TNAG-2794-FCO40-4034-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Taiwan-1993 — Page 178

CODE RAD

Miss Painting FED

02015

Reference.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

18. 1993

REGISTRY

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

PA

Action Taken

TAIWAN DIPLOMAT STUDYING AT OXFORD

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HU/TAIWAN

1. I took Mr Huang out to lunch as requested. He speaks excellent English. We talked mainly about Taiwan, its internal politics and international relations. He is now a First Secretary and clearly well plugged into the Taiwanese bureaucracy, claiming to have good relations with colleagues in the Prime Minister's office especially dating from his time in the Government Information Office. It was perhaps a bit disappointing for him as he did not learn a great deal about the workings of the FCO, but he seemed more than happy to carry on about Taiwan and no doubt to win over another friend of the Chinese people.

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2. He sees the next four years as crucial time for Taiwan. will show whether the DPP has the maturity necessary for involvement in government. He is afraid that they are still too much attached to the independence issue. Taiwan has real interests in a better relationship with the mainland, especially in economic terms. The mainland has many opportunities in terms of investment and markets, and Taiwan as a sort of "stockholder" enjoys preferential treatment. It is this kind of economic argument that makes him a believer in reunification. If Taiwan rejects reunification, it relinquishes the preferential treatment it enjoys at the moment in commercial dealings with the mainland and Taiwan needs the investment and market opportunities the mainland provides. He was open minded about whether the Chinese would actually follow up their threat to use force if Taiwan went along the route towards independence. But he said that it was a real possibility, and a risk that a responsible politician should not run. Relations with the mainland were going pretty well at the moment. there were many informal contacts. Investment was no over $8 billion according to latest Taiwan official figures and was probably much more than that. he did not seem particularly put out by the difficulties the Taiwan unofficial liaison body has been experiencing in negotiating with the Chinese.

3. We talked a little about Hong Kong. He was interested in why the British should have chosen this moment to launch political reforms, but did not try to be argumentative about it. He said that his contacts with mainland officials and others in Oxford had shown him that China was very much attached to the international conspiracy theory (it had also shown him that there was a considerable difference in their mind set, despite the fact that he got on well with many of them he found their ideological bent very trying). They saw Mr Patten's appointment, as part of wider plot by the United States and Britain to do china down. It was the Chinese way of doing things (not just the Chinese Communists) to see plots in everything. His prescription for the way out of the present impasse was to send a secret messenger to China who could make contact with the people right at the top (ie Deng Xiaoping) and sort it out at that level in an informal way. This would be the Chinese way and would preserve face.