TNAG-2794-FCO40-4034-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Taiwan-1993 — Page 130

CONFIDENTIAL

seable Equipment

In order to be consistent with our position, we should:

(a)

Refuse the direct export of defence-related equipment, including parts, and technology destined for the Taiwan armed forces if its acquisition would enhance their capability.

(b) Refuse the indirect export of defence-related equipment,

third countries.

eg via

(c)

Permit the export to third countries of the following

categories even i f it is clear that the equipment is to be subsequently ex ported to Taiwan:

technology for manufacture-under-licence of defence-related equipment;

parts of defence-related equipment, provided these do not constitute the majority share of the final equipment.

In either case permission for such exports would depend on the following provisos: -

that the UK firm would give undertakings to avoid publicity about its part in the eventual business with Taiwan;

that the arrangement with the third country licensee or

manufacturer was part of a wider commercial deal and not

Taiwan-specific.

(d)

Permit the direct export of dual purpose defence equipment and technology, where the end user is civilian eg: coastguard or police.

(e) Permit subject to our existing global criteria the direct

export of internal security equipment destined for the civil

authorities in Taiwan.

HD 2AHO

CONFIDENTIAL