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16. We should witwine our policy off bribing other owhers. Several have ecomme
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CONFIDENTIAL iteration with the Chinese. We should encourage
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The US position on GATT re-accession will be crucial.
formal US/China bilateral will be held on 1 March (the first
since 1989). The Americans intend to take the Chinese through
what needs to be done if China is to achieve accession to GATT.
We should keep in touch with this process which could offer some
leverage.
17.
Declaratory policy, eg through G7 or CHOGM, would remind
China of international concern about their policies towards Hong
Kong. But it would tend to feed Chinese conspiracy theories
(they have already drawn a link between the Governor's
constitutional package and what they see as US efforts to undermine the present Chinese regime). ↑ It could also cause unease in Hong Kong; as 1997 approaches sensitivity to third countries rocking the boat is likely to increase. A higher declaratory profile would therefore be better avoided while hope of dialogue with China remains. We should keep it in reservé in
case relations with China deteriorated further and Hong Kong
opinion favoured enlisting wider support irrespective of China's
reactions.
17.
Initiating debate on Hong Kong in the UN would be a very
high-profile challenge to China. It would also be high-risk.
. Some countries could seek to reopen the self determination issue.
This might in extremis trigger an early Chinese takeover (almost
certainly not the case with the other options discussed in this
paper). China in any case has a veto in the Security Council,
and has not accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. However, we might wish to consider a wider UN monitoring role post 1997. For example, the fact that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to be
applied to the Hong Kong SAR will give a locus for UN monitoring of human rights issues. Vather we jumal sand his profile glins will let Арил
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19 February 1993
1
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CONFIDENTIAL
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