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3.
I gave a detailed exposition on Hong Kong ́s
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the British position on all these points. On (i) above I said that if the US were not prepared to take our word for it, we could no doubt produce a piece of paper from the JLG that would show Chinese concurrence. Alternatively, we might deal with the question in the document we were discussing with the Chinese side which would give effect to our intention that multilateral treaties would continue in force after 1997. Neither of these suggestions satisfied my interlocutors; they thought that something direct from the Chinese would be necessary.
4.
On (ii) above, I said that, given the terms of the UK entrustment, Hong Kong's autonomy in the relevant subject-matter and the attitude we had so far encountered from other partners, the answer was that there would be no "left-overs" for the UK before 1997 or the PRC after 1997. The Americans were inclined to take a rather more "classical" view of international treaty law and I was not able, at this stage at least, entirely to convince them. warned them that any question of there being residual rights for the PRC after 1997 could have, depending on the context, serious consequences for the SAR.
I
5.
On (iii) above, I explained the deal we had struck with the Chinese side on the right to instruct in cases which would substantially affect the PRC'S responsibilities for external affairs and defence. State's lawyers took the view that the concept was very wide and general and that, if they were to get an extradition treaty through the Senate, they would need a good deal more "specificity" (as they put it). I replied that there would be real problems about being more specific and that they must realise that what we were really talking about was national security and defence type matters.
6.
On (iv), I re-iterated what we had already said at length to the Americans at the last round of extradition negotiations in Hong Kong in October. They said that they had real problems on this and would need much more detail.
7.
I then asked the Americans what they wanted to do about all this. Should we continue our negotiations with them on extradition and IPPA, so that all other problems could be solved and then, just before initialling, turn to the more general matters they had now raised? They replied that they did not see much point in continuing negotiations until we had thought through and solved together these problems. I expressed disappointment but said that, if that was really their view. we should get on and deal with the questions as soon as possible. It was left that State would wilts bu
setting out their requests and questions and seeking our views as to how they might best be tackled. I left them in no doubt that they had raised some
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