us and to any British Governor in the tightly constricting
conditions of the late transitional period. To a marked
degree the script had been written and, short of tearing up
the text and
abandoning
Sino-British
cooperation
altogether, there was little that could be done except to
recite it with some personal differences of emphasis. But
this was not a view that found favour.
The Autumn of 1991 saw Sino-British relations,
both over Hong Kong and more generally, once again at a high
point. And, although neither government entertained
illusions, it seemed we should be able to enjoy a smooth
passage in our dealings for some time.
It was an illusory prospect. The Hong Kong
elections of 1991, the first direct elections to the
Legislative Council, summoned into existence new
political parties and returned a strong group of United
Democrats, under Martin Lee. Lee, a slight, intense,
dogmatic, self-absorbed lawyer had acquired a great name as
the advocate of a defiant policy towards China and a rapid
introduction of more directly elected seats on the
legislature, in disregard of the Chinese if need be. Indeed
he saw a positive virtue in defiance, as the only way to win
Chinese respect. It was a policy which had a certain appeal
for those who were not burdened with any responsibility.
The Chinese, for their part, claimed that Lee sought to
overthrow their government and promised his exclusion from
the legislature after 1997. There were rich possibilities
for trouble here.
Hong Kong
also decided
to
assert itself by
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