workers, paid on a daily scale, de­ manded an increase of wages from sixty to seventy cents a day, and the regular workmen on monthly salary demanded a raise of two dollars a month. To divide the employees, the masters acceded to the demand of the regular workmen but not the odd-job workers. Thereupon, all the employees including regular workmen staged a strike. But after three days a settlement was reached. 16

The Washermen's Guild possessed some characteristics of a mod­ em trade union. The Mat-bag Packers' Guild and Painters' Guild did as well. In August, some seventy mat bag packers employed at the

264 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



Sugar Refinery at Quarry Bay went on strike for several days. But it came to an end by August 13, when additional men were brought to work.117 Unskilled workers had little bargaining power, because there were plenty of laborers around. There was also a strike of the em­ ployees of the Painters' Guild in August. The men demanded a raise of five cents a day. When this was granted, they further demanded a fixed minimum wage for all members of the guild. But the real cause was a wish to force masters to engage apprentices at full wages. The strike was shortly given up. 18In September a strike occurred among the junkmen engaged in carrying stones for the new Harbor of Ref­ uge at Mongkok. Their demand for higher wages was refused, but some small concessions by the contractors resulted in a resumption of work by all the junkmen except the two ringleaders, who lost their jobs. 19 In November there was still another strike of casual laborers employed in pounding rice. Some two hundred and fifty rice-poun­ ders demanded a raise of wages from twenty-two cents to thirty cents a day. But their masters could easily replace such unskilled workers. The masters made small concessions, and the strikers re­ turned to work at the end of a week.120

Finally, there were the chair and ricksha coolies, whose legal fares, set by the government, were so low as to cause constant complaint. The government made various regulations to control these traffic coolies. In protest against the increased amount of fines and penalties imposed on the offenders, 2,200 ricksha pullers and 1,340 chair bear­ ers went on strike on October 29, 1912. The owners of the vehicles urged the government to suppress the strike. On the afternoon of October 30 the coolies agreed to resume work on the understanding that the punitive regulations be investigated.121

The Canton revolutionary government's attitude towards the labor movement underwent some changes. Before 1911 the T'ung-meng- hui revolutionaries had been active among workers in Hong Kong, especially skilled and semiskilled workers such as mechanics and seamen, seeking to assist them and to recruit them for the revolution­ ary forces. But once the revolutionaries came to power in Canton, they felt constrained by circumstances to turn their back on the labor movement. The precarious new government in Canton did not wish to alienate the British by encouraging "rowdyism" and labor unrest in Hong Kong. Looking to the banks and the Chinese merchants in Hong Kong for financial assistance, the new Canton government was

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 265



eager to cultivate the goodwill of the British colonial authorities. In quest of British approval and support, the Canton government turned its back on the labor movement and ended up alienating the Chinese working people, which eventually helped to pave the way for its eclipse in August 1913.

The young Chinese republican government had not been liberal in its labor policy. Although the Provisional Constitution of the Chinese Republic, adopted in March 1912, provided for freedom of associa­ tion, it made no special mention of workers. The freedom of associa­ tion supposedly guaranteed by the constitution was much restricted by Article 224 of the Provisional Penal Code, whereby strikes were prohibited and severe penalties of fines and imprisonment were prescribed for the strikers and their leaders. The Kuomintang's es­ pousal of the worker's cause would come only in 1919, after the May Fourth incident.1 2

In Hong Kong the labor movement enjoyed no legal protection. The Trades Union Acts of 1871, 1876, and 1906, instituted in Great Britain, did not apply to the colony of Hong Kong. Consequently, every association formed by workers for the purpose of promoting better wages was illegal, its action being "in restraint of trade"; each of its members was liable to be prosecuted and imprisoned for con­ spiracy and also accountable for damages for inducing employees to leave their employment.123In short, collective actions by the colony's workers in labor disputes enjoyed no legal protection. Frustrations in life and in work nurtured among the lower-class Chinese a strong feeling of animosity towards the colonial authorities, which was fre­ quently expressed in extralegal means, such as assaults on the col­ ony's police and British officials.



Assaults on Governor Sir F. Henry May

Sir Frederick Lugard's tenure as governor of Hong Kong expired in early 1912. Ho Kai and Wei Yuk joined with other unofficial members of the legislative council to petition London for an extension of his term. The petitioners praised Governor Lugard's administration, say­ ing that it "has commanded the respect and admiration not only of the British, but also to a very marked degree of the Chinese commu­ nity." The petitioners suggested that if Lugard's term as governor could not be extended, then Sir F. Henry May should be appointed

266 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



as the new governor.124 The veteran former official of Hong Kong enjoyed such a strong reputation for being a disciplinarian that Lon­ don now decided to appoint him as the new governor. Lugard left Hong Kong on March 16,1912, to take up the government of Nigeria. The colonial secretary, Claud Severn, administered the Hong Kong government until the arrival of Sir F. Henry May on July 4.125 But the comings and goings of the governors made no difference to the working people in Hong Kong and brought no change to their daily struggle for a living.

Governor May was an old China hand. He had been with the Hong Kong colonial service for twenty-eight years, from 1881 to January 1911, when he had been transfered to Fiji as governor and high commissioner for the South Pacific. With a command of both Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese, he had held various positions in Hong Kong. Yet he was best known by the Chinese as the former head of the police and jail. As the police chief for nearly a decade, he had distinguished himself in suppressing both the coolie strike in 1895 and file popular resistance to British occupation of the New Territories in 1899. He did not commend himself to the coolies; he often had trouble finding chair and ricksha coolies willing to work for him. He was the author of several publications, including a Guide to Cantonese and several manuals for use in the police force.126 After an absence from the colony for one and a half years, the fifty-two- year-old Sir F. Henry May, a man of "a fearless impetuosity," re­ turned to Hong Kong as its new governor on July 4,1912.127

In a secret dispatch to the Colonial Office in London, Sir Henry revealed with remarkable frankness "the real feelings of the mass of the population towards Englishmen in this Colony." He was gravely concerned about "the animosity against foreigners which, always existent in the Chinese mind, has been inflamed by the recent [Chinese] revolution." He pointed out that from the time of his arrival in Hong Kong, on July 4,1912, up to the end of the boycott of the tramway in February 1913 assaults on the police were of weekly occurrence. These took the form of, at times, the attempted rescue of prisoners and, on other occasions, throwing missiles from verandahs at the police. The governor himself was subjected to physical attacks. A stone was thrown into his motor car as he sat in it with his wife. On another occasion a bundle of lighted firecrackers was thrown at a vehicle while Sir Henry and his wife were in it; it struck the foot-

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 267



board. On still other occasions sticks, orange peels, and other mis­ siles were thrown at the car, also while the governor was riding in it.128The ex-police chief was greatly annoyed.

