TNAG-2915-FCO40-4190-International-support-from-European-countries-regarding-the--1993 — Page 38

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stay in the NPT in a way that did not weaken the Treaty or its Safeguards systems. The IAEA BOG meeting on 31 March should refer to the Security Council North Korea's non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards Agreement. He hoped the Russians would support the draft resolution. Their role, between the P3 and China, was important. favoured a calm and measured process in the Security

Council.

The UK

28. Mr Solovyev agreed the situation was worrying. However, he thought tough measures now against North Korea

would produce an adverse reaction. After North Korea had

declared its withdrawal from the NPT, he had met the North Korean Ambassador in Moscow and urged the North to remain in the NPT. Mr Solovyev had said that withdrawal would damage North Korea's image and lead to greater isolation. In the

same talks, which had been very difficult, he had raised clause 1 of the 1961 Treaty between Russia and North Korea,

covering the possibility of an attack on North Korea. At

present the clause was unclear as to who would decide if

such an attack were provocative. For obvious reasons the

Russians wanted to be the ones to decide. Mr Kunadze, in equally difficult talks in Pyongyang in February, had made the same point. The North Koreans were studying the Russian points.

29.

As for the BOG Meeting in Vienna, Mr Solovyev said that

while Russia was prepared to be flexible, it also wished to be principled. Russia's preference was against referral at this stage. Russia favoured using other political measures

to persuade Pyongyang to stay in the NPT. They were

considering sending representatives to North Korea from

Vienna and Moscow for talks. If the Security Council

decided to adopt sanctions against North Korea, the

sanctions might not be effective partly because China would

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