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6. How should we respond?
We discussed this briefly at
the Minister's meeting this week. The Governor is concerned
that the group could acquire a status in Hong Kong which
could undercut HKG's authority, and its dialogue with the
Chinese Government. We should clearly do all we can to
avoid this, and our public line needs to be judged
accordingly. But we cannot do very much: one point we can
make is on the absence of consultation. We agreed that the Minister would follow-up Hong Kong's approach to NCNA by raising the point with Ambassador Ma on 10 February (we will
include in the briefing). In addition to the consultation
point, he could also repeat Hong Kong's implicit warning against the group being given any institutionalised form (eg no formal meetings). It would clearly be undesirable for
the group to become a visible "second centre of power" in
Hong Kong. We should be careful not to give the group extra
status by the way in which we deal with them. I therefore
have reservations about a concerted effort to feed British
views to them, eg by circular letters. This could itself
look like a bypassing of the Hong Kong Government, as well
as enhancing the status of the group.
7. I suggest that we see how the group settles down, and
what we learn about their activities and objectives from
other channels. The Central Policy Unit and others in the
HKG as well as UKRep JLG already have contacts with a number
of people on the list, and could be used to ensure that key
members understand HMG/HKG policies. In due course some could perhaps be fed targetted messages to convey, in a way similar to that for the Basic Law Drafting Committee. But there will always be the problem that these people will
not want to be seen in Peking as reflecting British views,
and may therefore not reflect them accurately. The Minister
might discuss how to make imaginative use of some of these "Advisers" when he is in Hong Kong.
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