126
indicated in Table 1, the Japanese outnumbered the Hong Kong garrison by 3.09 (X). However, they could only inflict a casualty rate of 2.11 (Y). The Singapore garrison, by comparison, fared better than its counterpart in Crete.
Some Speculative Thoughts Regarding the Merits of the Defence
Constrained by the statistics available to the author, the above analysis is crude indeed. However, it raises the point that the Hong Kong garrison, however unprepared and poorly equipped, had fought quite well. There are indeed sources that suggest a much higher casualty rate for the Japanese. Why was this the case?
Any answer to this question surely requires a much more rigorous study. A number of speculative points and observations worthy of attention are raised below. Firstly, the geography of Hong Kong rendered defence more effective than that of Singapore. It is a cliché that the Japanese forces were well trained and prepared. Yet, they did suffer great losses. Most such losses were incurred when they made attempts to cross the harbour and in fighting for control of the hills and gaps on Hong Kong Island. In both the Battle of Singapore and the Battle of Hong Kong, the Japanese forces aimed at capturing reservoirs as their tactical targets, as they had anticipated long resistance and the loss of water supply would erode the morale of the defending forces and their ability to continue fighting. Unlike the Island of Singapore, Hong Kong Island is much larger in size, and is highly rugged in relief with several reservoirs in different parts of the upland areas.
Secondly, the size of the garrison was also a factor. Comparing again Hong Kong and Singapore, a smaller garrison operating in a more defensible topography proved to be more battle worthy than a large number of troops congested in a much smaller flat island devoid of air cover and was running out of fresh water.
Thirdly, notwithstanding criticism of the design weakness of the Gin Drinkers Line, the Hong Kong garrison fought in an orderly manner according to a pre-conceived plan with defence structures well in place. As soon as the under-powered Shing Mun Redoubt was lost, the garrison evacuated the New Territories and Kowloon to prepare for
126
indicated in Table 1, the Japanese outnumbered the Hong Kong garrison by 3.09 (X). However, they could only inflict a casualty rate of 2.11 (Y). The Singapore garrison, by comparison, fared better than its counterpart in Crete.
Some Speculative Thoughts Regarding the Merits of the Defence
Constrained by the statistics available to the author, the above analysis is crude indeed. However, it raises the point that the Hong Kong garrison, however unprepared and poorly equipped, had fought quite well. There are indeed sources that suggest a much higher casu- alty rate for the Japanese. Why was this the case?
Any answer to this question surely requires a much more rigorous study. A number of speculative points and observations worthy of at- tention are raised below. Firstly, the geography of Hong Kong ren- dered defence more effective than that of Singapore. It is a cliché that the Japanese forces were well trained and prepared. Yet, they did suffer great losses. Most such losses were incurred when they made attempts to cross the harbour and in fighting for control of the hills and gaps on Hong Kong Island. In both the Battle of Singapore and the Battle of Hong Kong, the Japanese forces aimed at capturing reservoirs as their tactical targets, as they had anticipated long resistance and the loss of water supply would erode the morale of the defending forces and their ability to continue fighting. Unlike the Island of Singapore, Hong Kong Island is much larger in size, and is highly rugged in relief with several reservoirs in different parts of the upland areas.
Secondly, the size of the garrison was also a factor. Comparing again Hong Kong and Singapore, a smaller garrison operating in a more defensible topography proved to be more battle worthy than a large number of troops congested in a much smaller flat island devoid of air cover and was running out of fresh water.
Thirdly, notwithstanding criticism of the design weakness of the Gin Drinkers Line, the Hong Kong garrison fought in an orderly man- ner according to a pre-conceived plan with defence structures well in place. As soon as the under-powered Shing Mun Redoubt was lost, the garrison evacuated the New Territories and Kowloon to prepare for
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