TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 105

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Once LegCo resumes after the Easter recess, pressure from the

liberals for the legislation to be introduced is likely to

grow unless agreement on talks has been reached by then.

7. The arguments pro and con the two options of talks,

or leaving the initiative to LegCo, are finely balanced:

(i)

(ii)

The advantages of holding talks are as follows.

The community in Hong Kong are in favour of trying

the talks option. If we could reach with China an

understanding covering the 1994/95 elections and

the through train in 1997, this would ensure

continuity for LegCo through 1997, and restore

cooperation on other Hong Kong issues. (If the Chinese were willing to envisage a genuine through train, it would be easier to accept changes to the

Governor's proposals on functional constituencies

and the Election Committee.) For as long as talks

lasted, work on other Hong Kong issues, eg technical issues in the JLG, might resume.

Chinese plans to retaliate against British

commercial interests would probably be shelved. And the fact of talks, even if they were

ultimately unsuccessful, might moderate Chinese reactions to the eventual legislation passed by

LegCo, provided that this was amended by LegCo

members in the direction of Chinese wishes (but

this judgement is open to question: see para 8

below).

The disadvantage of talks is primarily that it is very unlikely that we would be able to reach an

acceptable understanding, given the gulf between arrangements which we could accept, and the Chinese

HongKong issuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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