9.
AMERI
DIRECTOR GENERAL KIM WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. HE THOUGHT THAT ONCE THE NEW PRESIDENTIAL TEAM WAS IN PLACE, THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDEVELOP LIS.
RUSSIA 10.
DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI, RESPONSIBLE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, EMPHASISED KOREA'S CONTINUING UNCERTAIN RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA. THE YELTSIN VISIT HAD BEEN BOTH A SUCCESS AND A DISAPPOINTMENT. THE PROCESS OF RELAXING PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND SUSPICIONS OF RUSSIA HAD BEEN SET BACK FOLLOWING THE VISIT, BY THE DISCOVERY THAT THE KAL FLIGHT BLACKBOX HAD NOT CONTAINED THE MATERIAL WHICH THE KOREANS HAD EXPECTED. THAT HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MISTAKE BY THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES. THE ROK CONTINUED, HOWEVER, TO BE HOPEFUL THAT THEIR NEW TIES WITH RUSSIA WOULD PRODUCE A RELAXATION IN TENSION ON THE PENINSULA. DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI REFERRED TO THE CURRENT VISIT OF A RUSSIAN VICE MINISTER TO PYONGYANG. THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO REGAIN THEIR POLITICAL LEVERAGE THERE AND THE ROK SAW EVERY ADVANTAGE IN RUSSIA HAVING AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA.
BILATERAL AND EC LINKS
11. DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI THOUGHT THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDES OF THE BRITISH PRESS, NOVEMBER'S ROYAL VISIT HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN ENHANCING BRITAIN'S STATUS IN KOREA. THE KOREAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AND IMPRESSED BY THE DIVERSITY OF TRHS' PARTICULAR INTERESTS.
12.
THE ONE BILATERAL ISSUE WHICH YOU AND I HAD BOTH EXPECTED TO ARISE HAD BEEN THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW OUR HONOUR GUARD. BUT SURPRISINGLY THIS NEVER CAME UP THROUGHOUT YOUR ENTIRE VISIT. IN . PARTICULAR, THERE WAS EVERY OPPORTUNITY FOR DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI TO RAISE IT DURING THE DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH ABOUT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
13. WE AND DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI HAD A MUTUAL SELF-CONGRATULATION SESSION OVER THE WILLINGNESS OF PRESIDENT-ELECT KIM YOUNG-SAM TO ACCEPT A CALL ON HIM BY THE TROIKA. YOU AND I EMPHASISED THE VALUE TO THE KOREANS OF OPERATING MORE FREQUENTLY WITH THE TROIKA. IT WAS, HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT THAT DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI MENTIONED THE VISIT LAST AUTUMN TO PYONGYANG OF THE ITALIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR, PINÍ, AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN CHINA. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE KOREANS CONTINUE TO BE PUZZLED BY THAT VISIT AND SEE IT AS A BREACH IN THE ESTABLISHED POSITION WHICH THE EC HAD BEEN TAKING OVER CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA. YOU AND I BOTH AGREED WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL CHOI THAT THERE HAD BEEN A RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID THAT IN THE
FUTURE.
VISITS
14. ON THE FCO SIDE, YOU AND I AGREED THAT IF IT WOULD BE WELCOME IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ABLE TO INCLUDE KOREA IN HIS EARLY-APRIL VISIT PROGRAMME. YOU MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PUS COMING HERE IN THE AUTUMN . THAT TOO WOULD BE WELCOME. THE QUESTION AROSE OF A POSSIBLE DATE FOR A VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE. MY VIEW IS, AS I TOLD YOU, IF WE HAD THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN APRIL AND THE PUS IN SEPTEMBER, THE RIGHT TIME FOR THE MINISTER OF STATE TO COME BACK HERE WOULD BE IN SPRING 1994.
WRIGHT
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