CONFIDENTIAL
(c) whether to make a bid for discussion in Cabinet Committee before Mr Patten leaves for Hong Kong.
find.
an
excuse t sick b
justify
viniging
SUBSTANCE
3.
Manive
Before addressing specific points, it would be useful to have a Ministerial steer on the roles of priority of the Government's different objectives in making arrangements for
HMOCS:
"giving wifeet to a
phoy and practici
(a) fulfilling a long-standing obligation of successive Governments, which has quen rise & reasonable expectations
(b) avoiding a political storm about any apparent rendging
it
Commitm
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on such a commitment;
(c) inducing HMOCS members to stay in Hong Kong at least
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until 30 June 1997, and maintaining their morale,loyalty and * sense of commitment until that date;
(d) inducing HMOCS members to stay for a shorter or longer period after 30 June 1997, with good morale and sense of commitment, in order to contribute to a smooth transition; (e) winning Chinese goodwill and cooperation on other civil service issues relevant to a smooth transition;
(f) minimizing the risk that the chinese will renage on their
in osfeer of
; (g) ensuring that HMG are in the best possible position to respond if the Chinese do renage on the JD commitments, eg: possibility of transferring funds from HKD to HMG to meet HMOCS pensions commitments if Chinese announce their intentions before 1997;
Joint Declaration commitments to the civil service
- ability to draw clear lines between HMOCS and other civil
only Hnoss servants, with HMG taking responsibility for the former; (h) avoidance of HMOCS arrangements' damaging morale etc among local civil servants.
4. On sterling safeguards there is not much point in looking further at the details of our proposal (a trigger level for HMG intervention of HK $16 £1) until Treasury Ministers or Cabinet endorse the principle. Nor will the
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