SECRET
or begin hejco, and
debatrin
lean th the Chinese
Kwalls away fr.
The Fab4,
conception of the 1995 elections and the through
train, whereby they would be able to control the
outcome at least in a proportion of the seats and
throw people like Martin Lee off in 1997. There is
also a serious problem of timetables: the Chinese
will seek to string us out for as long as possible,
and would try to prevent us introducing the legislation during that time (see para 13). They
would probably resist giving any additional
assurances, eg that all LegCo members could ride the through train; and that China would agree to full direct elections in Hong Kong as soon as the BL allows (2007). We would therefore face a dilemma, probably in late May: either proceed with talks,
allow the LegCo timetable to slip until the autumn
and possibly decouple the arrangements for the 1994
District Board elections from the 1995 LegCo elections; or precipitate a breakdown, and dash the expectations which would have built up in Hong Kong while talks were taking place.
(iii) The advantages of passing the initiative to LegCo
are that debate could begin more quickly, with a
better prospect of laws reaching the statute book by
the summer, in plenty of time for the 1994/95
elections. The Governor's proposals would be put to LegCo without change; there would be no scope for media or Parliamentary criticism of U-turns; and decisions on whether any amendment was necessary to the Governor's proposals to meet Chinese concern
would be made by LegCo members, not in Sino-British
talks. This might be easier for the liberals in
LegCo to accept.
HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
SECRET