TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 111

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would also be under sustained pressure from British

business who would be alarmed at missing out on one of the

few major growing markets in the world.

Conclusions: How can we mitigate the Chinese reactions?

12.

There is a point on the scale of electoral measures

below which we cannot go if we are to hold elections which

are open, fair and acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. The precise point will only emerge in the light of the debate in LegCo. But it is almost certainly above anything

acceptable to the Chinese. Whether or not talks take

place, we are almost certain to face the requirement to

constrain Chinese reactions to an outcome they cannot

accept, and to maintain the governability of Hong Kong in

the absence of full cooperation from China. We recommend

the following measures:

give the Chinese side opportunities to influence

the eventual shape of the legislation. Talks

before introduction to LegCo would provide such

an opportunity (although views differ on the

value of this if talks broke down). But once the

debate in LegCo starts (either because talks do

not take place, or because they are broken off),

we should discreetly encourage some members of

LegCo to sound out the Chinese on their own

channels before putting forward amendments.

should then try to arrange a further official

contact with China before enactment.

We

-

Keep open our channels to the Chinese. If talks

take place, they will achieve that while they

last. But there will be a need to engage the

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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