The gravest assault on Sir Henry May took place the very day of his arrival to take up the reins of the government—July 4, 1912. Having inspected the guards of honor at Blake Pier, Governor and Lady May and their daughters got into sedan chairs, which were accompanied with the procession to City Hall to receive an address of welcome from the community. Sir Henry's chair was on the right and Lady May's chair on the left. There were four Indian constables on each side. Behind them were other police, and the streets were lined with troops. The sedan chairs had proceeded about fifty yards when suddenly a Chinese carrying a revolver ran out between the troops and between the second and third Indian constables, put his hand and elbow on the chair occupied by Sir Henry, and pointed the revolver point blank at Sir Henry's head. The Indian constable Kala Singh promptly threw up the assailant's arm, while Sergeant Garrod ran forward to seize his wrist. The pistol discharged, but the bullet missed Sir Henry and lodged in the canopy of Lady May's chair. The assailant struggled with Sergeant Garrod and attempted in vain to fire a second shot but was overpowered by the sergeant.129 As he was led away, the local English press reporters heard (apparently from among the Englishmen in the crowd of spectators) cries of “Lynch him," "Kill him," and "Let us have him."130

The prisoner, named Li Hon Hung, was a Cantonese, twenty-four

years of age, and the son of a former Hong Kong constable from a lower-class background. After his arrest, he declared that he was determined to assassinate Sir Henry May, owing to his detestation of the British. Li Hon Hung named several grievances against the Brit­ ish colonial authorities: first, the ill-treatment of Chinese in Hong Kong and in South Africa, including the compulsory repatriation of Chinese coolies employed in the mines in the latter place. Second, the prohibition of the circulation in Hong Kong of Chinese copper coins issued in Canton, which, he claimed, was an interference with the Canton republican government. And third, Li Hon Hung's father had been dismissed from the Hong Kong police force by then police chief Henry May, because, while holding the position of a detective in the Hong Kong service, Li's father was also found to be in the pay of Canton officials.131Thus, personal grievances and patriotic feelings

268 Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution



converged to impell Li Hong Hung to action. Li Hon Hung was subsequently tried on July 17 in a large courtroom filled with some five hundred persons, in addition to the Chinese crowds who gath­ ered round the entrance to the law court to catch a glimpse of the defendant. His lordship sentenced Li Hon Hung to life imprisonment with hard labor.132

On July 6 a deputation representing various Chinese elite associa­ tions waited upon his excellency the governor at Government House with reference to the assassination incident. Sir Kai Ho Kai, acting as the spokesman, expressed "the horror and consternation of the Chinese at the dastardly outrage, and expressed their profound sym­ pathy." The local English press described the audience with the governor as follows:

The deputation assured the Governor of the loyalty of the Chinese to the British Crown and of the esteem and affectionate attachment that they had for Sir Henry May as His Majesty's representative, as a personal friend and a Chinese well-wisher The Governor, in

reply, thanked the deputation and said he knew at the time the crime was committed that it would be abhorrent to none more than to the Chinese community, and had at once attributed it either to some person having spite or to some members of the secret soci­ eties to whom the policy of the British Government in maintaining law and order was distasteful. The Governor felt sure that law- abiding Chinese would render assistance in maintaining good gov­ ernment in the Colony. The deputation then withdrew.1 3

"The loyalty of the Chinese to the British Crown" and "the esteem and affectionate attachment for Sir Henry May,"—perhaps these

words truly expressed the feelings of some prosperous elite Chinese in the colony but not of the lower-class masses, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population.

The attempt on Governor Sir Henry May's life had not been con­ nected with any political plot. In Sir Henry's view, it was "the act of a man who if not mad must be of weak intellect."134 Whatever his personal view of the assailant's intellect. Sir Henry frankly conceded in a secret despatch to London that "the real feelings of the mass of the population towards Englishmen in this Colony" could be de­ scribed in one word—"animosity." The governor pointed to the fol­ lowing incident for illustration: when the police searched the assail­ ant's lodging, they found a letter written by a Chinese woman of the

Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution 269



peasant class in whose miserably poor dwelling the assailant had lodged. The letter was intended to be sent to her relative in Canton. The police opened the letter to see if it gave any clue to a plot. It dealt with many domestic details such as the recent sale of a pig and concluded with these words: incidently, "yesterday my lodger fired a pistol at the Governor of Hong Kong and most unfortunately missed him." The governor himself commented that the woman "merely regretted that I had not been killed, as one might regret that one's terrier had missed a rat in the ditch."135

The Chinese revolution therefore served as a vehicle for accentuat­ ing the anticolonial discontentment of the people as well as fostering nationalistic sentiment, which found expression again in the orga­ nized tramway boycott in 1912-13.

T E N

The Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway, 1912-13



A ll of us . . . should refuse to travel by the company's trams Indeed all our fellow-

countrymen should speedily awake.

—A n-ya Pao, Canton, November 28,1912



The boycott of the Hong Kong Electric Tramway was precipitated by the tramway company's refusal to accept Chinese coins (minted in Canton) in payment of fare. It aroused strong feelings of hostility among the Chinese in Hong Kong against the European-operated tramway company. The boycott lasted more than two months, from late November 1912 to early February 1913. Why were the Chinese feelings so strong and the boycott so persistent? Who promoted the boycott? What motivated the populace to engage in boycott? What did the boycott reveal about social relations in the British colony and about the Chinese revolutionary government in Canton? The an­ swers to these questions must begin with the politics of Canton and Hong Kong.



Prelude to Boycott: Canton and Hong Kong Politics

The Kwangtung revolutionary government had led a precarious ex­ istence since its founding on November 9, 1911. It exercised little authority beyond the dty of Canton and its suburbs. At the head of the Canton government was Hu Han-min, the tutu of Kwangtung. Under him, Ch'en Chiung-ming ranked first as military official, com-

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 271



manding some twenty thousand to thirty thousand well-armed men. Another commander. Lung Chi-kwang, had an army of Kwangsi and Yiin-nan men whose numbers had dwindled from twelve thousand to three thousand by July 1912. There were other groups of soldiers (such as that of Li Tang, an ex-robber, in Ho-nan, Kwangtung), but the connection between them and the Kwangtung provincial govern­ ment seemed very vague.1

