CONFIDENTIAL
seable Equipment
In order to be consistent with our position, we should:
(a)
Refuse the direct export of defence-related equipment, including parts, and technology destined for the Taiwan armed forces if its acquisition would enhance their capability.
(b) Refuse the indirect export of defence-related equipment,
third countries.
eg via
(c)
Permit the export to third countries of the following
categories even i f it is clear that the equipment is to be subsequently ex ported to Taiwan:
technology for manufacture-under-licence of defence-related equipment;
parts of defence-related equipment, provided these do not constitute the majority share of the final equipment.
In either case permission for such exports would depend on the following provisos: -
that the UK firm would give undertakings to avoid publicity about its part in the eventual business with Taiwan;
that the arrangement with the third country licensee or
manufacturer was part of a wider commercial deal and not
Taiwan-specific.
(d)
Permit the direct export of dual purpose defence equipment and technology, where the end user is civilian eg: coastguard or police.
(e) Permit subject to our existing global criteria the direct
export of internal security equipment destined for the civil
authorities in Taiwan.
HD 2AHO
CONFIDENTIAL