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9
DSR 11C
one of the less powerful LDCs is dependent on the UK and
chooses to embark on a particularly quixotic course will
bilateral sanctions stand much chance of success. Moreover,
there is a risk, where NICs are concerned, that aggressive
UK action could cause NICs to gang up (for example, through
ASEAN). It is conceivable, nonetheless, that circumstances
might arise in which it was worth incurring a cost in order
to make an example or where relations had deteriorated so
badly that there was little to lose.
15. The scope for sanctions will, however, have to be
reviewed in the light of individual circumstances, together
with an analysis of UK goods traded with the country
concerned. Apart from traditional means of protest such as
cancelling ministerial visits and public condemnation, possible
steps that might be considered include the following:
(a) Action through the GATT (which would normally
be taken by the Commission on our behalf). If the
relevant country is a signatory of a government
procurement agreement, it would be possible to
bring limited pressure to bear. The country
would be forced to explain itself; but since the
powers of GATT are largely persuasive and its
procedures fairly lengthy, the sanction is
unlikely in practice to remedy the injury
at least in the short-term. In the case of
GATT signatories which have not acceded to
the government procurement code (the vast
majority including some developed countries,
notably Australia) it would in theory be possible
to take action under Article 17 of the General
Agreement itself which requires
/state