TNAG-2989-FCO40-3575-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-talks-betwee-1992 — Page 31

CONFIDENTIAL #3

機密

COMMENT

19.

to HKG.

The

source's observations were intended as a message

(At one point, he referred to his written brief.)

20.

The message has three components:

(a)

a warning that the CPG will not be deterred by

the economic costs of a confrontation;

(b)

an

indication of the CPG's preferred formula

for the British side to start negotiations; and

21.

(c)

a reassurance that the CPG is prepared to be reasonable if treated appropriately.

The chief significance of the message is its

demonstration:

(a) of the level of intimidation which the CPG is

prepared to threaten; and

(b)

of the importance which the CPG attaches to

inducing HKG to beat an early retreat on the

issues of the election committee and functional

constituencies.

Central Policy Unit

31st October 1992 CPU L/MA/89/92C

CONFIDENTIAL ##

機密