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utilizing only 20 per cent of its bomb capacity was not the way to obtain satisfactory returns on a US$3 billion gamble. Even worse was a bomber that could not make it to the runway due to breakdowns or adverse weather.
Eventually, the Allies captured the Marianas Islands in the Pacific, and the B-29s were transferred there. The Marianas also suffered from typhoons, but they were closer (no more than 1,600 miles) than Hong Kong to Tokyo. When the B-29s began bombing Japan from the Marianas, each plane carried about two tons of bombs. The results continued to be unsatisfactory, and were an indication of how the B-29s likely would have fared had they operated from Hong Kong. Not until the Allies acquired more aircraft and tried a new tactic - stripping down each B-29, loading it with six tons of incendiary bombs, and making them fly lower to ease the stress on the engines - did Tokyo begin to burn, as it did in March 1945, when as many as 100,000 of its inhabitants were incinerated in one raid,
Aside from its distance advantage, the Marianas were also safer from Japanese interference than Hong Kong. This advantage became even more significant later in the war, when Japanese control of the Pacific ebbed, but swelled in China. Should the Japanese not contest an Allied landing or Hong Kong, they were expected to harass the LoC established into it with a sizable naval force. The Hong Kong area was a good place for the Japanese to make their stand. They had shorter LoC plus the potential support of land-based aircraft from nearby Japanese-held areas. The Allies, presumably coming from the southeast, would have extended LoC that were potentially vulnerable to attack on the flanks, and such LoC would be passing through a typhoon-infested area.52
So it was evident how vital a secure LoC into Hong Kong from the sea was in order for B-29 operations to begin from there. In the absence of such a LoC, the strategy of having the B-29s fly their own supplies to Hong Kong (if the Allies somehow managed to recapture it by land), like they did for Central China, would be impractical. Even without Japanese interference, the weather alone was enough to ensure that establishing and maintaining LoC into Hong Kong would be a monumental undertaking indeed.
But, until the Central Pacific drive made better progress, China
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utilizing only 20 per cent of its bomb capacity was not the way to obtain satisfactory returns on a US$3 billion gamble. Even worse was a bomber that could not make it to the runway due to breakdowns or adverse weather.
Eventually, the Allies captured the Marianas Islands in the Pacific, and the B-29s were transferred there. The Marianas also suffered from typhoons, but they were closer (no more than 1,600 miles) than Hong Kong to Tokyo. When the B-29s began bombing Japan from the Marianas, each plane carried about two tons of bombs. The results continued to be unsatisfactory, and were an indication of how the B- 29s likely would have fared had they operated from Hong Kong. Not until the Allies acquired more aircraft and tried a new tactic - stripping down each B-29, loading it with six tons of incendiary bombs, and making them fly lower to ease the stress on the engines - did Tokyo begin to burn, as it did in March 1945, when as many as 100,000 of its inhabitants were incinerated in one raid,
Aside from its distance advantage, the Marianas were also safer from Japanese interference than Hong Kong. This advantage became even more significant later in the war, when Japanese control of the Pacific ebbed, but swelled in China. Should the Japanese not contest an Allied landing or Hong Kong, they were expected to harass the LoC established into it with a sizable naval force. The Hong Kong area was a good place for the Japanese to make their stand. They had shorter LoC plus the potential support of land-based aircraft from nearby Japanese-held areas. The Allies, presumably coming from the southeast, would have extended LoC that were potentially vulnerable to attack on the flanks, and such LoC would be passing through a typhoon-infested area.52
So it was evident how vital a secure LoC into Hong Kong from the sea was in order for B-29 operations to begin from there. In the absence of such a LoC, the strategy of having the B-29s fly their own supplies to Hong Kong (if the Allies somehow managed to recapture it by land), like they did for Central China, would be impractical. Even without Japanese interference, the weather alone was enough to ensure that establishing and maintaining LoC into Hong Kong would be a monumental undertaking indeed.
But, until the Central Pacific drive made better progress, China
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