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How far would China be prepared to take
non-cooperation before 1997? To the point of making
Hong Kong ungovernable?
How important is it to avoid retaliation against
British commercial interests?
4.
By their nature, these questions do not lend themselves
to black and white answers. But the shade of grey we are seeking will influence shorter term judgements.
How Can We Achieve Our Objectives?
5.
Securing a smooth transition will require cooperation with China over a wide range of issues. The question of the 1995 LegCo dominates debate at present, but other issues such
as arrangements for the Civil Service and judiciary will also
be important. On the immediate issue, we now face a choice between talks with China in an effort to narrow differences,
or passing the ball to LegCo and leaving it to LegCo members
to decide whether to make amendments, in the light of their
own informal soundings with China.
6. Hong Kong opinion favours talks (no doubt because the
general expectation is that they will resolve the present
dispute). Statements by Chinese leaders indicate that they
are still willing to have talks with us on their terms
(although there is no sign of a change in their position on
substance), and that introduction of the draft legislation
into LegCo is the step which would make talks impossible.
There is therefore a (narrow) window to get talks underway.
HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
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