CONFIDENTIAL #3
機密
COMMENT
19.
to HKG.
The
source's observations were intended as a message
(At one point, he referred to his written brief.)
20.
The message has three components:
(a)
a warning that the CPG will not be deterred by
the economic costs of a confrontation;
(b)
an
indication of the CPG's preferred formula
for the British side to start negotiations; and
21.
(c)
a reassurance that the CPG is prepared to be reasonable if treated appropriately.
The chief significance of the message is its
demonstration:
(a) of the level of intimidation which the CPG is
prepared to threaten; and
(b)
of the importance which the CPG attaches to
inducing HKG to beat an early retreat on the
issues of the election committee and functional
constituencies.
Central Policy Unit
31st October 1992 CPU L/MA/89/92C
CONFIDENTIAL ##
機密