TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 140

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would also be under sustained pressure from British

business who would be alarmed at missing out on one of the

few major growing markets in the world.

Conclusions: How can we mitigate the Chinese reactions?

11.

There is a point on the scale of electoral measures

below which we cannot go beyond if we are to hold elections

which are open, fair and acceptable to the people of Hong

Kong. The precise point will only emerge in the light of the debate in LegCo. But it is almost certainly above anything acceptable to the Chinese. There is therefore a fine judgement as to whether no talks with China would be

better than breaking off unsuccessful talks.

This paper

concludes that it will be better to hold talks, if only to

gain time. But whether or not we do so,) we are almost

certain to face the requirement to constrain Chinese

reactions to an outcome they cannot accept, and to maintain

the governability of Hong Kong in the absence of full cooperation from China. We recommend the following

measures:

wit

give the Chinese side opportunities to influence

the eventual shape of the legislation. Talks

are the obvious option. But once the debate starts, we should discreetly encourage some

members of LegCo to sound out the Chinese on

their own channels before putting forward

amendments.

Al. tist credi Wild Llama

h

If

+ malbend

candy?

Keep open official channels to the Chinese. talks take place, they will achieve that while they last. But there will be a need to engage

the Chinese as well on other areas: we should

try to resume meetings of the JLG and the Airport

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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