TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 135

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET

Statements by Chinese leaders indicate that they are still

willing to have talks with us (although there is no sign of a change in their position on substance), and that introduction

of the draft legislation into LegCo is the step which would

make talks impossible. But they are unlikely to take the

initiative to resume official contact. There is therefore a

(narrow) window for us to make a renewed effort to resolve

the issue of Hong Kong Government representation and get

talks underway. Once LegCo resumes after the Easter recess, pressure from the liberals for the legislation to be introduced is likely to grow unless agreement on talks has

been reached by then.

7. The arguments pro and con the two options are finely

balanced:

(i)

The advantages of holding talks are as follows:

If we could reach with China an understanding on

electoral issues, that would ensure continuity for

LegCo through 1997, and restore cooperation on other Hong Kong issues. Even if we did not reach an understanding, the Chinese side would have been seen to influence the process. That might

moderate their reaction to the eventual legislation passed by LegCo, particularly if this had been amended in ways they liked during its

passage. Holding talks on these issues might

itself be enough to unblock other work over Hong Kong, eg technical issues in the JLG, and would probably stave off any Chinese plans to retaliate against British commercial interests. The community in Hong Kong are in favour of trying the

talks option.

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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