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(iv)
8.
Against that, the disadvantages of the LegCo-only
option are as follows. We and HKG would no longer
have much control over the Bill. The Chinese side
would be predisposed to react harshly to the outcome, since they would have had no role in the
process, unless the Bill was heavily amended by their allies in LegCo. The fact of introduction of
the legislation into LegCo without prior discussion with China could well be the trigger for China to decide on a parting of the ways, and to develop
separate arrangements to come into force in 1997 for
the legislature. China could continue to withhold
cooperation in the JLG, the Airport Committee and extend this to other areas (eg the Land Commission)
although there are constraints on them, discussed further in para 11. LegCo (which is deeply split on the issue) might prove incapable of building majority support for amended proposals which were still fair and open, and yet moved in China's
direction.
If LegCo became paralysed, they might
put the Bill on hold and ask the Governor to hold
talks with the Chinese. That would send us into
talks with a very weak hand.
There are two views on where the balance of advantage lies. One school holds that talks are worth pursuing, because (i) the alternative is a definitive parting of the ways with China and non-cooperation for the next four
years; (ii) talks with China would give the Chinese a role in the process and might therefore mitigate the reaction to the eventual legislation passed by LegCo, and (iii) the Hong Kong community are clearly in favour of talks.
Another school considers that holding talks is not in our interest because (i) the prospect of a satisfactory
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