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The
2. The Khmer Rouge's attitude was still unclear. accepted wisdom was that they would not seek to disrupt the elections. But this could not be guaranteed. The recent
attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and on UNTAC
personnel were also disturbing.
3. Mr Solovyev said that he agreed with this analysis.
Cambodia faced a difficult future. He did not think that any faction would win a majority in the elections. A compromise solution involving the formation of a coalition government in
which the SOC had to be included would be needed. Russia
maintained a good dialogue with the SOC, although its influence over them was less than in the past. The SOC had
changed greatly over the last 2 years. Although some of its
actions were still unacceptable, notably continuing political
intimidation, it would be impossible to form a stable
government in Cambodia without them. If the SOC won a
majority of votes in the Constituent Assembly elections they would still probably include non-Khmer Rouge parties in a
coalition.
4. Prince Sihanouk's position was also unclear. He was
probably awaiting the result of the elections before deciding
which course to pursue. Despite his unpredictablity, he was
the only figure capable of serving as a unifying Head of
State. National reconciliation was important. Elections
alone would not help Cambodia solve its problems. However, Cambodia had not enjoyed a peaceful recent history. Even in
the 1960s there had been conflict and considerable opposition
to Sihanouk's rule. It was likely that the international
community would need to continue to be involved in Cambodia
after the elections. This was best done through the Core
Group in Phnom Penh rather than reconvening the Paris
Conference. The UN would be judged by its performance in
Cambodia. If UNTAC was seen to be a failure this would
damage the UN's image.
DK801
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