TNAG-2978-FCO40-1470-Trade-relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-the-UK-1982 — Page 78

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9

DSR 11C

one of the less powerful LDCs is dependent on the UK and

chooses to embark on a particularly quixotic course will

bilateral sanctions stand much chance of success. Moreover,

there is a risk, where NICs are concerned, that aggressive

UK action could cause NICs to gang up (for example, through

ASEAN). It is conceivable, nonetheless, that circumstances

might arise in which it was worth incurring a cost in order

to make an example or where relations had deteriorated so

badly that there was little to lose.

15. The scope for sanctions will, however, have to be

reviewed in the light of individual circumstances, together

with an analysis of UK goods traded with the country

concerned. Apart from traditional means of protest such as

cancelling ministerial visits and public condemnation, possible

steps that might be considered include the following:

(a) Action through the GATT (which would normally

be taken by the Commission on our behalf). If the

relevant country is a signatory of a government

procurement agreement, it would be possible to

bring limited pressure to bear. The country

would be forced to explain itself; but since the

powers of GATT are largely persuasive and its

procedures fairly lengthy, the sanction is

unlikely in practice to remedy the injury

at least in the short-term. In the case of

GATT signatories which have not acceded to

the government procurement code (the vast

majority including some developed countries,

notably Australia) it would in theory be possible

to take action under Article 17 of the General

Agreement itself which requires

/state