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fighting pitched battles in fence works on the upland and coastal low-land of the Island of Hong Kong. The defence works in the uplands did pose for some time death barriers for the advancing Japanese infantry, though these works were often only defended with small infantry arms. It is well reported that the Japanese had good maps as to the locations of these defence positions. It is also correct to say that the best post-war documentation of the routes of invasions and battles is that produced by Japanese authors rather than the British. Nevertheless, there are reports that the Japanese Army had to make several pointless raids on unmanned defence positions, such as those in Sai Kung, and that it had to force civilians to be guides when approaching lines of resistance. It is interesting to know just how well informed the Japanese were about these defence works at the time of hostilities.
Fourthly, while the British might have made a tactical mistake by abandoning the defence works in the Devil's Peak area on the Kowloon side, the Japanese also appeared to have committed a number of tactical mistakes that delayed their victory. The withdrawal of the defending forces and equipment to the Island from the mainland was unhindered by much Japanese interference. As commented on by Tse (Tse, 1996), the Japanese apparently missed an opportunity to pursue the retreating British forces. Besides, the Japanese infantry suffered huge losses on the Island until it had obtained artillery support.
Fifthly, the frequent argument that the Hong Kong garrison was significantly less well equipped in weaponry than the invading forces must be carefully interpreted. While it is true that the Japanese had absolute control of the air, the Battle of Hong Kong was mainly fought on the ground. A close analysis of the weapons and transport equipment possessed by the Hong Kong garrison shows that the defenders had at their disposal quite a high percentage of machine guns, field guns and conveyances. The garrison had over 2,042 machines (a very high ratio of one per six defenders); 152 mobile guns (comprising 49 field guns; at least 27 anti-aircraft guns and 86 mortars) as well as 31 coastal defence guns in fixed locations. Ignoring the fixed guns, the defenders used 152 mobile guns to contest 203 guns and mortars, various calibres, of the invaders. The defenders were not overwhelmingly outnumbered in the number of mobile guns in absolute terms. In relative terms, the defenders had one gun per 85 persons and the Japanese one per 197. This observation should of course be qualified by the
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fighting pitched battles in fence works on the upland and coastal low- land of the Island of Hong Kong. The defence works in the uplands did pose for some time death barriers for the advancing Japanese infantry. though these works were often only defended with small infantry arms. It is well reported that the Japanese had good maps as to the locations of these defence positions. It is also correct to say that the best post war documentation of the routes of invasions and battles is that produced by Japanese authors rather than the British. Nevertheless, there are re- ports that the Japanese Army had to make several pointless raids on unmanned defence positions, such as those in Sai Kung, and that it had to force civilians to be guides when approaching lines of resistance. It is interesting to know just how well informed the Japanese were about these defence works at the time of hostilities.
Fourthly, while the British might have made a tactical mistake by abandoning the defence works in the Devil's Peak area on the Kowloon side, the Japanese also appeared to have committed a number of tacti- cal mistakes that delayed their victory. The withdrawal of the defend- ing forces and equipment to the Island from the mainland was unhin- dered by much Japanese interference. As commented on by Tse (Tse, 1996), the Japanese apparently missed an opportunity to pursue the retreating British forces. Besides, the Japanese infantry suffered huge losses on the Island until it had obtained artillery support.
Fifthly, the frequent argument that the Hong Kong garrison was significantly less well equipped in weaponry than the invading forces must be carefully interpreted. While it is true that the Japanese had absolute control of the air, the Battle of Hong Kong was mainly fought on the ground. A close analysis of the weapons and transport equip- ment possessed by the Hong Kong garrison shows that the defenders had at their disposal quite a high percentage of machine guns, field guns and conveyances. The garrison had over 2,042 machines (a very high ratio of one per six defenders); 152 mobile guns (comprising 49 field guns;20 at least 27 anti-aircraft guns and 86 mortars) as well as 31 coastal defence guns21 in fixed locations. Ignoring the fixed guns, the defenders used 152 mobile guns to contest 203 guns and mortars, various calibres, of the invaders. The defenders were not overwhelm- ingly outnumbered in the number of mobile guns in absolute terms. In relative terms, the defenders had one gun per 85 persons and the Japa- nese one per 197. This observation should of course be qualified by the
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