STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN
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iron factories and built many steamships. She has changed to the use of Western weapons. [...] Perhaps she is merely planning for self-protection. But if Japan seeks only self-protection, she is nevertheless oppressing and looking down on our China. Should not China plan for herself?"5
6
The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War perhaps causes us to cast the "success" of Japan and the "failure" of China in too sharp relief. But Cohen's protests to the contrary, modernization is a horserace. It involves the notion of catching up, or at least maintaining competitive presence. And nowhere is the race more evident than in military affairs. Yet curiously, very little attention has been given to the military as a perspective from which to view the comparative modernization of China and Japan. This is especially surprising in light of the importance attached to military reform by modernizers in both countries, the common threat posed to each by Western imperialism, and the same basic access to foreign military technology and assistance in the nineteenth century. This research note, based on my own preliminary investigations, suggests two tentative conclusions: First, that Japan's modernizing advantages in the military sphere on the eve of the Western encounter do not explain her military "success" in the Meiji period;7 and second, that the modernizing implications of Japan's successful military reforms, and the relative "failure" of China's, extend well beyond the sphere of military affairs.
Four main stages have been identified with the responses of China and Japan to the Western "impact”: (1) Recognition of Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of the need to train native personnel in Western military technology; and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West also had to be introduced. These phases unfolded relatively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simultaneously.
A common feature of the effort to achieve national strength and self-sufficiency in both China and Japan was the employment of foreigners in military affairs. This policy, which entailed certain obvious risks, brought substantial benefits to Japan in the Meiji period, as Ernst Presseisen has indicated. In China, however,
STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN
13
iron factories and built many steamships. She has changed to the use of Western weapons. [. . .] Perhaps she is merely planning for self-protection. But if Japan seeks only self-protection, she is nevertheless oppressing and looking down on our China. Should not China plan for herself?"5
6
The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War perhaps causes us to cast the "success" of Japan and the "failure" of China in too sharp relief. But Cohen's protests to the contrary, modernization is a horserace. It involves the notion of catching up, or at least main- taining competitive presence. And nowhere is the race more evident than in military affairs. Yet curiously, very little attention has been given to the military as a perspective from which to view the com parative modernization of China and Japan. This is especially surprising in light of the importance attached to military reform by modernizers in both countries, the common threat posed to each by Western imperialism, and the same basic access to foreign military technology and assistance in the nineteenth century. This research note, based on my own preliminary investigations, sug. gests two tentative conclusions: First, that Japan's modernizing advantages in the military sphere on the eve of the Western en- counter do not explain her military "success" in the Meiji period;' and second, that the modernizing implications of Japan's successful military reforms, and the relative "failure" of China's, extend well beyond the sphere of military affairs.
Four main stages have been identified with the responses of China and Japan to the Western "impact”: (1) Recognition of Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of the need to train native personnel in Western military technology; and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West also had to be introduced. These phases unfolded rela- tively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simul- taneously.
A common feature of the effort to achieve national strength and self-sufficiency in both China and Japan was the employment of foreigners in military affairs. This policy, which entailed certain obvious risks, brought substantial benefits to Japan in the Meiji period, as Ernst Presseisen has indicated. In China, however,
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