TNAG-2707-FCO40-3913-Hong-Kong-political-parties-Cooperative-Resources-Centre-(CR-1993 — Page 21

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They suggested that a similar argument applied to any

process of amending the Governor's proposals. This should not

be left to LegCo. The Executive should decide what amendments to make before putting the proposals to LegCo. Executive would lose all control of the process.

Otherwise the

- Mr Lee emphasised that the Chinese reaction, if the proposals were put to LegCo unamended and without consultation, would be very severe. The pro-China LegCo members (Philip Wong, Tam Yiu-Chung) and David Li might refuse

to take part in the process (ironically, that might ensure

that there were enough votes to pass the functional

constituency proposals unamended).

-

- Mrs Chow said that the recent apparent softening in the

Chinese attitude was a matter of form, not substance.

They asked why we were in such a hurry to table legislation

for 1995 in February 1993. 1994 would be early enough (except

for arrangements relating to the District Boards which were straightforward). In normal circumstances, there would be

merit in getting a controversial issue like this out of the way as soon as possible. But in this case passing legislation

without Chinese agreement would not remove the problem, but

make it worse.

-

They very much hoped (and assumed) we were engaged in

opening channels of communication with China.

They had the impression from business contacts here and in

Hong Kong that British businesses in Hong Kong were not winning contracts and were becoming increasingly concerned

that the present political dispute might affect them adversely.

hm.rick.PR

SLM

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