The Kwangtung provincial treasury had been managed very badly. Lacking efficient machinery for collecting taxes, the government ex­ penditure exceeded its income. The monthly receipts of the Canton government were one million two hundred and fifty thousand dol­ lars and the expenditures two million. The financial supplies from Chinese abroad (to which the Chinese community of Hong Kong had contributed between two and three million dollars) had all been spent or embezzled. The government then issued notes worth twenty- two million dollars without any reserve to secure them, resulting in the notes being at a discount of between 30 and 40 percent. In July 1912 the Canton government approached the Hongkong and Shang­ hai Banking Corporation for a loan against the security of the govern­ ment Cement Works at Canton. Failing to obtain this, it again looked to Chinese abroad for loans. The financial situation seemed desper­ ate.2

The founding of the republican government in Canton had in­

spired high hopes and dreams among the Chinese in Hong Kong and Canton. They had responded with much enthusiasm to the monetary subscriptions for the new government. Within two or three months, however, that enthusiasm quickly began to wane, as the new government proved incapable of maintaining financial and polit­ ical stability in the province. In fact, "moneyed men in Hongkong and Canton and abroad are getting tired of pouring their money into a sieve, and they require some kind of security before subscribing much more."3

With close commercial ties to Canton, the Chinese merchants in Hong Kong were seriously concerned about the problems in Canton. As early as November 23, 1911, they calculated that they had lost "over five million dollars already by the stoppage of trade."4 As the situation had become worse by the summer of 1912, Ho Kai and Wei Yuk came up with a collaborationist idea. In a confidential conversa­ tion on July 12 they proposed to Governor Henry May that if finan-

272 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



dal aid could be given to the Canton government, it would accept British supervision of its expenditure and British advice in matters of administration. This coindded with Governor May's imperialist scheme to "reorganize" the administration of Kwangtung "under tadful and unostentatious British supervision and advice, backed if necessary by financial assistance." Governor May's only fear was the "demonstra­ tions by a mob which might resent even the semblance of the loss of independence." In response to the governor's suggestion, the Lon­ don colonial authorities remarked that "it would be an excellent thing

. . . to get the Province straight." But they dedded not to do so for fear of provoking protests from other powers, who might start pro­ tectorates over other provinces in China.5

While Ho Kai, Wei Yuk, and Governor Henry May were contem­ plating a collaborationist-imperialist scheme, the Canton government tried every possible device to improve its financial situation. It at­ tempted to induce the Chinese merchants of Kwangtung and Hong Kong to form a Canton and Hong Kong Co-operative Financial Com­ pany with a capital of five million dollars. This company would purchase Canton banknotes from the market at market price and deposit them with the Provincial Treasury Bank, hoping thereby to improve the notes' market value.6 But very few people had taken up the company's shares. In Hong Kong, "on account of various obsta- des and difficulties" merchants were unable to give their strenuous assistance.7 The greatest difficulty was, according to Governor May, the conviction of many Chinese merchants that the Canton govern­ ment under Hu Han-min was in grave danger of collapse. Abhorring the Canton government's exertion of influence over the colony's Chinese population, and convinced that Canton government would soon collapse. Governor May threw a number of obstades in its way, as if intending to hasten its fall. He warned the promoters of the Canton and Hong Kong Co-operative Financial Company that the levy of subscriptions was viewed with disfavor by the colony's gov­ ernment.8 Thus discouraged by the colonial authorities, the promo­ tion of the financial company was formally abandoned on September 3 , 1912.9

Yet, the dire financial straits gave the Canton government little option. The superintendent of the Canton Government Money De­ partment, Chau Lo, came to Hong Kong to contact the Money Changers' Guild to push the circulation in the colony of the Canton

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 273



banknotes. “The Society of Chinese Abroad for the Promotion of Patriotic Subscriptions" called upon the various Chinese guilds in the colony to send delegates to a meeting on October 5 at the Sze Yap Association in order to promote the Canton notes. It was re­ solved at the meeting that “the Canton notes should be taken as the standard and accepted in accordance with their face value," and that “the various Guilds should themselves draw up a scale of fines to be imposed for any breach of this requirement and appoint special officers to deal with the matter." The colonial authorities sought to ban such promotion activities in the colony, declaring it illegal to circulate foreign banknotes and instructing police to stop the “mis­ chief."10

The Canton government made further attempts to obtain patriotic subscriptions from overseas Chinese. Leaflets were distributed in Hong Kong calling upon patriotic Chinese in the colony to make monetary contributions to the republic—to avoid raising foreign loans and to protect “the rights and privileges of our nation." Again, the colonial authorities banned such subscriptions. The Canton govern­ ment then proposed to issue lottery loan bonds to the value of ten million dollars in small shares of ten dollars, with the periodic draw­ ings of many prizes. 1 But the colonial government also banned the bonds.12

In sum, colonial authorities threw a number of obstacles in the way of the Canton government, which sought desperately to alle­ viate its financial situation. They prohibited the circulation of Canton banknotes in Hong Kong, banned the Canton and Hong Kong Co­ operative Financial Company, and forbade the Canton lottery loan bonds. Such a series of unfriendly acts antagonized what the colonial authorities called the Young China Party in Hong Kong.13The most important and energetic agency of this party was the Sze Yap Asso­ ciation, which played a major role in the boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway. A description of the boycott and analysis of the boycott promoters and their motivations follows.



Boycott of Tramway

The boycott was touched off by the Hongkong Tramway Company's refusal to accept Chinese coins in payment of fare. On November 22, 1912, handwritten bills and caricatures advocating a boycott of the

274 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



trams were posted all over the colony from Shaukiwan to West Point. As mentioned previously, one caricature depicted the passengers of a tramcar as pigs, kangaroos, and other beasts. On November 24 a demonstration against the tramways took place at Shaukiwan. A crowd of about one thousand people gathered at the tramway termi­ nus and threatened the tramcars, calling "boycott." When Police Sergeant Ogg arrested a man, the crowd shouted out to strike the Sergeant and began to throw stones. A second man, who struggled violently with the police, was arrested. Inspector Gourlay had to threaten the crowd with his revolver before the arrested men could be removed to the police station.14

More notices urging a boycott were posted around the colony. Very few people used the trams on November 26. A disturbance took place in the Central District between Central and Western Markets. About one thousand people gathered in Des Voeux Central. The crowd mobbed and intimidated the tram passengers. A large force of police proceeded to the scene from the Central Station. The crowd threw stones and other missiles at the police. The police made four arrests, after which police pickets patrolled the tram route night and day. On November 28 fifty soldiers were sworn in as special consta­ bles to ride in the trams and as night pickets.15

