TNAG-2910-FCO40-4185-International-support-from-Asia-regarding-the-future-of-Hong-1993 — Page 51

RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE NORTH. HE HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE PRESS.

5. AMBASSADOR GONG, AMBASSADOR GREGG AND ASSISTANT MINISTER KOO IN THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ROK TRYING TO FIND A WAY ROUND THE NUCLEAR INSPECTION ROAD-BLOCK. THEY ALL SAW THE CRUCIAL CARD AS BEING PROGRESS TOWARDS NORMALISATION OF NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS WITH EITHER THE US OR JAPAN, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF WHAT THE LATTER WOULD MEAN FOR ACCESS TO JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. PYONGYANG MIGHT BE PREPARED TO TRADE OFF PROGRESS ON THIS FRONT FOR PROGRESS OVER NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS.

6.

THIS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ISSUE LED ALL YOUR INTERLOCUTEURS INTO THE QUESTION OF NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORM. AMBASSADOR GONG · WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT KIM JONG-IL WAS BACKING REFORM-MINDED TECHNOCRATS IN THE NORTH. HE MENTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF HARD-LINERS TO LESS CENTRAL POSTS AND THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES BEING GIVEN TO KIM YONG-SUN AND KIM DAL-HYUN. THE CHINESE BELIEVED

THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE NOW LOOKING FOR WAYS OF FOLLOWING THE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT PATH. THEY HAD DESPATCHED RESEARCH TEAMS TO SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG WERE LOOKING AT THE IDEA OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES. ASSISTANT MINISTER KOO MADE A GREAT DEAL OF THE NEED FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS REUNIFICATION TO FOLLOW THE COMMONWEALTH MODEL. GERMAN-STYLE REUNIFICATION WAS NOT WHAT THE SOUTH WANTED. THE TWO HALVES OF THE PENINSULA HAD GROWN APART PSYCHOLOGICALLY DURING THEIR 40 YEARS OF DIVISION. THERE NEEDED TO BE A SLOW PROCESS OF EVOLUTION ON THE PART OF TWO STATES WITHIN ONE COMMONWEALTH. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT SORT OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WOULD PROVIDE THE NORTH WITH THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REVISING ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND BUSINESS HABITS. AND PROGRESS THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH MECHANISM WOULD PROVIDE THE SECURE ECONOMIC BASE WHICH THE PENINSULA NEEDED TO TACKLE IN UNITED FASHION THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY.

REGIONAL SECURITY

7.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN NORTH-EAST ASIA WAS WIDELY EMPHASISED. THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE US ACTING AS HONEST-BROKER. JAPAN HAD YET TO SECURE SUFFICIENT RESPECT FROM OTHER REGIONAL POWERS FOR IT TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE. AMBASSADOR GONG THOUGHT THAT THE CHINESE PRIVATELY ACCEPTED_THE US'S HONEST-BROKER ROLE. BUT OF COURSE THEY WOULD NEVER REFER TO IT PUBLICLY. HE DESCRIBED ANY PROGRESS IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA AS 'A NIGHTMARE' FOR THE ROK. HE REFERRED BACK TO THE PATTERN OF REGIONAL ALLIANCES AND TENSIONS AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY AS JUSTIFYING KOREAN ANXIETIES. IT WOULD STILL TAKE TIME FOR A NEW FORUM FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION TO DEVELOP. ONCE IT HAD, KOREA MIGHT WELL WISH HER OTHER FRIENDS OUTSIDE THE REGION (IE IN EUROPE) TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY MECHANISM. DIRECTOR GENERAL KIM OF THE ASIAN BUREAU THOUGHT THAT KOREA WAS MAKING PROGRESS IN IMPROVING HER RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. BUT THE ONUS WAS STILL ON JAPAN TO MAKE THE NECESSARY GESTURES TOWARDS KOREA.

CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN

8. YOU GAVE THE ASIAN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR POSITION OVER HONG KONG. YOU STRESSED OUR HOPE THAT WE COULD EXPECT THE ROK, AS A PARTNER, TO EMPHASISE TO THE CHINESE THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT OVER OUR HONG KONG PROPOSALS. DIRECTOR GENERAL KIM REFERRED TO THE CHINESE BELIEF THAT THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR HONG KONG WERE PART OF A REGIONAL US PLOT. THIS REFLECTED CHINESE ANXIETIES ABOUT THEIR SECURITY POSITION AND THE THREAT THAT THEY FELT FROM THE US. DIRECTOR GENERAL KIM SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT CHINESE POSITION.