TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 139

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given a higher and діє membe

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issues as the airport, and contracts and franchises. And they would have to decide

whether to boycott/disrupt the 1995 elections, or encourage their allies to participate.

They could opt for a policy of wider non-cooperation. Within that broad approach

there would be considerable scope for

calibration, on a spectrum from passive

resistance (no answer to our request for agreement on specific matters in the JLG, no agreement on airport financing, or land disposals above the 50 hectares a year laid down in the

JLG) to active harassment (not accepting return

of illegal immigrants, a blind eye to

cross-border criminal activity, harassment of shipping etc). This would probably be combined with efforts to polarise the Civil Service, and

undermine the authority of HKG, eg requiring

those seeking contracts and franchises to

negotiate with Peking (or possibly the preparatory apparatus for the post-1997 Hong Kong, which would no doubt) mushroom). Even in these circumstances, China would probably

maintain contact over financial issues, and

others where it was clearly in their interest to

do so.

The Chinese would step up the pressure on HMG though retaliation against British business

in China.

10.

On the evidence so far, the third option at present

looks the most likely. The prospect is for a difficult four years, with HKG facing a series of decisions as to how far it can proceed on specific issues in the absence of Chinese agreement (the airport saga is a foretaste).

HMG

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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