The determination of the Chinese people to boycott die trams surprised the European community in the colony. Prior to the boy­ cott the tramcars were daily crowded with Chinese commuters, be­ cause the alternative was the jinricksha, a slower and more expensive means of locomotion. As the local English press reported, "in a Colony like Hongkong, where some thousands of Chinese are em­ ployed in factories and workshops, where time-sheets are kept, time means money. So that if the boycott means a heavy loss to the Tramway Company, it involves at the same time a considerable sacrifice on the part of the boycotters." Despite several successive days of rain in early December, which added to the inconvenience of not taking the tram, the boycott continued unabated.16

The boycott involved some cases of violence. At Wanchai, West Point, and other places, a number of passengers who alighted from the tramcar were said to be stabbed in the buttocks with sacking needles. But only one case of assault came to the notice of the police: a Chinese domestic servant employed by an European employee of the tramway company was attacked by several Chinese in the Central

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 275



Market after alighting from a tramcar.17Very few Chinese were using the trams, but of the few that were doing so, a large proportion were women, which seemed to indicate that apprehension of violence or intimidation was not sufficient cause for refusal to ride in the tram- cars.18



Government Measures

Eager to end the boycott, the colonial authorities enacted a Boycott Prevention Ordinance on December 15, and threatened to proclaim certain areas of the dty as "boycott areas," hence to levy a special tax on their inhabitants to compensate the tramway company for its losses. Deeply concerned that the governor might arbitrarily pro­ claim "boycott areas," Ho Kai gained assurance from him that "lead­ ing inhabitants" of a particular district would be consulted before the proclamation was issued.19

On December 18, 1912, Governor May convened a meeting of about one hundred and fifty leading members of the Chinese com­ mercial community. Addressing them on the subject of boycott, the governor said that the Hong Kong Tramway Company had in the past incurred a great loss in accepting Canton coins, which were lighter and cheaper than Hong Kong coins; that the company's cur­ rent decision to refuse Canton coins was purely a business transac­ tion and not meant to be an insult to China; and that the boycott was "unreasonable and foolish and . . . unjust," for the boycotters were trying to destroy a commercial concern of much benefit to the com­ munity and in which considerable Chinese capital was invested. The governor then urged the leading Chinese to show that the boycott was a misunderstanding by traveling themselves and bidding their employees to travel by tramway. After the governor's speech. Sir Kai Ho Kai, the Honorable Mr. Wei Yuk, and others spoke about the need to end the boycott. Many of these "leading Chinese" then proceeded to ride in the tram cars, hoping to set an example for others.20

Subsequently, on December 20, a meeting was held at the Chinese

Commercial Union at which both Ho Kai and Wei Yuk made speeches justifying the actions of the tramway company and the Hong Kong government. The meeting was, however, poorly attended.21 Ho Kai reminded the audience that if the malcontents brought about the

276 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



destruction of Hong Kong prosperity, they would bring misery not only to thousands in the colony but also to “millions in China," since the Chinese British subjects would no longer be as ready as in the past to help their poorer brothren in Kwangtung with money. 2 In other words, the "collaborationist patriot" Ho Kai reminded the Chinese in the colony that the "millions in China" would be better served, not by boycott but by cooperation with the colonial govern­ ment to maintain prosperity in Hong Kong. Patriotism was subject to different interpretations; it took different forms.

Hoping to induce the Chinese to use tramcars, the tramway com­ pany carried passengers free of charge for three days, from December 21 to 23. On the first day of free rides the tramcars were practically monopolized by Indian soldiers and Chinese children, who crowded the cars for fun all day, and there was little room for others with ordinary traveling purposes. On the second day the tramcars were occupied by a fair proportion of Chinese adults. And on the third and last day of free rides the cars were almost completely monopo­ lized by the former Chinese patrons of the cars with their customary baggage. After the three-day free rides were over, however, the tramcars were again deserted by the Chinese and the boycott re­ mained in full force.23

Once again it had been demonstrated that fear of intimidation was not a sufficient reason to explain the boycott movement. As we shall see, several reasons combined to sustain the anticolonial boycott movement.



Threatening Letters to Collaborators

Some "leading" Chinese who eagerly collaborated with the colonial authorities in an attempt to end the boycott received threatening letters. Mr. Lau Chu Pak received one from the Dare to Die Society. The Honorable Mr. Wei Yuk (Wei Po-shan) received more than one. Here is a threatening letter addressed jointly to Wei Yuk and Chan Kang Yu (Ch'en Keng-yü):

This is for your information, Po Shan. I cannot see that you have during your past life distinguished yourself in any other way than in flattering others, especially foreigners [T]o our surprise you

alleged that the tramway boycott was promoted by the upper classes, and societies had been formed for the purpose. . . . Let me ask

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 217



you who are the originators of these societies, where are these societies and what proof have you of their existence. On receipt of this letter you must publish in the papers for my information the people you have procured, otherwise I will show you no mercy. You are the only man who brings ruin upon us Chinese. The longer you remain in Hong Kong, the longer we Chinese residents cannot enjoy peace. . . . The tramway boycott is but an undertaking of individuals, yet that offensive [Governor] May caused an ordinance to be enacted by the Government. . . . [IJnstead of putting forth any argument against the enactment of the Ordinance, you on the other hand act with hostility towards us Chinese residents; and in fact you have conferred no single benefit on your fellow-country­ men. Why do you despise your fellow-countrymen so much? Have you not been informed that the wife of your younger brother carried on the business of a sly prostitute every night? Indeed your history is too dirty for my pen to describe. In fact you deserve to die for the various actions you have done. Now in conjunction with our fellow countrymen, I have determined to see whether you or we have to die first and to know how long you can enjoy the happiness of being a cuckold.

Chan Hon Tat. 23 December, 191224

Thus, the letter had two major complaints: first, "that offensive May's" enactment of the Boycott Prevention Ordinance, which threatened to impose a special tax on Chinese residents. Second, Wei Yuk's habit of flattering foreigners, despising his fellow countrymen, and collaborating with colonial authorities, informing them that the boycott was promoted by upper-class Chinese.



Boycott Promoters and Their Motivations

The tramway company's refusal to accept Chinese coins threatened the interests of several social groups that joined together to sustain the boycott. They included the small bankers, money changers, and other middlemen who made profits by the manipulation of exchange between Hong Kong currency and Chinese coins. The Nam Pak Hong and Kam Shan Chung Chinese merchants who traded with California were also involved in money exchange. They were closely associated with the Sze Yap Association, which in turn was closely connected with the Canton revolutionary government and with polit­ ical agitators in Hong Kong who saw the tramway's refusal of Chinese

278 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



coins as a slur on Chinese dignity and "an affront to the newly- awakened spirit of nationalism."25 In other words, several overlap­ ping social groups, prompted either by economic interest or by a sense of nationalistic pride, or by both, became active promoters of the boycott of trams.

