consult as to what to do about our forces in Turkey after the election. There might well be a case for keeping the ceiling but scaling them down in practice. That would leave us free to reinforce if we had to. But it might be more acceptable to the Turks than carrying on at our present level. The Iraqis had noted the increase in reconnaissance following the build-up of their forces around Suleimaniyeh and had taken the message clearly during the recent upsurge of apprehension as to their intentions following their military build-up. But we also had to send a signal to the Kurds that we would not be around forever. We had to decide what to do reasonably soon, and consult the French as well.
1.
Mr Clarke remarked that the Iraqi regime was fragile. The WMD issue remained serious. Sir D Gillmore said that the Saudis ought surely to be conscious of the continuing danger to them from Iraq, which would be exacerbated if they asked us to remove our forces. Mr Clarke said that it was indeed sobering to realise how little we in fact knew. The IAEA would be changing their approach. Blix was aware of their shortcomings. He hoped that a way forward on South Africa might be possible through a proposed ban on the production of fissile materials. The 12 - 15 bombs the South Arricans nad should be found before they could be seen as members in good standing of the NPT. Shamir was very suspicious of American proposals for a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone.
8.
Sir D Gillmore said he had been struck by what Mr Solomon had to say about the North Koreans having a nuclear reprocessing ability within nine months. Mr Clarke said he thought nine months was an exaggeration and that two years was nearer the mark. If the South were prepared to renounce nuclear weapons but the North stalled on the question that would be an indicator of their intention to pursue a weapons programme. The Americans intended to take their weapons out of the South. If the North then built up a nuclear capability the south would respond. The Japanese had warned more than once that in those circumstances they too would have to take similar action. The Chinese should be asked to exert pressure on the North Koreans. He alα not think the latter coula be in any qouot as to the American position. II Japan went nuclear that would change the basis of the US/Japanese relationship. Matters could get out of hand.
The
Sir D Gillmore raised the question of the Ukraine. ambition to create an army larger than that of Germany for example could complicate the CFE ratification process. Sir D Gillmore said that the Ukraine appeared to have played its nand, from its narrow perspective, well. His personal hunch was that the Ukrainian first objective was to achieve full independence including all the trimmings such as a separate currency. Once they had the symbols there might be some possibility of negotiating more effectively with the other Republics. But the bargaining process, which might include bargaining over nuclear weapons, would be full of hazards. He noted reports that earlier drafts of the Yeltsin speech of 28 October had included a claim on behalf of the Russian republic to nave a say in the fortunes of Kussians outside its poraer.
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