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CONFIDENTIAL
a continued locus in assuring that Hong Kong develops as provided
for in the JD).
7. Hong Kong press reports have suggested
-
though
subsequently played down that the Chinese list "blatant and irresponsible internationalisation" as one of 8 situations which
could provoke them to intervention in Hong Kong pre 1997. At the
extreme end of the spectrum, China would be especially enraged by any attempts to secure the international administration of Hong
Kong. But China is quick to take offence at lesser hints of international interest in Hong Kong. Questions by other
countries about guarantees of democracy in Hong Kong post 1997
are equally seen as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty there (and
indeed held to imply a wish to subvert the constitution on the
mainland).
Pressure points
8.
There is already a considerable level of interest in the
way China treats Hong Kong, particularly in the US, also in e.g. Australia, Canada, Japan. Chinese dependence on foreign investment to sustain the economic reform programme gives
particular influence to the US and Japan. Chinese desire for international acceptance, for reasons of prestige and internal
stability as well as for the economic benefits given by
membership of the right international clubs, suggests possibilities for generating multilateral - as opposed to
bilateral
-
pressure.
9. China's public stance is invariably to reject any implication that she would be influenced by international
pressure. But the facts sometimes contradict this. For
example, during the special 301 negotiations with the US, China maintained that she wouldnot submit to US pressure,
wouldnot then on the last day, signed a' compromise agreement.
internat.NAT
JEB
CONFIDENTIAL
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