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than the US$2 billion Manhattan Project that built the atom bomb - and its total production run stopped just short of 4,000. (In comparison, the combined production run for its predecessors - the B-17 and B-24 - surpassed 30,000.) As previously mentioned, the B-29's novelty was enough to render some of its numbers unserviceable due to mechanical failures. But a low production rate and a shortage of trained air crews and fuel also contributed to its meagre deployment when it first went into action in 1944. In a place like Hong Kong, bad weather could reduce the number of operational B-29s even further.
The fuel shortage problem was exacerbated when the JCS ordered that bombing operations against Japan commence before Hong Kong's recapture.48 Thus, the B-29s began bombing Japan from bases in Central China. Such extreme distances for the time - about 1,600 miles (2,575 km) from their targets - increased the fuel consumption of each aircraft and reduced its bomb load to two tons. As a land or sea route into China had not yet been reopened, all supplies had to be flown in over the Hump by the B-29s themselves (sometimes supplemented by B-24s), which was a wasteful task because each B-29 had to expend two tons of fuel to haul one ton of supplies.49 These early bombing missions were inauspicious, with a good raid numbering only about 100 unescorted B-29s (compared to the 1,000-plane raids the Allies were by then routinely making against Germany), and usually less. The primitive airfields of Central China were not all-weather; although the runways would be painstakingly constructed to such standards, and a few B-29s would sometimes be mired in mud after heavy rains and therefore written off for a mission,50
Tokyo (enemy capitals were used as benchmarks), however, lay beyond the range of a B-29 operating out of Central China. If B-29s were to operate from Hong Kong, which was about 1,800 miles (2,897 km) from Tokyo, each bomber would theoretically be able to carry only about 20 percent of its maximum 10-ton bomb load. This doesn't take into account other factors, like the need to fly off course and make evasive manoeuvres during combat, and obviously the weather. This would necessitate cutting back even further on bombs in favour of more fuel. While B-29s based in Hong Kong could bomb other areas of Japan that were closer, the Allies knew that only an ability to get off consistent and heavy strikes at the Japanese capital would have the desired political, if not military, effect on the enemy. Hence, a bomber
52
than the US$2 billion Manhattan Project that built the atom bomb - and its total production run stopped just short of 4,000. (In comparison, the combined production run for its predecessors - the B-17 and B-24 - surpassed 30,000.) As previously mentioned, the B-29's novelty was enough to render some of its numbers unserviceable due to mechanical failures. But a low production rate and a shortage of trained air crews and fuel also contributed to its meagre deployment when it first went into action in 1944. In a place like Hong Kong, bad weather could reduce the number of operational B-29s even further.
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The fuel shortage problem was exacerbated when the JCS ordered that bombing operations against Japan commence before Hong Kong's recapture.48 Thus, the B-29s began bombing Japan from bases in Central China. Such extreme distances for the time about 1,600 miles (2,575 km) from their targets - increased the fuel consumption of each aircraft and reduced its bomb load to two tons. As a land or sea route into China had not yet been reopened, all supplies had to be flown in over the Hump by the B-29s themselves (sometimes supplemented by B- 248), which was a wasteful task because each B-29 had to expend two tons of fuel to haul one ton of supplies.49 These early bombing missions were inauspicious, with a good raid numbering only about 100 unescorted B-29s (compared to the 1,000-plane raids the Allies were by then routinely making against Germany), and usually less. The primitive airfields of Central China were not all-weather; although the runways would be painstakingly constructed to such standards, and a few B-29s would sometimes be mired in mud after heavy rains and therefore written off for a mission,50
Tokyo (enemy capitals were used as benchmarks), however, lay beyond the range of a B-29 operating out of Central China. If B-29s were to operate from Hong Kong, which was about 1,800 miles (2,897 km) from Tokyo, each bomber would theoretically be able to carry only about 20 percent of its maximum 10-ton bomb load." This doesn't take into account other factors, like the need to fly off course and make evasive manoeuvres during combat, and obviously the weather. This would necessitate cutting back even further on bombs in favour of more fuel. While B-29s based in Hong Kong could bomb other areas of Japan that were closer, the Allies knew that only an ability to get off consistent and heavy strikes at the Japanese capital would have the desired political, if not military, effect on the enemy. Hence, a bomber
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