TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 107

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(iv)

8.

Against that, the disadvantages of the LegCo-only

option are as follows. We and HKG would no longer

have much control over the Bill. The Chinese side

would be predisposed to react harshly to the outcome, since they would have had no role in the

process, unless the Bill was heavily amended by their allies in LegCo. The fact of introduction of

the legislation into LegCo without prior discussion with China could well be the trigger for China to decide on a parting of the ways, and to develop

separate arrangements to come into force in 1997 for

the legislature. China could continue to withhold

cooperation in the JLG, the Airport Committee and extend this to other areas (eg the Land Commission)

although there are constraints on them, discussed further in para 11. LegCo (which is deeply split on the issue) might prove incapable of building majority support for amended proposals which were still fair and open, and yet moved in China's

direction.

If LegCo became paralysed, they might

put the Bill on hold and ask the Governor to hold

talks with the Chinese. That would send us into

talks with a very weak hand.

There are two views on where the balance of advantage lies. One school holds that talks are worth pursuing, because (i) the alternative is a definitive parting of the ways with China and non-cooperation for the next four

years; (ii) talks with China would give the Chinese a role in the process and might therefore mitigate the reaction to the eventual legislation passed by LegCo, and (iii) the Hong Kong community are clearly in favour of talks.

Another school considers that holding talks is not in our interest because (i) the prospect of a satisfactory

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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