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CONFIDENTIAL
Background
4. We have now had initial thoughts on the way ahead from
the Governor (his telno 2575) and from Sir R McLaren (his
telnos 1472 and 1500). Sir R McLaren confirms that the
Chinese will see the period ahead in terms of a sharp struggle with the immediate aim of undermining support for
the Governor's proposals in Hong Kong, particularly in LegCo. Looking further ahead, he thinks that if the Governor's
electoral proposals are passed, the Chinese will mount a
campaign against them in Hong Kong. He tentatively suggests considering whether the Governor's proposals could be
modified, without losing their essential character, in ways
which could be presented as meeting the most important
Chinese concerns (para 10 of his telno 1472).
to
5. The Governor wishes to discuss the end-game with
Ministers when he is here in November. But he does not agree
that he should modify his proposals in the way Sir R McLaren
suggests. He sees virtually no chance of bringing the
Chinese to acquiesce in proposals which would win majority support in Hong Kong. He confirms that his aim is to put legislation to LegCo in February.
6.
The Governor's telegram gives some analysis of the likely
level of support in LegCo (a hard core of 27 out of 60
members). But he does not say much about the likely trend of opinion in Hong Kong under pressure of the Chinese propaganda
onslaught, or what points on the end game he wishes to
discuss in London in mid-November.
Arqument
If we are to produce a full assessment for Ministers of
the implications of the present row with the Chinese for our policy to Hong Kong, we need rather more analysis of the
7.
condev.BRIEF.bern
CONFIDENTIAL
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