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Nonetheless the Germans perceived that the Japan/ US
relationship was more at Germany S expense than to its
advantage; recession in Japan would make relations with
Europe worse rather than better. Herr Schlagintweit said the dominant theory on Japan in Germany was that if there
was a problem it was for the Germans to solve and not the
Japanese. It was a challenge that Germany must take up.
17. Sir J Coles said our perception of Japan was a
little different. We heard little in the UK of a
Japanese threat, largely because Japanese investment had been welcomed, well-judged and in depressed areas. We
were pleased at Our recent success in penetrating the Japanese market, even though a number of problems
remained. Our experience was that if emphasis was placed on the political relationship and commercial difficulties were put further down the agenda, this met with a good
response from the Japanese and they became more inclined
to deal with the commercial difficulties. He said that
the US/Japan relationship was preoccupied with its commercial aspects. It was
a weakness in the Western
world that that relationship should be strained. our Presidency we were going to make a priority of building up EC/ Japan relations, in consultation with our
Partners, this might conceivably demonstrate to the US
how a constructive relationship should be run.
During
18. Herr Schlagintweit said that we should not underestimate the US/ Japan relationship which remained
vital despite Japan-bashing in the US and resistance in
Japan itself. This was particularly so against the background of instability in the region. We had to
realise that while we could involve Japan in our political discussions, we could do nothing for Japan's security. Sir J Coles acknowledged the importance of the
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