The money changers played an important role in instigating the boycott.26 Their number had risen from 104 in 1905 to 420 in 1912. They were associated with the compradors, shroffs, and other middlemen who acted as intermediaries between employer and em­ ployee in the payment of wages. Especially important were mer­ chants and bankers who received remittances from Chinese overseas and transmitted them to relatives in China. Since their profits came from money exchange, they felt threatened by the prohibition of Chinese coins in the colony; they welcomed the boycott of trams as a means of expressing their resentment.

According to the government estimate, the Nam Pak Hong-Kam Shan Chung merchants received from Chinese residents abroad re­ mittances in gold in the amount of about fifty-six million dollars per annum for payment to Chinese in Hong Kong, Canton, and its vicinity. These merchants charged no commission but made the pay­ ments in subsidiary coin and pocketed the whole of the discount. Their profit amounted to some two million dollars a year. Naturally, they were opposed to the rehabilitation of Hong Kong subsidiary coins, and to the prohibition of the circulation in the colony of Chinese and other foreign coins and the consequent removal of some media of manipulation of exchange. The Hong Kong government was con­ vinced that it was the money changers and the Nam Pak Hong and Kam Shan Chung merchants who actually organized the boycott.27

Many of these merchants were members of the powerful Sze Yap Association, the patriotic Young China Party in Hong Kong.28 The moving spirit of the Sze Yap Association was Li Yü-t'ang, the T'ung- meng-hui veteran who had served as the new Canton government treasurer. Li was the owner of the Chin-li-yiian Chinese medicine firm, which handled the remittance of one hundred and ninety thou­ sand dollars from overseas for the T'ung-meng-hui in 1912.29 Li was also the principal promoter of the Canton and Hong Kong Financial Co-operative Company, which aimed to help the Canton govern­ ment financially but had to be abandoned on September 3,1912, due to the opposition of the colonial authorities.

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 279



For these overlapping groups of money changers, bankers, middle­ men, Nam Pak Hong and Kam Shan Chung merchants, and the Sze Yap Association patriots the tramway company's refusal of Chinese coins both hurt their interest and put a slur on Chinese dignity. Motivated by both patriotism and economic interest, they promoted the boycott of tramway. Invoking political sentiment of the Chinese populace against British colonialism, they won popular support.



The Canton Government Attitude Towards the Boycott

What was the attitude of the Canton government toward the boycott of trams in Hong Kong? Carefully watched by the British, some Canton officials sought to disassociate the Canton government from the boycott movement. In an interview with the colony's registrar general on December 20,1912, the visiting Canton police chief Chan King-wah (Ch'en Chin-hua) affirmed that his government “in no way sympathized with the boycott which . . . was the outcome of spontaneous action on the part of the lower and more ignorant classes." He added that his government would do all in its power to assist the Hong Kong authorities in suppressing the boycott.30

But Governor May was not satisfied with this affirmation. He was doubtful regarding how far the opinion of the Canton police chief was endorsed by the Canton government, because “objectionable" articles fostering the boycott were repeatedly published in the Can­ ton press, including the official newspaper Chung-kuo jih-pao.3i A notice from “the whole commercial community of Canton and Hong Kong," published in An-ya Poo, Canton, November 28,1912, read in part as follows:

The recent centralization of the Republican Government and the union of the five races under our Republic enjoy the universal support of all friendly civilized nations. . . . Recently, however, the Electric Traction Company . . . has issued a notice discriminat­ ing against Chinese Silver Coins and refusing to accept them, a step evidently designed to cast a slur on our Republic and to repudiate friendship with our people therefore all of us should

not allow ourselves to be boycotted but should refuse to travel by the company's trams. Anybody who permits himself to be boycot­ ted and travels by the tramway is no better than a brute beast. Indeed all our fellow-countrymen should speedily awake.32

280 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



This notice revealed the Chinese humor by asserting that since the Hong Kong Tramway Company was boycotting the Chinese repub­ lic, the Chinese "should refuse to travel by the company's trams."

Similarly, the Canton official newspaper Chung-kuo jih-pao pub­ lished letters from its correspondents in Hong Kong, asserting that the tramway company's rejection of all Chinese coins showed its "deliberate hostility against the Chinese," and that boycott was "the only means available of marking their displeasure." 3 Such articles were reprinted in Hong Kong Chinese newspapers.

Despite the colonial authorities' protestation, the Canton official newspaper continued to publish "mischievous" articles calculated to incite the inhabitants of Hong Kong to persist in the boycott.34 One article related that two Chinese ladies, on alighting from a tramcar, were subjected to abuse by bystanders: something was thrown into their mouths, their dresses were soiled, and the ladies were told that they had no patriotic pride. Articles like this were printed for the purpose of keeping the boycott alive.35 Many of these articles were attributed to the Sze Yap Association patriots.36 It was not until January 3, 1913 that the tutu of Canton, Hu Han-min, took action to stop such publications.37 The Canton government seemed too weak or too divided to exercise an effective control over the press.38

In sum, the boycott seemed to be tacitly endorsed by some Canton authorities connected with the Sze Yap Association who had grudges against the Hong Kong government for putting too many obstacles in the way of the Chinese revolution, and who regarded the rejection of Chinese coins in the colony as an insult to the Chinese republic.



Working People in Boycott

But the major actors in the boycott remained the Hong Kong crowds— the general population who refused to take trams, the lower-class people who mobbed the tramcars, who posted notices and carica­ tures on the street, and who intimidated and assaulted the few boycott violators. Without popular sympathy and support, no boy­ cott could be launched. Governor May deplored the loss of influence by the "leading Chinese" over the colony's population. Sir Kai Ho Kai concurred, admitting that the "respectable Chinese community and the merchants who had the largest stake in the Colony were terrorised by the lower orders." He urged "strong measures to deal

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 281



with the unruly and rowdy lower classes and to re-establish the lost influence of their whilom leaders."39 The crisis situation once again revealed the extent of community disaggregation in the colony dur­ ing the 1910s.

