TNAG-2346-FCO40-3415-Political-relations-between-Hong-Kong--Japan-and-China-1991 — Page 88

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the department for Enterprise

5. The following is a summary of the more striking points made:

Defence

(a) The Gulf. The Japanese feel let down in the wake of the

Gulf War. Having contributed US$13 billion to the war effort they see Saddam Hussein still in power and are criticised for "cheque book diplomacy". The Japanese contribution was raised (appropriately) by a fuel tax; the Japanese public therefore felt the burden in immediate terms and are conscious of the US administration's reluctance to tax their motorists;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

The Japanese are also concerned at the lack of consultation by the US. Mr Baker never bothered to visit Japan, the main paymaster;

Kakizawa, Director of the National Defence Division of the LDP, said he was seeking a more active role for Japan in UN Peace Keeping and in refugee protection. He would like to see Japanese forces participating in a US Peace Keeping operation on Cambodia. However the Japanese public's reluctance would have to be overcome as well as ASEAN sensitivities respected;

The Japanese showed interest in Mr Cooper's (Head of Planning Staff, FCO) suggestion that Europe and the Japanese might share military satellite intelligence as a way of making the US more ready to share information;

There was also discussion of the possibility of associating the Japanese, Indonesian and Thai forces with Five Power Defence Arrangement exercises involving Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Hong Kong/China

6. The Japanese were keen to know how they could help to support Hong Kong, particularly after 1997. They saw it as immensely valuable to the region as a whole and were clearly disturbed at the prospect of the transfer of sovereignty to China. We urged that they continue to bring home to the Chinese the strength of Japanese feelings. We agreed that, should China violate the Joint Declaration after 1997, Japan, Britain and other interested Western countries should consult and jointly make clear to the Chinese the cost to them of misconduct over Hong Kong.

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