TNAG-2675-FCO40-3872-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 95

GOVERMENT HOUSE HONG KONG.

WED 14 APR 93 09:51

PG.19

:(18 78

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SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENT LEVEL OF GARRISON COSTS AND THE NEED TO SHOW A DECLINING TREND OF THOSE COSTS FROM THE 1993/94 FINANCIAL YEAR IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. WE WILL CERTAINLY UNDERLINE THE NEED TO FACE LEGCO REALITIES IN ANY COMMENT FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THE FCO CAN BE OF MUCH HELP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MOD OVER PAYMENT OF THE 1992/93 DCA COSTS.

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ON THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR COST-SAVINGS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 7 I AM SURE YOU ARE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH MUCH CLOSER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN YOUR OFFICIALS AND MOD OVER GARRISON COSTS. THAT IS ALSO LIKELY TO HELP YOU UNEARTH EXAMPLES OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION SUCH AS THOSE LISTED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 7(B). SIR T DAUNT HAS

IF YOU CAN OFFERED TO TAKE UP SUCH SPECIFIC CASES WITH THE MOD. LET US HAVE ANY FURTHER EXAMPLES WE WILL PURSUE THEM.

8. ON SUPPORT COSTS (YOUR PARA 7 (C)) WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS AT THE MOD THAT THEY ARE OPEN TO A HARD LOOK AT THIS AREA. SUCH INSTALLATIONS AS THE RN HOSPITAL SEEM TO US TO BE WORTHY OF SCRUTINY. UNACCOMPANIED SERVICE RAISES PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES FOR THE MOD GIVEN THE EXTENT OF THEIR PRESENT COMMITMENTS WHICH ARE NECESSARILY UNACCOMPANIED (NORTHERN IRELAND, BOSNIA ETC). THERE ARE SENSITIVITIES IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT EXTENDING THIS BURDEN. I JUDGE THAT THIS IS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD NOT WISH TO PRESS THE DEFENCE SECRETARY.

9. I SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN EXPLORING WITH THE MOD THE POINT IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 7(D) ABOUT DETACHING ONE HONG KONG-BASED BATTALION FOR DUTY OVERSEAS (ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE WHETHER TO USE THE ONLY UK BATTALION IN HONG KONG FOR THAT PURPOSE, OR A GURKHA BATTALION WHICH WOULD PRESUMBLY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEPLOY ELSEWHERE). THIS DOES, HOWEVER, RAISE THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A MORE RAPID

THE MOD'S RUN-DOWN TO A SINGLE, SYMBOLIC BATTALION IN HONG KONG. PRESENT PREMISE IS THAT THE GARRISON SHOULD STAY AT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM MILITARILY VIABLE SIZE (TWO BATTALIONS) UNTIL AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL (IE THE LAST REMAINING GURKHA BATTALION WOULD DISBAND IN THE AUTUMN OF 1996 LEAVING A SINGLE UK BATTALION). AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO REDUCE MUCH MORE QUICKLY TO A SINGLE UK BATTALION AND TRY TO MAKE COMMENSURATE SAVINGS ON SUPPORT. EVEN ON THE MOST OPTIMISTIC TIMETABLE I DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD SHOW MUCH REDUCTION IN COSTS UNTIL 1994/95, BUT MIGHT OFFER A MUCH SHARPER DECLINE FROM THEN. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF QUITE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES: THE PERCEPTION THAT WE WERE SCALING DOWN CUR COMMITMENT TO HONG KONG, THE CHINESE ANGLE, THE DISRUPTION TO MOD'S FORWARD PLANNING ETC. IF YOU DID WANT TO GO DOWN THIS ROUTE, I EXPECT THAT THE ISSUE WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED IN OPD (K). OUR INSTINCT HERE IS THAT IT WILL BE BETTER TO STICK WITH THE PRESENT BROAD SHAPE OF THE RUN-DOWN BUT TO LOOK RIGOROUSLY AT GARRISON SUPPORT COSTS FOR SAVINGS. YOU MIGHT USE YOUR RESPONSE TO MR RIFKIND TO SPELL OUT YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS KEY ISSUE.

HURD

SECRE