What were the motives of the "lower classes" participating in the boycott? How did they become activated? An appeal to patriotism alone could hardly mobilize the masses to a sustained and persistent boycott lasting more than two months. Patriotism had to be com­ bined with an appeal to mundane interest in order to mobilize the populace in a prolonged social movement. The crowds in Hong Kong were activated by both economic reasons and the politics of anticolo­ nialism. Among the working population, the most active supporters of the boycott of trams were chair coolies, ricksha coolies, the me­ chanics' union (which was closely connected with the patriotic Sze Yap Association and T'ung-meng-hui), and other artisans interested in the launch traffic and ricksha traffic that were reaping a golden harvest in the tram boycott.40

Besides, large numbers of laborers supported the boycott because they felt the threat of economic losses as a consequence of the tram­ way's refusal of Chinese coins. Many Chinese shops and business houses were in the habit of supplying their workers and employees with Chinese coins to travel by trams and ricksha.41 The coal coolies and other workmen were often forced by their foremen or employers to accept payment of wages in Chinese coins, which were lighter and cheaper than the Hong Kong coins.42 These workmen were angered by the tramway company's refusal to accept Chinese coins in pay­ ment of fare. And the general population had suffered indignities by being turned away from the tramcars for failure to produce Hong Kong coins.43 When the colonial government came to support the tramway company it aggravated popular indignation against the gov­ ernment.



Chinese Patriotism and Anticolonialism

Workers' concern with economic losses converged with the politics of anticolonialism to propel the boycott movement. As the governor conceded, a boycott could not be started without working on and winning the political sympathies of the people, who had but scant respect for the colonial government.44 The anticolonial political sen-

282 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



timent of the populace was deeply rooted in history. Of all social classes in Hong Kong, the coolie laborers were the most inclined to dislike colonial rule, as they were the most exploited and abused. The colonial setting made them susceptible to the influence of pa­ triotic forces from various sources, such as the mandarins and Triads during the Sino-French War in 1884, the Pao-huang-hui in 1908, and the T'ung-meng-hui in 1911-13. Sir Henry May, the much-hated governor of Hong Kong, admitted that from the first day of his arrival on July 4, 1912, he had “noticed signs of aggressiveness and antipathy to Europeans on the part of the Chinese population.“ 45 This was an understatement, considering the attempt on his life that day and subsequent similar threats.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 had politicized the people in Hong Kong to an extent never previously attained. It had inspired high hopes and dreams among the Chinese in the colony for a better status and a better future for themselves. This was further reflected in a number of incidents. A Chinese constable was walking along the road in Hung-hom when a Chinese, who was in company with a number of others, called after him: “This constable is slave enough to serve a foreign power during the boycott." The man was arrested and sentenced to a fine of fifty dollars or two months' hard labor.46 Popular animosity to British colonial rule was a theme of notices posted in the streets:

Attention! Attention! Attention!

Why was a meeting of the various merchants convened by the Governor of Hong Kong? It was on behalf of the Tramway. After the tea and refreshments at the conclusion of the meeting, he made them return home by the tram. Some of those present, being far sighted, slunk away beforehand, but some of them who were fond of flattering others, travelled by the Tramway. Indeed we people must not behave like shifting sands, but we pray that all our Chinese will unite in mind that offensive May be driven back to his home.47

In his confidential dispatch to London, Governor May reported that he had received warnings that further attempts might be made upon his life.48

Another notice was posted in the street on December 20,1912, by “Ip of the Branch Society for Secret Assassination," who denounced

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 283



the leading merchants riding in the trams as "cold-blooded animals

. . . fond of flattering others":

They are indeed no better than oxen and horses, willingly obeying the directions of foreigners. We presume that they would even vie with one another to be the first in yielding their wives and concu­ bines to foreigners, and would consider such an undertaking as glorious. . . . We hope that after the issue of this notification, the merchants of the various Guilds will exhort their fellow-country­ men far and wide to persist in the boycott Give strict obser­

vance without fail.49

Still another street poster proclaimed:

The Electric Tramway Company has adopted a new law refusing to accept dragon coins. A boycott must be put up. The five races must combine together. Those who take no notice of my word will be exploded to death. All brethren must look out, avoiding the bomb.50

This notice contained a nationalist aspiration derived from the newly founded Chinese republic—namely, to combine China's "five major nationalities" of Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans in a grand unity against foreign imperialism.

The ideology of popular protest was an amalgamation of the com­ mon people's inherent beliefs and the more structured ideology de­ rived from the T'ung-meng-hui activists: people's inherent hatred of the fankwei merged with the Republican revolutionaries' derived idea of national unity of all Chinese against foreign imperialism. As George Rude has observed, "the 'derived' ideology . . . can only be effec­ tively absorbed [by the populace] if the ground has already been well prepared."51 The long series of strikes, riots, and boycotts that had taken place since 1842 against British colonialism, together with the T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries' activities among the people, had prepared a popular ground for the absorption of nationalism and republicanism, which found expression in the mass jubilation over the founding of the republic and in the boycott of the tramway in 1912-13.

Tensions between Chinese and foreign residents gave rise to a

rumor that there was talking among the Chinese of a "general rising" against foreigners in connection with the boycott.52 The Europeans observed with uneasiness the display of China's republican flag from

284 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



many residences and places of business on the New Year's Day, 1913. As the local English press reported.

The universal display of the five-striped banner in Chinatown sug­ gests a spirit of defiance which was not discernible in the old days. The hundreds of flags seen flying all belonged to the same pattern, and the poles were likewise of a standard pattem, facts which suggest organization.53

The English press complained that the hoisting of China's national flag was likely to encourage the "wrong impression . . . as to the ownership of the island." When children in the Hong Kong vernac­ ular schools were asked: "To which country does Hong Kong be­ long?," ninety-eight percent of them said Hong Kong was Chinese territory.54



To End the Boycott

It is significant that the boycott of the tramway caused only some inconvenience of traffic; it caused neither major street riots nor the disruption of work or trade, which would have alienated large num­ bers of Chinese traders and merchants who generally disliked social disorder. The tramway company's rejection of Chinese coins, sup­ ported by the colonial government, split the merchants in Hong Kong. Those who were engaged in the money exchange business and overseas remittance were adversely affected by the colony's rejection of Chinese coins. So they helped to promote the boycott of trams—and they did so in the name of patriotism. But those who were not directly engaged in money exchange were more inclined to collaborate with the colonial authorities in ending the boycott. With economic ties to foreign capitalism, the prosperous merchants espe­ cially had vested interest in desiring law and order in the colony. In fact, considerable Chinese capital was invested in the tramway com­ pany. Mr. Lau Chu Pak was known to be an important shareholder and a director of the tramway company. 5 He had sought to collabo­ rate with the colonial authorities to help suppress the boycott, for which he had received a threatening letter from boycotters.

Yet shopkeepers, store owners, and traders were adversely af­ fected by the rejection of Chinese coins, as large numbers of them used to supply their workers and employees with the cheaper Chinese

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 285



coins to travel by trams. They were inclined to support the boycott. The boycott of trams lasted for more than two months (from late November 1912 to early February 1913), partly because it caused neither major social disturbances nor commercial disruption. If the shopkeepers, merchants, and businessmen faced the prospect of a financial loss, they would exert their influence to help end the boy­ cott.

