TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 134

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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How important to us is the LegCo "through train"? would avoid disruption in 1997 and pre-empt a Chinese-run election that year on terms which we could

not influence. But is this continuity worth a significant watering down of the Governor's proposals?

Could we accept that any members of LegCo should be

removed in 1997 on the basis of a judgement that they

did not uphold the Basic Law, even if most members of the "through train" remained on board?

How can we best preserve Hong Kong's autonomy after 1997: by building up strong political institutions before 1997, or making the compromises necessary to secure Chinese agreement that the structures in place

in 1997 will continue?

How far should we go to satisfy the community's evident desire for a cooperative relationship with China and certainty beyond 1997?

4. By their nature, these questions do not lend themselves

to black and white answers. But the shade of grey we are

seeking will influence shorter term judgements.

How Can We Achieve Our Objectives?

5.

We now face a choice between talks with China in an

effort to narrow differences, or passing the ball to LegCo and leaving it to LegCo members to decide whether to make

having

Asemally amendments, and' to clear these (with China.

6.

Hong Kong opinion seems to be firmly in favour of talks

between Britain and China (no doubt because the general

expectation is that they will resolve the present dispute).

Hongkongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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