TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 73

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or begin hejco, and

debatrin

lean th the Chinese

Kwalls away fr.

The Fab4,

conception of the 1995 elections and the through

train, whereby they would be able to control the

outcome at least in a proportion of the seats and

throw people like Martin Lee off in 1997. There is

also a serious problem of timetables: the Chinese

will seek to string us out for as long as possible,

and would try to prevent us introducing the legislation during that time (see para 13). They

would probably resist giving any additional

assurances, eg that all LegCo members could ride the through train; and that China would agree to full direct elections in Hong Kong as soon as the BL allows (2007). We would therefore face a dilemma, probably in late May: either proceed with talks,

allow the LegCo timetable to slip until the autumn

and possibly decouple the arrangements for the 1994

District Board elections from the 1995 LegCo elections; or precipitate a breakdown, and dash the expectations which would have built up in Hong Kong while talks were taking place.

(iii) The advantages of passing the initiative to LegCo

are that debate could begin more quickly, with a

better prospect of laws reaching the statute book by

the summer, in plenty of time for the 1994/95

elections. The Governor's proposals would be put to LegCo without change; there would be no scope for media or Parliamentary criticism of U-turns; and decisions on whether any amendment was necessary to the Governor's proposals to meet Chinese concern

would be made by LegCo members, not in Sino-British

talks. This might be easier for the liberals in

LegCo to accept.

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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