Such a prospect came from the colonial government's threat, in January 1913, to carry into practice the Boycott Prevention Ordi­ nance. A government notice threatened to proclaim ten districts as ''boycott areas," whose inhabitants would be subjected to a special tax to compensate the tramway company for losses incurred by the boycott. The governor in executive council, however> would give audience to representatives from each area to hear their views as to why any area should be exempted from the levy.56

This high-handed measure created more animosity among the Chinese residents against the Hong Kong government. In fact, the London Colonial Office belatedly disapproved of the governor's mea­ sure. But it proved to be effective in ending the boycott. Merchants hated financial losses. Facing the prospect of a personal financial loss, many Chinese merchants began to take steps with an aim to stop the boycott. A meeting took place in the Tung Wah Hospital on the night of January 8, 1913, attended by about fifty merchants and shopowners representing all districts of Hong Kong. Addressing the meeting, Mr. Lau Chu Pak (a wealthy businessman, shareholder, and director of the tramway company) explained the "reasonable­ ness" of the tramway company's action in collecting only Hong Kong coins on the trams. He said that the enforcement of the boycott ordinance would make not only the landlords but also the tenants suffer:

Some of you say it is only the lower class who are boycotting . . . [but] don't attribute everything to the lower classes. Many of the lower classes are your servants or your workmen Those who

are masters of shops, employers of labour or managers of big firms, can prove to the Government that they have no interest in the boycott by disallowing the conveyance allowance, and giving their men tram tickets instead.57

Finally, the meeting resolved to call on all the guilds and associations in the colony to cooperate in breaking down the boycott.

286 Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway



Meanwhile, representatives of the "boycott areas" appeared be­ fore the executive council to request an extension of time before the special levy was imposed so that they could endeavor to use their influence to help end the boycott. The local Chinese press, too, began to publish articles explaining that the tramway company's action originated purely from financial loss and did not mean "con­ temptuous rejection of Chinese coins," and that the boycott had arisen from "misunderstanding."58 The Chinese press expressed its "sincere hope that the storm of boycott will abate without delay [so] that no special rate may be levied to the injury of us Chinese."59 Appealing to the working people to end the boycott, the Chinese press also publicized the colony's law that every workman might demand payments of his wages to be made in Hong Kong coins, and that any foreman who compelled any workman to accept Chinese coins would be liable to prosecution in court on charge of fraud.60

In the meantime, a considerable number of employers had under­

taken to purchase monthly tram tickets for their employees.61 At the request of the "leading Chinese," one hundred thousand tickets at half price were sold in books to Chinese shops and business houses that were in the habit of supplying their employees with Chinese coins to travel by the tramway and, during the boycott, to travel by ricksha. This was a compromising and face-saving device to compen­ sate the Chinese employers, who were confronted with the financial loss by the tramway company's refusal of Chinese coins.62

As a result of all these measures, large numbers of the working population were induced to take trams, so that by February 4,1913, the governor was able to telegraph London that the boycott had ceased and the ordinance had been suspended.63



Implications

The Boycott Prevention Ordinance incurred more animosity among the Chinese inhabitants against the colonial authorities. It also cre­ ated tensions within the colony's Chinese community. As Ho Kai had observed, by boycotting the tramway company, the Chinese themselves would be the losers, because monetary compensation for the company would be collected by the colonial government in the form of increased taxation "so that the people whom the Chinese boycottera were injuring were their own compatriots and not the

Boycott of the Hong Kong Tramway 287



British at all." "By that means, bitterness would be aroused, and all brotherly feeling, sympathy, good will and readiness to help in time of need, on the part of the leading Chinese, would be alienated."64 The London Colonial Office considered the Hong Kong Boycott Prevention Ordinance as "a most extraordinary piece of legislation," because the special tax provision was "certain to inflict a great deal of hardship or injustice" on the Chinese residents. "It is quite inde­ fensible and a very serious step to have taken without the previous consent [of the Colonial Office]. Sir H. May must have quite lost his balance," commented Colonial Office authorities. London, therefore, ordered Governor May to have the ordinance repealed and to imme­ diately terminate any steps that might have been taken in enforcing the special tax provision.65 In fact, the governor's threat to enforce the tax provision forced the Chinese residents to bow grudgingly to

the will of the colonial authorities.

Thus, by February 4, 1913, the boycott had been halted, but the governor's high-handed measures had further incurred Chinese ani­ mosity against British colonialism. The boycott of the Hong Kong tramway shed much light not merely on the complex sociopolitical relations and structure in the colony but also on the relations be­ tween the Canton government and the British colonial authorities in Hong Kong. The latter's ban on Chinese coins was widely perceived to be a slur on Chinese dignity. The British had put up a number of obstacles in the way of the Chinese revolution, despite the eagerness of the Canton revolutionary government to court British goodwill. Ironically, in its vain attempts to win British approval and support, the Canton revolutionary government turned its back on the labor movement in Hong Kong and ended up alienating the Chinese pop­ ulace in the colony. In fact, the earlier enthusiasm of the Chinese public for the Canton government quickly waned when the govern­ ment proved incapable of maintaining financial and political stability in Kwangtung province. This contributed to the eclipse of the Canton revolutionary government in August 1913, as the Chinese communi­ ties in Canton and Hong Kong abandoned the Canton government and pledged their allegiance to President Yüan Shih-k'ai in Peking.



Conclusion



This study explores three main themes concerning the history of Hong Kong—the changing urban community structure and social relations, the changing nature and patterns of social unrest, and the growth of nationalism among Chinese merchants, populace, and intelligentsia in Hong Kong under British colonial rule. These themes are examined in the context of Chinese history during the seven decades from 1842 to 1913. This conclusion recapitulates these themes. Under British colonial rule, Hong Kong had its own path of histor­ ical development. Peculiar sociopolitical experience made it different from China in some ways, although its society remained distinctly Chinese. The British acquired Hong Kong primarily for the promo­ tion of trade, not for territorial conquest. Therefore, they were ini­ tially willing to leave the Chinese to their own devices so long as

public order was maintained and trade enhanced.

