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this part of their discussion on a negative note. He repeated that we would work for agreement if humanly possible.
4.
Mr Clarke said that the Administration had felt compelled to work on the President's nuclear initiative in great secrecy and in haste because of the way the Soviet situation was evolving. They wished it could have been otherwise and were sorry for the minimal consultation. But they thought that they had in fact managed to catch the tide of events. Sir D Gillmore said that as Mr Clarke would know we were very much behind the spirit of the President's initiative. We had some queries on particular areas, including missile material. Mr Clarke said that, in effect, the Americans had decided not to take a position on this matter. There was no question but that there would be plenty of material for British needs. Mr Rope (Pol/Mil Bureau) and Mr Walpole (same Bureau) referred to the central location of air delivered nuclear weapons as being another problem which had to be set to one side, and to nuclear testing as an area where US policy had to remain both clear and unchanged. Mr Clarke asked about SRAM. Sir D Gillmore said we were grateful for what Mr Cheney had said. Mr Clarke said that Americans needed to find out more about French intentions, especially when it came to range. If it came to a joint programme it would be necessary to get the French range down. It was not clear that a missile was needed which would go over START limits. But there was time for the dust to settle before decisions needed to be taken.
5. Sir D Gillmore raised NCND. Mr Clarke said that the State Department's proposal was that once nuclear weapons had been taken off ships the Americans should move from NCND to quoting the President's assurance that nuclear weapons would not normally be carried on US ships. The Navy on the other hand were keen to go further. They did not like having to carry nuclear weapons.
The Americans would consult with the British before taking a decision. They had not changed their approach to New Zealand. The New Zealanders had to change their law. It was not just a matter of weapons. The New Zealanders also objected to nuclear powered widge
6.
Mr Clarke said he had just returned from the Middle East. There were a number of points he wanted to make about Iraq. UNSCOM 16 would have been the occasion for the Americans to do "the right thing" had the Iraqis held the UN team on the tarmac for much longer. There was a current problem with Bahrain. He thought the Bahrainis would come round in the end but they had now almost said to the Americans that the Kar would not be allowed to operate iгom there if the Americans ala not provide patriots. не пад peen disturbed, too, by a strong feeling current in Saudi Arabia that all US military personnel and war planes should be removed. of the reporting on this came from the US Ambassador in Riyadh, who was not always reliable. Nonetheless there were those that were saying that the Americans nad promised to leave Saudi Arabia once the Gulf War was over, but were still there. We also needed to
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