steps to reassure Hong Kong. And, most important, there was
realisation that in this massive project,
a growing
on
straddling the hand-over, and critically dependent
private finance, and therefore on Chinese endorsement,
they had a powerful lever, with which to assert their claim
to greater control of the territory in the transitional
phase.
The Hong Kong Government held expert talks to
inform and reassure Peking, three rounds
in all. They
certainly informed, but they apparently did not reassure;
and Hong Kong decisions, relating to preliminary work on
the project and coinciding with the first round of talks,
gave the Chinese an opening to denounce publicly unilateral
moves, "insincere attitudes" and inadequate consultation.
It is true that Peking could have been handled
been
sensitively; but it is questionable whether this would have
much affected the outcome. The Chinese used the talks for
propaganda purposes and advanced a series of extravagant
demands as
preconditions
for their
agreement.
more
These
demands were for very considerable sums to be set aside from
the Hong Kong fiscal reserves and for veto powers, not only
on the airport authority, but more widely in the financial
sphere.
Discussion moved to a higher level: the Governor
talked to Lu Ping, now Director of the Hong Kong and Macao
Office, and to Li Peng, the Chinese Premier. A combined
Foreign Office and Hong Kong team of officials under Andrew
Burns, the Foreign Office Assistant Under-Sectretary for
the Far East, underwent two long and punishing rounds of
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