In 1842 Hong Kong was a new frontier settlement with little preex­ isting local power structure. The town grew rapidly as the Chinese from the neighboring districts congregated there seeking employ­ ment opportunities. In the unsettled conditions of the colony during the 1840s and the early 1850s, Chinese pioneers and adventurers from very humble origins like Loo Aqui and Tam Achoy had risked their lives to serve the British during the Opium War in return for land and privileges with which to acquire wealth. They used their

Conclusion 289



wealth to serve the Chinese community and thereby emerged as its leaders. They built temples that served as community centers. The British colonial policy of segregation allowed them to manage Chinese public affairs. They arbitrated civil and commercial disputes among the Chinese to help maintain public order. But they were not allowed to possess private armed power, unlike the Chinese strongmen com­ manding armed followers in other frontier settlements like Taiwan or Kweichow. As Esherick and Rankin justly affirm in their volume of essays on local elites and patterns of dominance, "different environ­ ments and resources available to elites in different areas of China . . . produce different types of elite."1 The relations between Chinese and Europeans in Hong Kong were marked by both cooperation and tensions, harmony and conflict. When order and security were at stake, the British colonial authorities were quick to resort to coercive force. The power of the Chinese elite was severely constrained by the modem colonial state.

The composition of the Chinese elite in Hong Kong began to change in the 1850s and 1860s with the influx of Chinese families and capital during the Taiping uprising in China. New elements of wealthy, respectable merchants joined the elite group. Aspiring Chinese used all the resources available to promote their power and influence. In Hong Kong connections with the British served as an important vehide for social advancement. Chinese contractors, merchants, and compradors formed business connections with the British colonists. Resources for the aspiring Chinese also induded native place-dialect ties as well as the transregional assodations. These two were not perceived as mutually exdusive. With the formation of such associa­ tions as the District Watch Committee in 1866 and the Nam Pak Hong Guild in 1868, a sense of Chinese community dominated by a merchant elite in Hong Kong was greatly enhanced. And it was further strengthened by the founding of the famed Tung Wah Hos­ pital in 1872.

During the 1870s and 1880s the elite exerted an unchallenged cultural hegemony over the populace. They shared some common cultural values and traditions, such as beliefs in feng-shui, pa-tzu, omens, religious worship, family loyalty, and Confudan ideology. It was these shared values that bound the Chinese community together and distinguished it from the Europeans in the colony. Like the gentry elite in China, the gentrified merchant elite in Hong Kong

290 Conclusion



sought to foster social consensus based on Confudan ideals of sodal harmony and elite paternalism. Consensus was maintained through compromise and elite mediation in conflict situations. The Tung Wah elite arbitrated dvil disputes. Through community service and phi­ lanthropy, the elite affirmed its daim to social superiority. It used all available sodal and economic resources to cultivate loyalties based on vertical ties of occupation, kinship, and ethnidty. Such loyalties reinforced Confudan ideals of sodal order, harmony, and a sense of hierarchy. The elite propagated Confucianism as the hegemonic ide­ ology.

The colony's sodoeconomic structure provided a fertile ground for

the hegemonic Confudan ideology. Chinese merchants often hired their trusted kinsmen and fellow provincials as assistants, office derks and workers, and domestic servants. Vertical, paternalistic relation­ ship was usually maintained among them. Urban Hong Kong was in large part a dty of small shopkeepers who perceived themselves as upholders of tradional Chinese way of life and sustainers of Confu­ dan culture. The elite used all resources available to induce popular deference and subordination; and in return it had to fulfill its moral obligations to the populace by providing public service and repre­ senting the community in its dealings with the colonial government. But the elite management of public affairs was carefully watched by the government. Unlike elites in late imperial China who possessed power in tax collections and military force, the Hong Kong elite exerdsed no such power. The local arena of Hong Kong as a British colony limited the power of its Chinese elite.

Up to the mid-1880s the colonial government's segregationist pol­ icy allowed the Chinese community to function under its elite lead­ ership. The elite's periodic display of cultural symbols of wealth, power, and authority rivaled those at the offidal yamen compounds in imperial China. Yet, high trees attract the wind. Such constant display of power incurred European suspidon. The colonial situation brought the local elite into a complex, interlocking web of ambivalent relationships with the British and the Canton authorities. The colo­ nial government needed Chinese community leaders' cooperation in maintaining law and order in the colony, but it also looked upon them with a watchful, suspidous eye, particularly when the elite became dosely connected with the Canton officials. Both Canton and Hong Kong authorities daimed allegiance from the colony's Chinese

Conclusion 291



residents; the local elite therefore served two lords, seeking to manip­ ulate the situation to its own advantage. Colonial experience made the local elite different from Chinese elites on the mainland.

The popular insurrection of 1884 marked an important turning point in the colony's history. It made a lasting impression on the colonial government, which henceforth sought to impose direct rule over the Chinese community. To accelerate political integration, the government assumed more control over the elite organizations and created new channels for social advancement for the aspiring Chinese individuals who were coopted into the government power structure. Henceforth government connections became the most important av­ enue to the top elite status. The elite's cooperation with the govern­ ment was reinforced by its economic ties to foreign capitalism in the colony. The elite-sponsored Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk were intended both to promote popular welfare and to facilitate social control. During the 1890s tensions surfaced between the lower- class Chinese and the elite who collaborated with the government to keep them in line. The mob attack on the Tung Wah chairman in 1894 symbolized the decline of the old elite's power and prestige in the new social milieu.

From the mid-1880s to the 1900s society became more heteroge­

neous as a result of population growth and economic expansion. It became more difficult to attain community consensus. The develop­ ing capitalist enterprise employing large number of workers was conducive to the growing consciousness of different interests of cap­ ital and labor. A younger generation of merchants, businessmen, professionals, and new intelligentsia emerged. It was a generation more Western-oriented than the old elite and more inclined to inno­ vations and new commitments. Although still bound to many tradi­ tional ideas, values, and customs, some members of the new intelli­ gentsia became iconoclastic, ready to challenge some parts of Chinese culture and tradition. They denounced as superstitions some old cultural values and practices (such as the aforementioned feng-shui, pa-tzu, omens, religious worship, and herbal medicine) that had bound together the old elite and community in earlier times.

The dividing of the elite into factions reflected the tendency toward community disintegration during the period from the mid-1880s to the 1900s. In China, the scope of local elite management of public affairs rapidly increased after the Taiping rebellion and continued to

292 Conclusion



expand in subsequent years until 1911, when it collided with the state power and resulted in the overthrow of the Ch'ing govern­ ment.2 By contrast, in the British colony of Hong Kong, elite manage­ ment developed in just the opposite direction: the assertion of state power and political integration after the mid-1880s meant the pro­ gressive decline in the scope of their management of public affairs. Again, the colonial experience made Hong Kong different from China. The new generation of Chinese merchants and intelligentsia in the colony became increasingly politicized by the main currents of events in China, from the Sino-French War in 1884-85 to the revolution of 1911. During these years both elite and populace became more polit­

ically activated.